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Chiang Kai-shek and His Time

New Historical and Historiographical Perspectives

edited by
Laura De Giorgi and Guido Samarani

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

Chiang Kai-shek and His Time

Sinica venetiana

Collana diretta da
Tiziana Lippiello, Chen Yuehong 陈跃红

4

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Sinica venetiana

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Foreword

Laura De Giorgi, Guido Samarani
(Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Italy)

The essays collected in this book were originally presented at the international workshop *Chiang Kai-shek and His Time. New Historical and Hiss toriographical Perspectives*, held at the Department of Asian and African Studies of Ca' Foscari University of Venice on October 18th, 2013. The workshop was jointly funded by the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of China at Taiwan (Taiwan Spotlight Project) and Ca' Foscari University. It gathered scholars from Europe, Mainland China, Taiwan and Japan, and the scope was to offer an opportunity for debate and reflection among historians of different scholarly and intellectual backgrounds on one of the most important protagonists of twentieth century history.

It is true that there are quite a number of studies of Chiang Kai-shek as one of the most controversial and elusive figures of Chinese contemporary history (for an introduction to historiography on Chiang see Taylor 2015). Nevertheless, for a long time this field of study was more or less frozen by political and ideological prejudice (Taylor, Huang 2012). Cold War alignments affected historical judgement of Chiang and his contribution. In mainland China and in Taiwan he had been considered as either the worst of villains or the anti-Communist patriotic champion, since along both sides of the Taiwan Straits scholarly work on him reflected – and partially still does – the influence politics and ideology can bring to bear on historical studies. These positions were also echoed in Western historiography. Western studies concerning Chiang have been affected by several assumptions following on from the victory of the Communist Party in 1949. In most cases, where the Communist victory is considered as the necessary outcome of the social and economic structural dynamics at play in China since the late nineteenth century, Chiang has often been seen mainly as an authoritarian, incapable military dictator at the head of a weak, corrupt government, doomed to defeat.

Moreover, scholarly perspectives on his political and military capacities have also been affected by sources' bias, not only in China but also in the West. The most well-known example is the influence on the historical evaluations of Chiang of General Stilwell's negative opinion regarding

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the Chinese leader's political and military capacities, as highlighted by Stilwell's writings on his experience with Chiang in Chongqing during the second world war.

This state of things is gradually changing. In the last ten years, the study of Chiang Kai-shek has flourished, producing a better understanding and a more nuanced assessment of his personality and role. A reflection on recent scholarly production of Chiang is beyond the scope of this introduction (for a critical overview see Huang 2011; Taylor, Huang 2012), but it is worth reminding the reader that reassessment of Chiang Kai-shek has also been the consequence of broader shifts in the historiography of twentieth century China in the post Cold War era.

Historical revisionism of Chiang has benefited from the appreciation of the importance of the Republican era in the understanding of twentieth-century China as well as of the development of new studies on post-1949 Taiwan. The issues concerning historical continuity across the 1949 divide in Chinese State-building, the relevance attributed to the war against Japan as the fundamental turning point in twentieth century China, the centrality acknowledged to mass nationalism as a fundamental issue in shaping Chinese political culture and ideology, a new appreciation of China's world outlook and active role in international politics in the last century and, last but not least, the need to investigate and better understand the roots of the political and economic development of Taiwan in the post-1949 era are all factors that contributed to raising renewed scholarly attention for Chiang Kai-shek.

Moreover, one of the main factors which are currently supporting a deeper understanding of Chiang is the availability of new sources. From Chiang Kai-shek's diaries to the journals and personal papers of several Guomindang military, political and cultural figures, to the opening of local archives, new documentation has given scholars world-wide the opportunity to better understand Chiang Kai-shek's political and military role and his connections with other leading figures of his age. At any rate, the particular features of these new sources have significantly influenced the historical approach, which has often focused on assessing Chiang's personality behind his public image, and his relationships with his family, political and military entourage. The outcome has certainly been a more sophisticated appreciation not only of Chiang's inner psychology and of his political and military strategic views, but also of the complicated personal dynamics which lay behind his bonds with collaborators and adversaries as well.

The first three essays in this book illustrate this interpretative trend, offering new insights into Chiang's personality and thinking, and his personal relations within the Guomindang.

The contribution by Professor Yamada Tatsuo, Emeritus at Keio University and one of the most well-known Japanese historians on Chiang Kai-shek, entitled "Chiang Kai-shek's Study in Japan in His Memories"

offers a perceptive analysis of the significance of Chiang's experience as a student in Japan, between April 1906 and October 1911, in the context of his later political leadership and political thought. Comparing what is known about Chiang's actual studies in Japan and how the Chinese leader later remembered and elaborated on these memories in order to develop his own discourse about China's problems, future prospects and identity, Yamada argues that the understanding of Chiang's experience in Japan cannot be separated from the analysis of the context of the political history of twentieth century China and of Chiang's political thought and ideology. Chiang drew from his rather limited stay in Japan political ideas and concepts which cannot simply be considered as the direct consequence of that contact, but rather as the outcome of a personal re-elaboration in the light of his subsequent experiences and attitudes.

Yamada's problematisation of Chiang's memories as a historical source about his stay in Japan is significant considering the centrality in Chiang's studies currently of his diaries, deposited at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University in 2004. Though the diaries were not written by Chiang for publication, they cannot be considered simply a mirror of Chiang's real personality, feelings and thoughts, but rather allowance must be made for the influence of Chiang's self-representation in his account of events, thoughts and deeds (see on this point Nathan 2011; Taylor, Huang 2012). Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that Chiang's diaries have shed new light not only on his personality, thinking and attitudes, but also on his role in several political and military turning points in Chinese history.

One of these key moments is certainly the second world war and consequently Chiang's role in the military development of the conflict against Japan. An analysis of the way Chiang Kai-shek dealt with the tragic events of the Japanese military offensive in 1944 is at the focal point of the contribution of Professor Chen Yung-fa, distinguished Research Fellow at the Institute of Modern History at Academia Sinica in Taibei, Taiwan and Professor of History at the National Taiwan University. Chen's essay "Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese Ichigo Offensive, 1944" offers an assessment of Chiang's handling of the main battles during the 1944 great Japanese military campaigns codenamed Ichigo (Number One). Relying on a close reading of Chiang's personal diaries, Chen further weakens the once prevailing view regarding Chiang Kai-shek's scant willingness to fight the Japanese invaders. In actual fact, Chiang's diaries reveal that the Chinese Nationalist Army's difficulties and failures when defending the Chinese cities during the Japanese offensive, were mainly due to some objective limitations in Chiang's strategic choices, such as bad intelligence, the difficulties of several of Chiang's best generals to accomplish their military mission and, lastly, the impossibility for Chiang to carry on his planned military reform. The defeats suffered by the Chinese army during the Ichigo offensive greatly

endangered the financial and military stability of the Guomindang State, in spite of Chiang's will to resist and fight the Japanese.

