


MW 1912

Retina

(1)



1. 'Machine theory': independent, ^(isolated) conduction of impulses to the brain. Specifically stated by Helmholtz, Wundt (among others).
2. MW & phenomenology: a single ~~line of~~ luminous line seen moving to & fro. This percept to be accepted at face value without ~~any~~ prejudice. I. e., there is no substratum of sensations underlying the percept.
3. But a proponent of the 'machine theory' would ~~also~~ deny # 2, i. e., he would say there is a substratum of sensations.
4. MW undertakes experiments to falsify # 3.


Reminder: the 'machine theory' in this instance exemplifies the constancy hypothesis.

see Portore, 1971, 283 ff.


MW 1912.

②

Consider an empiristic explanation of the kind that supposes the learning of displacement of an object from one position to another. I.e., an object moving in space determines the idea the one and same object is translocated. Presumably this sort of learning is then transferred to MW's experimental situation.



Thus in
MW's experimental
situation:




The 'empiristic' explanation implies:

- i) the perceiver has two distinct sensations
- ii) the perceiver undertakes an inference, namely, that for the same object ($A \equiv B$) to appear in two successive locations, the object ^(retaining its continuity) must move ~~more~~ from one point to the other. This conclusion then determines the ~~perceived~~ phenomenological event of a single line moving in space.

MW 1912

(3)



MW:

A

B



$A \neq B$

But movement is still perceived
despite nonidentity of objects $A \neq B$.

MW against segment explanation.

B A B



Handwritten notes at the top of the page, including "11-12" and "A/A".

GALLI



Krolik experiment.

EDITOR ~~REDA~~