Chiang's diaries are an important source also for Professor Chen Hongmin's essay "The Relationship between Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Cheng in Taiwan as appears from Chen Cheng's Diary". Professor Chen is Director of the Centre for Chiang Kai-shek and Modern History Studies at the University of Zhejiang University. His contribution to the workshop and to this book consists in a detailed analysis of the relationship between Chiang Kai-shek and one of his most important supporters, Chen Cheng, after the Guomindang's retreat to Taiwan. Using the diaries of Chiang Kai-shek and those of Chen Cheng, recently deposited at the Archive of the Institute of Modern History at Academia Sinica in Taiwan, Chen offers a study of the interaction between Chiang and Chen, highlighting the differences between their political views on some key moments in Taiwan history, but also between their personalities and their attitudes towards their reciprocal relationship. Chen Hongmin's essay deepens our understanding of the complex personal dynamics within the Guomindang in Taiwan, but also helps to better understand the moral code which determined the behaviour of both in several important passages of Taiwan's history.

The other four essays in the volume have a different perspective on the topic, focusing less on Chiang himself or on his close entourage and more on the international context in which the political role of Chiang and his China developed.

In her essay, "Chiang Kai-shek's Diplomats Abroad: Ambassador Fu Bingchang's perspective at the first United Nations Peace Conference in 1946 with reference to the 'Iran Crisis'", Dr. Yee-Wah Foo, Senior Lecturer at Lincoln University, makes use of both diplomatic documents and the personal diary of the Chinese delegate to the 1946 conference, Fu Bingchang, in order to reconstruct in detail the Chinese perspectives and position in the first diplomatic crisis of the Cold War. She demonstrates how Chinese diplomats such as Fu Bingchang were able to play an important negotiating role between the USSR and the USA, defending at the same time, after all, the national interests of the Republic of China in its strategically vital relations with both powers at the end of the second world war.

The renewed importance of China in the international dynamics in post war years is also highlighted by Professor Guido Samarani's contribution. In his "Difficult Years: Italy's policy on Chiang Kai-shek's China, 1945-49", Samarani, Professor of Chinese History at Ca' Foscari University, analyses Italy's policy regarding Chiang Kai-shek's China from the end of the second world war to Chiang's defeat in 1949. As a defeated country, Italy was in a weak international position, and its policy where China was concerned was characterized by the need to avoid being subjected to excessively penalizing conditions in the 1947 Peace Treaty and possibly to gain his support, or at least, not to incur Chiang's opposition to Italy's aspiration

to enter the United Nations. After 1947, in spite of Italian diplomats' perception of a future victory for the Chinese Communist Party, Italy's policy concerning China was further influenced by the wish to not damage its relations with the United States.

Finally, the essays of Dr. Andrea Revelant and Professor Laura De Giorgi, both of Ca' Foscari University of Venice, offer insight, from different viewpoints, into the public image of Chiang Kai-shek, studying the role of the media and of public opinion in international politics concerning China in the twentieth century.

Andrea Revelant's "Revolution Deconstructed: Chiang Kai-shek and the Northern Expedition in the Japanese Press, 1926-28" is an accurate study of the Japanese Press' coverage of a turning point in the rise to power of the Nationalist Party in China, an event which was instrumental in Chiang Kai-shek's own rise from the position of military commander to top political leader. Making use of a great number of articles from leading Japanese newspapers and magazines on the Northern Expedition, the analysis reveals the articulate response of Japanese public opinion concerning Chiang Kai-shek during those years. If on the one hand the Expedition gave cause for anxiety because of the threat it posed to Japanese interests, on the other, it raised the hope that a stable government would emerge after years of civil war. While some commentators expressed cautious optimism, however, other observers held strong reservations about Nationalist leadership. Furthermore, coverage of the Jinan Incident shows that even the advocates of a policy of conciliation could assume a hardline stance when the Japanese military took the initiative on the ground. Actually, the understanding of Japanese policies involving Chiang's China should not be limited to the study of State relations, but should also be seen from the perspective of educated public opinion and their perception of Chiang's personality, ideology and power in the context of the cross-national flow of news and images produced by the media.

Conversely, Laura De Giorgi's essay, "The *Alter Ego* of China. Westernized Chinese Intellectuals and the Building of Chiang's Image in the Wartime West" considers the efforts of the Guomindang international propaganda machine to shape Chiang's image in the eyes of Western educated élites during the war years. Focusing first of all on the contribution of Chinese intellectuals and diplomats and offering a reading of some biographies of Chiang Kai-shek in foreign languages, De Giorgi argues that, presenting the leader as the personification of the new, modern, national identity of the Chinese Republic, these works were connected to a broader cultural Guomindang agenda, which envisaged shaping Western discourse on China's civilization and place in world history and culture.

Together, the essays in this volume offer an overview of the major trends in recent studies on Chiang Kai-shek, reflecting also different cultural sensitivity and educational backgrounds. While scholars in East Asia have

mainly poured their efforts into deepening the understanding of Chiang's personality and relations, scholars from Western backgrounds have mainly looked at Chiang and his China from the broader perspective of international dynamics and events. Both approaches enrich our understanding of Chiang and of his age.

As we move further away in time from Chiang's life and times, and new historical sources become available to scholars, a better understanding of his place in Chinese history will hopefully be acquired. But this will be possible only if international scholarly dialogue and exchange develops fully. As the organisers of the workshop and the editors of this volume, we hope to have contributed to this end.

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Except for names of personalities internationally known differently, as Chiang Kai-shek and Sun-Yat-sen, all the Chinese names are transliterated in pinyin.

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Chiang Kai-shek's Study in Japan in His Memories

Tatsuo Yamada
(Keio University, Japan)

Abstract It is well known that Chiang Kai-shek studied in Japan in his younger days between April 1906 and October 1911. His experience during this period had a great influence on his political leadership and political thought in his later years. This article aims at confirming the facts concerning Chiang Kai-shek's study in Japan and at analysing Chiang's memories about that experience. The main argument is that, in order to place his experience in Japan within the context of the political history of 20th century China and of Chiang's political thought and ideology, Chiang's experience of studying in Japan should be understood as mixture of the facts themselves, the events related as memory in later years, as well as impressions and views about Japan which are from subsequent periods.

Keywords Chiang Kai-shek. Memories. *Daikō shugi*.

It is well known that Chiang Kai-shek studied in Japan in his younger days between April 1906 and October 1911. His experience during this period had a great influence on his political leadership and political thought in his later years.

One of the purposes of this paper is to demonstrate the facts of Chiang Kai-shek's study in Japan. However, his experience in Japan was not only limited to his time in Japan but continued to influence his political leadership and political thought throughout his life. This perspective helps to place his experience within the context of the political history of twentieth century China.

We must note here that he rarely referred to the facts of his study in Japan at that time though we can confirm them partly. Many of his experiences of studying in Japan were revealed in later years. When Chiang discussed his past, he emphasized one aspect while neglecting others. Chiang's memory and the logic extracted from his experiences of studying in Japan were determined by the environment in which it was remembered and by his politi-

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cal life and the structure of politics of twentieth century China. Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek's experience of studying in Japan should be understood as mixture of the facts themselves, the events related as memory in later years, as well as impressions and views about Japan which are from subsequent periods. I would like to begin by reconfirming the facts about his study in Japan.

1 Reconfirmation of the Facts

In order to elucidate the questions raised in this paper, it is necessary to review the facts of Chiang Kai-shek's study in Japan. However, as I mentioned, his direct statements and the records of his activities are incomplete. First of all, I would like to reconfirm the facts of his days in Japan by mainly using the existing studies.

1.1 First Visit to Japan

Chiang Kai-shek first visited Japan for his study in April, 1906 and returned to China "in the winter" or "at the end of the year" in the same year. The exact date of his return is not known (Qin 1978-2008, 1, 14; Huang 2001, 3). What was he doing in Japan during this stay?

Chiang left a reminiscence of events prior to 1916 before formally starting to write his diary in 1917. He wrote about this visit as follows:

> I went to Japan (at age nineteen) originally intending to study in the army. However, as the restriction was very severe, I was not allowed to enter the military school without having a recommendation letter from China's Ministry of the Army. That year I was introduced to Sun Zhongshan at Miyazaki Tōten's home by Chen Qimei. I also became acquainted with Chinese revolutionaries who were active in Tokyo. My feelingsfor the Chinese nation were deepened; moreover I could not contain my desire to expel the Manchu Qing and to restore China. (Chiang, n.d.)

Actually Chiang was twenty years old in 1906. Various sources indicate that he was studying at Seika gakkō in Tokyo during this year (Qin 1978-2008, 1, 14; Wang, 1). Thus we must reconfirm some facts from this period.

The first question regards the Seika gakkō. Liang Qichao established the Tokyo kōtō daidō gakkō in Tokyo in June, 1899 with the help of Overseas Chinese in Japan. He himself became the principal of the school. It was a school to introduce Western knowledge and to educate Chinese students who came to Japan. Subsequently the school faced financial difficulties and was finally taken over by Cai Jun,the Chinese minister in Japan, and named Seika gakkō (Feng 1976, 107-8; Ding, Zhao 2004, 305-10).

What did Chiang Kai-shek learn in this school? He was said to have learned his Japanese language there. Japanese, English, algebra, trigonometric, geometry, physics, and chemistry were included in the records of full-time students; the part-time students could select freely from those subjects (*Guanbao*, 1908, 130-5). It is however not clear that Chiang attended those classes in any capacity.

The second question is whether or not he became acquainted with Chen Qimei and associated with the Chinese revolutionaries through Chen's introduction during this stay. There are, for example, some questions regarding Chiang's meeting with Chen.

It was on October 9, 1906 that Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) returned to Japan from Saigon. Miyazaki Tōten was publishing *Kakumei Hyōron* at that time. Both Sun's and Miyazaki's chronologies record that Sun often visited the publishing office of this journal. However, Sun's visit to Miyazaki's home is ambiguous. The only source to indicate Sun's visit to Miyazaki's home is found in the records of Miyazaki that refer to "Sun's visit" (Miyazaki 1971-76, 5, 687; Luo 1969; Chen 1991). Even at that time no record is found that Chen Qimei and Chiang Kai-shek visited Miyazaki's home and met Sun Zhongshan. Miyazaki Tōten recalled his visit to Chen Qimei, who became the Shanghai military governor right after the 1911 Revolution, and treated him cordially. However, Miyazaki said, "Chen says he came to my home, but I do not know the fact" (Miyazaki 1973, 4, 312). In this context, the description that Chen Qimei and Chiang Kai-shek visited Miyazaki Tōten and Sun Zhongshan is very uncertain. Even though Chen and Chiang visited Miyazaki and Sun at that time, it was not a significant event for Miyazaki and Sun. Professor Huang Zijin also observed with reservation that "no significant exchange appeared between Sun and Chiang during this stay in Japan" (Huang 2011, 16). Those episodes about Chiang's meeting with Chen Qimei mainly had to rely upon Chiang's memoirs.

The third question is about the reason and circumstances as to why Chiang Kai-shek had to return to China at the end of 1906. He wrote that: "I was not allowed to enter the military school without having a recommendation letter from China's Ministry of the Army".

The "Regulation concerning the foreign-sponsored students in the school under direct control of Japanese Educational Ministry" (the Ordinance no. 11 of the Ministry of Education) had already been issued in Japan on June 4, 1900. Students "were supposed to be allowed only with the sponsorship of China's minister or consulate to Japan". In addition, the "Regulation concerning the public and private schools which allow Chinese students" (the Ordinance no. 19 of the Ministry of Education) was proclaimed on November 2, 1905. This document was intended to control students from China. Article 1 of the 1905 ordinance states, "when the public and private schools accept the Chinese students, they must attach a letter of introduction from their diplomatic mission to Japan to their ap-

plication forms" (Sanetō 1981, 186-7, 461-3). Chiang Kai-shek did not have the letter of introduction from Chinese diplomatic mission.

This ordinance was considered to regulate the Chinese students, and therefore provoked an opposition movement. One of the leaders to protest this measure, Chen Tianhua committed suicide at the seashore of Ōmori on December 8, 1905. It was during these student movements that Chiang Kai-shek came to Tokyo and returned to China at the end of 1906.

1.2 Second Visit to Japan – Shinbu Gakkō

Chiang Kai-shek went to Japan for the second time in the spring of 1908, and entered the Shinbu Gakkō in March the same year. There is a very detailed analysis by Professor Huang Zijin about Chiang during the days of Shinbu Gakkō (Huang 2001). Here, relying on those achievements, I would like to reconfirm some facts from my own perspective.

First of all, the question Chiang Kai-shek had to solve for this second visit was that, considering the experience of his first visit in 1906, he had to get qualification to study in Japan. For that purpose he entered the Tongguo lujun sucheng xuetang in Baoding in June, 1907. The Ministry of Army held an examination to select the students to study in Japan from among those who were specializing in Japanese language in that school in winter of the same year. Although Chiang was not majoring in Japanese, he passed the examination. Passing the exam was a guarantee by the Chinese government to study in Japan(Liu 2001).

Shinbu Gakkō, established in 1903, was a preliminary school for Chinese students who were going to study military affairs in Japan. Right after its establishment Yuan Shikai contributed 20,000 yen for expanding the school. The Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the Army shared the expenditures other than the tuitions collected from the students. Chiang Kai-shek entered the school with its eleventh class in March 1908, using the name Chiang Zhiqing (Huang 2001, 16, 25-6).

Professor Huang Zijin analyzed in detail the curriculum while Chiang was a student. According to Professor Huang, the curriculum was divided into military and general courses, with an emphasis on the latter. The general course included Japanese language, history and geography, mathematics (arithmetic, algebra, geometry and trigonometry), physics and chemistry, natural science (physiology and hygiene) and drawing. Many hours were devoted to Japanese language and mathematics among those subjects. According to Professor Huang's evaluation, "the level of those subjects was on the standard of ordinary Japanese students of middle school", but "for Chiang all of them were new fields for learning and the basis for his knowledge of modern civilization" (Huang 2001, 26, 30).

What did Chiang Kai-shek learn in this school? The contents of education contained broad fields from humanities to natural sciences. Looking at his school record at his graduation he was 55th out of 62, and the average grade point was 68. Incidentally Zhang Qun who followed Chiang in later years, was in the same class. His record was 3rd, and his average grade point was 95 (*Shinbu dai 11-ki hitsugyō-sei kibō heika ichiranhyō*).

Considering the nature of Shinbu Gakkō, education of Japanese language was regarded as important. There are few sources referring to Chiang Kai-shek's Japanese language ability. As he was living among the Chinese students in Shinbu Gakkō, he could to a large extent manage his daily life in Chinese. However, the teaching was conducted basically in Japanese in that school. Training in the 19th regiment at Takada was naturally done using Japanese. Therefore, his ability to read and write was considered substantially high. Newspaper articles during Chiang's visit to Japan between September 28 and November 8 in 1927 confirm his speaking ability. According to those articles, Zhang Qun served as interpreter in many cases, but Chiang responded in Japanese to Japanese reporters at Kobe on October 3. The article on this occasion reported that Chiang's Japanese was "fluent" and "skillful".[1]

It was also important for Chiang to learn other than Japanese language at Shinbu Gakkō. It is important to examine what sort of knowledge he acquired and how he placed himself and China in the world by getting new knowledge. The question to be examined here is not to reconfirm the concrete contents of what he learned, but to find his frame of mind formed by the knowledge which he supposedly learned in his Japanese education. The four text books used at Shinbu Gakkō will be referred to here,[2] though their analysis are to be omitted.

After learning systematically about the invasion of foreign powers into Asia through those text books, Chiang's sense of national crisis and existence intensified.

1 Professor Iechika Ryōko in her paper "Jiang Jieshi 1927 nianqiu de fang Ri - 'Jiang Jieshi riji' yu Riben xinwen baodao de bijiao fenxi" (Chiang Kai-shek's 1927, Travel to Japan: A Comparative Analysis of Chiang Kai-shek's Diary and the Coverage of the Japanese Press), presented to the international symposium *Chiang Kai-shek's Diaries and the Study of the Republican era* held in Taibei, December 2010, includes an extensive research on the Japanese press reports about Chiang's visit to Japan in 1927. For example, the articles about Chiang's fluency of Japanese language can be found in *Tōkyō Asahi shinbun yūkan* (1927 October 4) and *Ōsaka Asahi shinbun* (1927 October 4).

2 These books were Naka Michiyo (rev.), Kuwabara Jitzuzō (ed.), *Chūtō tōyō shi* (A Intermediate History Textbook of the East), Dai Nippon Tosho 1898; Yoshikuni Tōkichi; Wada Kanae, *Seiyō shi* (Western History), Uchida rōkakuho, 1899; Yatsu, Shōei, *Shinsen gaikoku chiri* (A New Compiled Geography of Foreign Countries), rev. ed., Maruzen kabushiki gaisha, 1902; Yatsu Shōei, *Chūchi bungaku* (Intermediate Literature), Maruzen kabushiki gaisha, 1899.

The last question to be examined about Chiang's days at Shinbu Gakkō is that the author of his chronology stated that Chiang participated in the Zhongguo Tongmenghui in 1908 with Chen Qimei's introduction and engaged himself in the publication of a journal, *Wuxue zazhi* (*Bugaku Zasshi*) (Qin 1978-2008, 1, 16). No document exists concerning Chiang's participation in the Tongmenghui. However, he possibly did so considering that he referred to this matter (Chiang, n.d.) and observing his activities in later years.

The question is his participation in *Wuxue zazhi.* The formal name of this journal was called *Wuxue* (*Bugaku*) and was published by Bugaku Henyakusha in Tokyo. The editors and publishers were Lu Guangxi and Fang Rizhong. It was a Chinese journal exclusively devoted to military affairs. I personally own several volumes though incomplete, published in 1908-09.[3] It covered very broad military affairs; building of the army, military strategy and tactics, discipline and education of army and soldiers, the problems of infantry, artillery, cavalry, and of horse, sapper, military police, transport soldiers, problems of land and sea forces, conscription system, columns for literature and research. Some of them were translation from Japanese literature, but Chiang Kai-shek's name is not found among the authors of these literary pieces. It is not probable that Chiang who was studying at Shinbu Gakkō, was able to write technical articles on military affairs or to be engaged in editing a journal of this sort. We can assume that Chiang who was studying military affairs, acquired military knowledge through this journal.

1.3 The 19th Regiment of Field Artillery of the 13th Division

After graduating from Shinbu Gakkō, Chiang Kai-shek entered the 19th regiment of field artillery of the 13th Division stationed at Takada, Niigata Prefecture as a second class soldier on December 5, 1910. He belonged at that time to the 5th company of the 2nd battalion where Zhang Qun was also serving. He was 169.4 cm high and weighed 59.2 kg. He was promoted to the first class soldier on June 1, 1911 and to the artillery leader on August 1, but was not promoted to the artillery sergeant for unknown reason at the same time with Zhang Qun who attained this position on October 1, 1911. Chiang Kai-shek together with Zhang Qun and Chen Xingshu slipped out of the regiment after the revolution broke out in Wuchang on October 10, 1911, and went back to China. The date

3 No. 1,3,5,6,9,10 were used here.

when they left the regiment is not certain, but three of them "withdrew from the army because of the accident".[4]

As to the military training in the 19th Regiment, Professor Huang Zijin introduced one year of the curriculum of the field artillery by using the "Table of One Year Education for Field Artillery" (Huang 2001, 40-1).

The year was divided into four terms, and the contents of each term consisted of "academic subjects" and "military subjects". Here, the concrete contents of training are to be omitted.

As to the military training during this period, I would like to point out several issues in terms of Chiang Kai-shek's memoirs from later years. The first issue is concerned with the table of training program used by Professor Huang Zijin, which was prepared in 1899. However, Chiang actually had his training in 1910-11. As eleven years had passed since its publication at the time of Russo-Japanese War, we must confirm whether there were changes of the contents of training during this interval.

Although there are not enough materials to thoroughly examine this question, we will begin by comparing the table of subjects for training with the *Yahōhei kyōkasho* (*Educational Book for Field Artillery*) published in 1907 (Bajōsei 1907). Although the contents of subjects are almost the same between two documents, the most important difference was that the latter text book added a supplement about "three-eight field artillery". This field artillery was introduced from Germany into Japanese army in 1904 as new weapon (Rikujō Jieitai Fuji Gakkō Tokkakai hen 1980, 81). This fact was reflected in the subjects of the academic training.

The introduction of "three-eight field artillery" also influenced the subjects of military training. The military training dealt with the actual education and training of the army. The *Yasen hōhei sōten* (*Field Artillery Drills Book*) which was revised and put into effect on December 19, 1910, presupposed to introduce new weapons (*Yasenhōhei sōten*, 1911). According to the explanation at that time, "three-eight field artillery and cavalry gun is very different in its structure from three-one running artillery. Therefore the handling of them was also greatly different". This indicated that the revision was made "in order to adapt itself to three-eight artillery" (*Rikugun kyōiku shi,* 1910). Chiang Kai-shek's training in the 19th regiment was practiced within this context.

The second point to be noted is the question of horses. The *Yasen hōhei sōten* describes: "ammunition and horses are important elements for the

4 Professor Kawashima Shin confirmed and elucidated those facts by using *Takada shinbun*, *Takada nippo, Takada-shi shi* during that period. I also would like to call attention to the existing article of Huang 2001, 37-40. The common materials use by three authors including me is "Yasenichi hōhei dai jūku rentai rekishi, Meiji 38-nen 4 gatsu tsuitachi (1905 April 1) – Taishō 4 nen gatsu tsuitachi (1915 April 1)" (Field Artillery 19th regiment hiss tory, 1905 April 1-1915 April 1), National Institute for Defense Studies Library collection.

artillery to show their special function. Therefore, they must try to groom and protect them". Seven items are included in the above mentioned curriculum of field artillery. As will be discussed, the question of horses was one of the most important interests for Chiang in his memories of his days in 19th regiment. In this context, we need to pay attention to the question of horses.

The third point was that "Imperial mandate for the military" was included in the curriculum. Chiang Kai-shek often referred to the education, spirit and discipline of Japanese army in later years in his recollection of his student days and the experience in Japan thereafter. The "Mandate" was not the only basis for his evaluation of Japanese military men, but still was an important source. Within this context, I would like to examine the points of the "Mandate" in terms of his memories.[5]

This document had long sentences, but every soldier was requested to learn by heart. However, it is not certain that Chiang Kai-shek as a foreigner was able to memorize it. He also never referred to this document. What then did this document mean to Chiang?

We must pay more attention to the latter half which generalized the spirit of soldiers as "right way of the universe and common practice of morality". It consists of five items:

a. The soldier must be loyal to his duties, which is related to the spirit of patriotism.
b. The soldier must be polite, a clear consciousness of upper and lower ranks and solidarity.
c. The soldier must respect bravery. The importance of justice, courage and consideration.
d. The soldier must respect faith and loyalty. Faith means to put into practice his words and loyalty implies to devoting himself to his duties.
e. The soldier should make it a principle to be modest. It is a warning to avoid luxury.

Lastly, the document concluded that "honesty is the only guarantee" to realize the five items. Those five elements were closely related to Chiang's standards used to evaluate Japan in later years.

The last point to be noted from this period is the "facts" of Chiang Kai-shek's life in Takada. Although some episodes about his contacts with Japanese society remain, very few of them were confirmed as real facts. Through investigation in 1975 Sankei Press found the site of a small restaurant at Takada where Chiang often went. They interviewed Ms. Watanabe Teru who was the daughter of the restaurant owner, and asked

5 The "Imperial mandate for the military" was promulgated under the name of Meiji Emperor on January 4, 1882 and the original document was broadly promulgated in the past. Here I quoted from the document included in Bajosei 1907.

her to tell her story (Sankei shibunsha 1975, 213-5). I myself had an opportunity to visit the site of Takada 19th regiment of field artillery at Jōetsu City (former Takada) in Niigata Prefecture in December, 2009. At present the Japanese Self-defense Army stationed at Takada occupies that site. A part of the barracks from Chiang's time and a small space for his exhibition can be found there.

2 Chiang Kai-shek's Study in Japan in His Memories

Based on the facts mentioned above, I will examine Chiang Kai-shek's speeches and writings regarding his days in Japan.[6] He recollects his days in Japan in his memories through speeches and writings. The recollections are not the facts themselves, but selective memories of some aspects of the facts. His selection is based on his position, thought and necessity.

Looking at Chiang Kai-shek's memories of his days in Japan throughout his life, we can distinguish three categories of speeches and writings. The first is his direct experience in his days in Japan between 1905 and 1911. The second is not limited to the above mentioned period, but more generalized and indirect expression of his experience in Japan. The third is a comparison of civilization between Japan and China stemming from his perspective as a Chinese leader. What did Chiang Kai-shek try to insist through those memories? In my opinion, his characteristics of political leadership manifested themselves in those categories.

2.1 Direct Experiences

Chiang Kai-shek's speeches and writings about his memories of Japan between 1906 and 1911 are already quoted in many writings. Relying on the exiting writings, I would like to re-examine this question from my own perspective.

The first problem Chiang Kai-shek was concerned with in his memory was a habit of spitting by a Chinese student which he saw on the boat to Japan in 1906.

6 I owe many of Chiang Kai-shek's writings used in this paper to the existing works. Huang (2005) picked up and edited Chiang's speeches and writings relating to Japan for his entire life. And, the quotations of the book edited by Sankei shibunsha (1975) overlap on many points with mine. Those overlapping passages were confirmed by Chiang's speeches as basic documents and by using Qin Xiaoyi (1984). Different from the two documents mentioned above, I considered the quotations not the facts, but mainly a part of his memories.

> According to my memory, when I went to Japan for the first time at age 19 (in 1906), I found that a Chinese student unconsciously spit on the forecastle deck. A Chinese sailor discovered it and told him that an ordinary Japanese would not spit anywhere. If he did it, he would spit in his handkerchief or in the tissue paper, and then put it in his pocket, bring it back home to wash or to throw away. (Chiang 1969, in Qin 1984, 29, 390)

This speech is a part of Chiang Kai-shek's long report to the Tenth National Congress of the Guomindang made at the beginning of the congress in March, 1960. This strong impression remained in Chiang's memory even after over 50 years. Chiang even at that time thought that Chinese people lacked a "common sense of modern life". It was a necessary attitude for a party member and ordinary people in general to master in order to promote ongoing reforms. For Chiang it was indispensable in building state and society for the Chinese people to liberate themselves from traditional bad habits and to become a polite modern person. Here he took out his memories of his days in Japan.

As to his study in Japan, Chiang Kai-shek most often referred to his experiences in the regiment at Takada. Coldness left strong impression on him as southern Chinese.

> Takada is a city located in Niigata Prefecture near Hokkaido. The climate of this area is very severe. They have heavy snow every winter. Such heavy snow cannot be found even in the northern frontier of our country. (Chiang 1944, in Qin 1984, 20, 316)

Coldness was not confined in itself. It had more effect.

> I was not physically strong when I was a young boy. I came to Japan to study in the army at twenty years old and entered the regiment at Takada. I tried hard to train myself. It snowed hard there. I sometimes washed my body with snow or cold water. My body became stronger after difficult training of washing my body in this way, and the spirit also became healthier concurrently with strong body. (Chiang 1933, in Qin 1984, 11, 557)

Coldness contributed to strengthening of the human body and spirit. Washing the face with cold water in the morning was also a Japanese custom to be noted for Chiang Kai-shek. For every Japanese

> washing his face with cold water became very popular custom all over the country. If someone does not do that, the others certainly consider him to be barbarous and not patriotic. What we know is that always

> washing the face with cold water can inspire a man's spirit and make his mind clear. That custom also strengthens his skin and makes him immune to colds. More importantly it can save time by doing so. The Chinese lack this custom. (Chiang 1934a, in Qin 1984, 12, 77-8)

It is clear in Chiang Kai-shek's memory that washing the face with cold water was closely related with awakening spirit, strengthening the body, rationalizing life, resisting against Japan and reviving the nation. In other words, choosing the fact of washing the face with cold water of his memories in his days in Japan, was based on the challenge of the problems he faced.

As a part of the question of coldness, Chiang Kai-shek also referred to cold meals taken by the Japanese people in the army and in daily life.

> Ordinary Japanese take cold meals every day. [...] He will carry a packed cold meal when he goes out during the daytime. [...] This is, in other words, a basic military training and military activities. They have got into the habit of working hard and enduring difficulty at home from their childhood, because their whole life has been militarized since early years and their soldiers could become strong. [...] The New Life Movement which I am advocating now [...] intends to militarize completely the life of whole nation. [...] Militarization means good order, sanitation, simplicity and naiveté. [...] Only by accepting these value, one can become a member of modern nation who has a sense of propriety, justice, honesty and honor, and is fitted to live in the modern world. (Chiang 1934a, in Qin 1984, 12, 78)

Thus the Japanese custom of eating cold meals was introduced into the targets of Chiang's New Life Movement, that is, militarization, good order, sanitation, simplicity and naiveté, sense of propriety, justice, honesty and honor, and creation of the new nation. Furthermore, this custom was considered one of the sources of strength of Japanese army. In this sense, eating cold meals by the Japanese people was one of Chiang Kai-shek's choices concerning his memories of Japan.

Chiang Kai-shek's memories of his military life in Japan had broader implications. Looking over his whole life, the attitudes of "self-cultivation" and "self-strengthening" which meant to influence other people were important (Yamada 2009). In this context, he was attracted by the good discipline of Japanese army.

He paid attention to the discipline of "our enemy, Japan" brought about by military education. It was in October, 1940 when this speech was made during the Sino-Japanese War. His experience in the Japanese army still had meaning for Chiang Kai-shek even at this point in time.

> As I saw in my days in Japan years ago, when the senior officer of the army examined bedrooms and a hall, at first they would see whether or not every corner of the room being clean and tidy, then examine the dust of backside of the door. They touched the bar of the door with white gloves. If they found dust on the gloves, the room was immediately judged not well in order and they had to clean it again. Then examining the spittoon, they had not only to see whether it was in good sanitary condition, but also to see whether water reached at the regulated level. […] I saw here the key to successful Japanese military education.[…] The only secret of the success of education of the Japanese army lies in the fact that everything required for their whole daily life from cooking rice to washing all charged by soldiers, and need not to turn to outsiders. (Chiang 1940b, in Qin 1984, 17, 487, 492)

The military education of Japan penetrated even into the daily life of the army, which contributed to maintaining discipline. Chiang Kai-shek found the strength of Japanese army in this aspect. Furthermore, military education and discipline was related to the problems of sanitation, cleanliness and order. These problems constituted in part to the strengthening of the Chinese army, party and nation which were compatible with his New Life Movement.

Other elements Chiang Kai-shek abstracted from his memory of disciplined life in the army were simple meals and monotonous time. As to a simple life of eating, he stated:

> [After entering the regiment] each person could eat only a medium-sized cup of rice in the Japanese army, and had to eat a boiled mixture of rice and barley several times during the week. Three pieces of pickled radish or salted fish were on the rice on other occasion. It was only on Sunday when we could eat some bean curd, green vegetables and meat. Regardless of being full or not, the amount of rice and vegetables for each person was limited to this volume. (Chiang 1944, in Qin 1984, 20, 317)

Even in this condition,

> the lower officers and soldiers in general were physically very good, and there was no health problem. This practice to limit the food was tried at Yunnan Chiangwutang earlier. According to their investigation, many of the students fell ill before having limited the amount of food, but the number of sick students even decreased three months after the restriction of food. (Chiang 1942, in Qin, 19, 185)

Thus, limiting the amount of food in the Japanese army resulted in strengthening Chiang Kai-shek himself and Chinese soldiers.

As to monotonous life in the regiment, Chiang Kai-shek stated:

> I spent one year in the regiment as mere soldier. The life was extremely monotonous and severe. At that time I felt it unreasonable because of the restriction of discipline, monotone of life and boringness. However, recollecting the past now, the basis for me to be able to live a simple life every day, to work constantly and to live a life for forty years as usual, was surely established in this one year of training as soldier. I feel that my will and spirit of revolution for my whole life thus became patient and not afraid of anything thanks to one year's experience as soldier. (Chiang 1946, in Qin 1984, 32, 154)

Enduring a monotonous life also resulted in Chiang Kai-shek's present strength.

Another question to be examined about Chiang Kai-shek's memory at Takada regiment was grooming a horse. As pointed out, taking care of horses occupied an important position in the training of the artillery regiment. As to grooming a horse, Chiang stated as follows:

> After washing the face, the senior officer takes us to the stable and leads us to rub a horse down. The task of rubbing a horse starts from hoofs and thigh to the back. We would rub from the horse's back to the head and tail. We had to rub every joint and muscle of the horse by bundle of straws with all our might. Then, the whole body of the horse would get warm after rubbing for about an hour, and the pulse would get smooth. We ourselves rubbed a horse down with strength and worked hard. Thus we came to feel not cold in this cold weather, and our body, hands and feet got hot, and sometimes sweated. […] After finishing rubbing a horse, we again take it to the horse bucket outside of the stable covered with snow and lead it to eat and drink water. After the horse had enough food, we finally went back to our barracks and had breakfast. In the evening again we went to the stable and rubbed a horse down, and after that could finally eat supper. (Chiang 1944, in Qin 1984, 20, 316-7)

This grooming of a horse was for Chiang "the greatest training in my whole life. Nowadays I believe that it was on this occasion that I had the inspiration to consider worry to be happiness, and not to be afraid of difficulty" (Chiang 1944, in Qin 1984, 20, 316-7).

Chiang Kai-shek also referred to grooming a horse on another occasion. "I found the spirit of Japanese army in this aspect at that time. That is the point we especially have to learn" (Chiang 1940a, in Qin 1984, 17, 41). That is to say, for Chiang grooming a horse was not confined in itself. The experience at that time constituted his spiritual basis. The Japanese army was a model to be followed.

2.2 Indirect Experiences

In this chapter I will deal with Chiang Kai-shek's life in Japan and with what he learned and heard there other than the period when he was a student. We must ask what he tried to extract from that experience, and how that experience was related with his memories in his student days in Japan.

The most distinct contrast between his memories of his days in Japan and his view of Japan during the rest of his life was his feeling of humiliation toward Japan. The aspect of conflict occupied many years of Chiang's entire life. Needless to say, the conflict was most severe during the time of Sino-Japanese War.

"Wiping out humiliation" (*xuechi*) toward Japan was related with "saving the nation" (*jiuguo*). "If we try to save our nation, first we must save the spirit of our nation. If we try to save the nation, first we must save the nationhood. Therefore, in order to revive the spirit of the nation, then we must surely begin by self-governing and self-strengthening" (Chiang 1932a, in Qin 1984, 10, 529). Chiang Kai-shek's attitude confronting the Japanese invasion resulted in wiping out humiliation, saving the nation, self-governing and self-strengthening. This showed that Chiang for everything started from strengthening one's own power position.

The next point to be noted is that Chiang Kai-shek tried to selectively extract useful elements for China from his experiences in Japan including his life in the army. He got the *Soldier's Handbook* of the Japanese army in 1940 amid the Sino-Japanese War and chose the following items from "the preface" consisting of 20 paragraphs. "Absolute obedience to the military officer and acting with courtesy" was required. "Courtesy" meant "keeping of discipline". The soldier "must do his best to help and support his war comrades, highly respect mutual courtesy, and further have the spirit to sacrifice himself for others" (Chiang 1940a, in Qin 1984, 17, 37-43).

A soldier must deal with the affairs of his family well and get rid of worry before going to war. The will to fight beyond life and death was important. Keeping the training, sanitation and health while awaiting orders are included with those items. Furthermore, this handbook required grooming a horse,having a will not to retreat when wounded, to respect the war dead and the wounded, not to be deceived by Japanese army, and to highly regard the importance of propaganda and espionage. These were general matters for the officers and soldiers to keep in mind when engaged in directing the army. However, looking all the items, they have common traits with his memories from his student days in Japan such as discipline of the army, unity and mutual assistance and the spirit for sacrifice. "We must surely pay attention especially to the morals of the army and military law" (Chiang 1940a, in Qin 1984, 17, 37-43). Within this context, the second volume of this handbook which exclusively dealt with the army morals, was important.

As an extension of this tendency Chiang Kai-shek summarized on other occasions what he learned from the Japanese army into the following three points:

a. We "must absolutely obey the law of government, keep strictly to the discipline of the army and execute the order of senior officers".
b. We "must highly regard the importance of political training, establish our core principle, fight for Three People's Principles (*sanmin zhuyi*), engage in the military service with strong will and complete the great task of revolution and building the nation".
c. We "must try to learn a sort of necessary skill for our daily life and train the middle cadres to build the nation and to remodel the society" (Chiang 1944, in Qin 1984, 20, 319).

It is evident that Chiang was trying to directly apply what he learned from Japan to the execution of Chinese revolution.

The third point to be noted about Chiang Kai-shek's indirect experience of Japan is that he was trying to find the source of the strength of Japanese army. From this perspective he paid attention to the importance of education in comparison with China. "Hereafter if we wish to build our state and revive our nation, there is no other basic way than developing education. Therefore, education is essentially the greatest work for saving and reviving the nation" (Chiang 1934a, in Qin 1984, 12, 75).

Recollecting his life in the Japanese army at the beginning of the New Life Movement, Chiang Kai-shek stated that the education which was equivalent to "the sense of propriety, justice, honesty and honor" was going on in Japanese army. "They (Japanese) nowadays finally built such a rich and strong state after carrying out an education of this sort for more than several decades" (Chiang 1934a, in Qin 1984, 12, 77). Education was the source of the strength of Japanese army.

I paid attention to three major points Chiang Kai-shek extracted from his indirect experiences in his life in the Japanese army. The common element of those three points was his attitude to try to find the source of strength of Japanese state and army and to apply them to strengthening China. As referred to in the previous chapter, it was also related to the elements he tried to extract from his direct experiences in his student days in Japan. However, it must not be forgotten that war with Japan had been going on for most of the years during which Chiang formed these attitudes.

2.3 Interrelations Between Japanese and Chinese Cultures

Chiang Kai-shek referred to the characteristics of Chinese culture on various occasions. When he discussed Japanese culture in comparison with its Chinese counterpart, he had his own logic. While he based his analysis

on his direct experiences in Japan, it revealed his view of Japan beyond those experiences.

Japan's "national soul" or "Japanese military soul" make up "Bushidō" and the "Japanese Spirit". Its contents consist of "loyalty and patriotism, respect for chivalry and fondness for justice" (Chiang 1934b, in Qin 1984, 12, 362). Japan's strength, however, originated "not in the influence of Western science but in the philosophy of China".What then is this Chinese philosophy? It is the "Confucian Way", which can be traced back to "Zhuxi's Scholarship" from the Song Dynasty. Chiang highly evaluated "Wang Yangmin's Scholarship" and emphasized the concepts of "the unity of knowing and doing" and "encouragement of natural knowledge" (Chiang 1950, in Qin 1984, 23, 313-4; Chiang 1932b, in Qin 1984, 10, 534-5).

Here I will not deal with the contents of the concepts themselves referred by Chiang Kai-shek. The issue is in his logic. According to Chiang, the Japanese way of thinking mentioned above was the source of their strength. Supposing that the Japanese thinking and philosophy originated in Chinese thought, it is logically appropriate then to return to Confucianism as China's traditional thought in order to enrich and strengthen China. However, when Chiang referred to Chinese tradition for the sake of nation building, he did not necessarily presuppose the existence of Japan.

Chiang Kai-shek's logic concerning the interrelationship between Japanese and Chinese cultures had a complicated nature. On one hand "if both cultures have an intimate relation, we should consider how we can be friendly and should try to live together in mutual prosperity" (Chiang 1938, in Qin 1984, 30, 279). On the other hand, he stated as follows:

> The reason why Japan succeeded nowadays as a conquering nation, is only because she partially put into practice the philosophy of Wang Yangming. Unfortunately Japan did cut off a part of Chinese philosophy, and did not extract its whole essence. (Chiang 1932c, in Qin 1984, 10, 604)

According to Chiang's logic, Japan became strong relying on distorted Chinese philosophy and invaded China by what she stole from China. This logic explained Japan's invasion while he was expecting peace. It also manifested his ambivalent feelings of love and hatred toward Japan.

3 Concluding Remarks – Chiang Kai-shek's Study in Japan and His Politics

The words, "Chiang Kai-shek's politics" sounds ambiguous. Here I intended to discuss his psychology and attitude as a Chinese politician. Therefore, specific policies, thought and ideology were not the objects of analysis. It will, however, define all framework within which the individual policies

of Chiang and Guomindang can be understood. Furthermore, it contains an element which was universally applied toward the political leaders of modern China.

As is well known, Chiang Kai-shek went to Japan for study twice between 1906 and 1911. This time includes three periods; Seika Gakkō, Shinbu Gakkō and no. 19 Regiment of no. 13 Division Field Artillery at Takada. The 'facts' regarding Chiang's activities in Japan during this period are not necessarily clear enough. Much of the existing research on Chiang during his student days in Japan, is mainly based on his memories from later years. That is to say, 'memories' were treated as 'facts'. However, 'memories' are not 'facts'. 'Facts' are chosen through 'memories'. That is to say, some aspects of a fact are deleted, while others are added. The 'facts' chosen through 'memories' are not the fact itself, but manifestations of the imagined scenery by the people who remembered that scene at various times. Thus, I began by confirming the facts about Chiang's activities in his student days in Japan, and tried to reconstruct his memories about his days in Japan which were expressed in later years. His later memories of Japan are not the facts themselves, but rather showed his psychological attitude toward Japan and his own politics.

What characteristics can we extract from his memories of Japan?

Firstly, he tried to show a strength and superiority obtained through his experiences in Japan. Chiang Kai-shek as a leader wanted to show himself to be superior to the ordinary masses intellectually and physically and had to prove his own strength. It was the logic of "self-strengthening" (*ziqiang*) which prioritized his own strength over others. Within this context, he felt his experiences in Japan strengthened him and chose those experiences from his memories.

It is very hot during the summer in Takada, and the humidity was high. But, Chiang Kai-shek chose coldness, suggesting that he became physically and spiritually strong and healthy by the life-style experienced in this coldness. He noticed the frugal meals instead of luxurious food which he failed to get. He felt that this experience contributed to preserving himself in good health. Furthermore, he became patient by enduring the monotonous daily life in the army.

Secondly, Chiang Kai-shek presented himself as a model for military men and the ordinary masses by his spirit of "self-strengthening". He suggested that they behave in the same way. The process of "self-cultivation" leading to "self-strengthening" was important for Chiang. Within this context, his memories of his student days in Japan were useful.

Chiang noted that in Japan the senior officer went into the bedrooms of soldiers and the halls and directed the arrangement of the rooms, in order to keep the discipline of army life. Thus keeping discipline was connected with cleanliness and sanitation. For example, his attitude manifested itself in his criticism of spitting.

Indirectly Chiang's observations and experiences in Japan influenced his New Life Movement beginning in 1934. The aims of the Movement such as militarization, order, sanitation, simplicity and naiveté, sense of propriety, justice, honesty and honor, were adopted in order to create a new and strong modern nation. The various elements indicated in his style of life had an important meaning in the process from Chiang's self-cultivation to self-strengthening which were related to his experiences in Japan.

Thirdly, Chiang Kai-shek tried to find the origin of the strength of Japanese army in his memories from his days in Japan. This effort came from his desire to understand his own weaknesses and to strengthen the nation. His ultimate goal was to create a strong nation and army. This attitude was ultimately related to his logic of self-strengthening. He wanted to build a nation and an army surpassing Japan during Sino-Japanese War while being aware of the experiences of Japan as an enemy. His formula included wiping out humiliation, saving the nation, self-governing and self-strengthening. As discussed above, this attitude appeared in Chiang's experiences and memories.

According to Chiang,the Japanese customs of washing the face with cold water and eating cold meals, and their attitude of saving and simplicity were sources of the strength of Japanese army. Ideological education and complete penetration of discipline, and diffusion of education throughout Japan also contributed to strengthening Japan and Japanese people.

The fourth point is the question of the horse. As referred to earlier, training and grooming a horse were among the most important duties for field artillery. He established his spiritual basis through his experience of grooming a horse. He considered that experience to be a valuable model to learn from the Japanese army.

The fifth point is Chiang's comparison of Japanese and Chinese cultures. Chiang considered that the spiritual basis of Japanese and Japanese army was in the "Japanese Spirit", "Bushidō" and loyalty and patriotism. This ideological system was the foundation on Japanese strength. However, according to Chiang, the spiritual basis of Japanese was formed under the influence of a part of China's traditional thoughts consisting of Confucianism, Zhuxi's scholarship and Wang Yangming's scholarship. This fact had two implications. On one hand, it implied that Chinese thought and philosophy still had superiority over the Japanese people. On the other hand, Japan became strong by a philosophy imported from China. China however, experienced humiliation being invaded by Japan. This logic was an manifestation of Chiang's ambivalent feelings of love and hate toward Japan. Chiang Kai-shek articulated his political position through positive experiences in Japan. However, his humiliation experienced during the Sino-Japanese War also must not be forgotten.

The sixth point is that Chiang Kai-shek acquired broad knowledge and insight about China and the world through his study in Japan. At the same

time it gave him an opportunity to participate in Chinese politics leading to the 1911 Revolution through acquaintances with Chinese revolutionaries there. In this context, participation in the revolutionary movement was a by-product of his study in Japan, and was also the aim itself.

Lastly, let me consider Chiang Kai-shek's politics within the whole structure of modern Chinese politics. In the past I proposed to adopt a concept of "Daikōshugi" (substitutionism) as an element of continuity of Chinese politics in the twentieth century. It is defined as "a system and style of political leadership, in which a group of elite sets up the target of reform in place of the people, puts political consciousness into them, mobilizes the people for the realization of their targets, but lacks the institutional guarantee for the people to participate in politics voluntarily" (Yamada 2007). This definition involves some questions. The first question is what political target the political leaders set up for the people. That is the leadership of political leaders over the people. The second is how the leaders put political consciousness into the people. In this case, the conditions of politics are to be determined by how the political leaders judge the degree of political consciousness of the people. The third point is the degree of institutionalization of raising objection by the people against the state and the party. The question to be asked is to what extent the government and party allow the voluntary political participation of the people. The system lacks institutional framework to solve the political conflicts. The fourth point concerning substitutionism is that maintaining the power of the leadership required absolute priority over the people, and therefore the apparatus, means and resources for that purpose must be taken into consideration. However, all of these questions were not necessarily connected directly with Chiang's student days in Japan; for it was before he came into power, and in this context he did not confront the question of institutionalizing the people's political participation. Rather, the question of what the political leaders should be in substitutionism, was his major interest in terms of his experiences in Japan.

In terms of Chiang Kai-shek's memories centering around his student days in Japan referred to earlier, these do not concludes all aspects of his life in Japan. These memories were selected from various aspects of his life in Japan. His attitude toward "self-strengthening", his consciousness of intellectual and physical superiority over the people, his desire to create a strong China, and his feeling of humiliation constituted a part of leadership of substitutionism. In this sense, Chiang Kai-shek's attitudes discussed in this paper are to be located in the broader context of Chinese politics in the twentieth century.

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Chiang Kai-shek and His Time
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Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese Ichigo Offensive, 1944

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Abstract During the second world war, American General Joseph Stilwell severely criticized Chiang Kai-shek's lack of will to fight the Japanese invaders. However, such a view, though dominant in the field for more three decades, cannot stand up to a close examination of relevant archives and other primary source materials, which only recently have been made available. Recent scholarship focuses so much attention on the second Burma campaign that it largely overlooks the largest offensive ever launched by the Japanese army throughout its history. This paper examines a series of Japanese campaigns codenamed Ichigo, and will rely in large part on Chiang Kai-shek's diaries to examine how he dealt with them. My essay is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the offensive and Chiang's command during it, while the second describes Chiang's handling of defensive failures.

Keywords Chiang Kai-shek. Ichigo offensive. Fang Xianjue. The Bible. Military reform.

During the second world war, American General Joseph Stilwell severely criticized Chiang Kai-shek's lack of will to fight the Japanese invaders. However, as Hans Van de Ven (2003) and Chi Hsi-sheng (Qi 2011) demonstrate in their respective works, such a view, though dominant in the field for more than three decades, cannot stand up to a close examination of relevant archives and other primary source materials, which only recently have been made available. Obsessed with his defeat in Burma in 1942, Stilwell not only exaggerated the strategic importance of that campaign but also misinterpreted Chiang's wartime strategy, especially his determination to fight the Japanese invasion to the end. While remedying the previous deficiency in the field, however, recent scholarship focuses so much attention on the second Burma campaign that it largely overlooks the largest offensive ever launched by the Japanese army throughout its history. I propose to examine a series of Japanese campaigns codenamed Ichigo, and will rely in large part on Chiang Kai-shek's diaries to examine how he dealt with them. My essay will be di-

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vided into two parts. The first part deals with the offensive and Chiang's command during it, while the second describes Chiang's handling of defensive failures.

To begin, I want to point out Western observers tend to see Chiang Kai-shek as a national leader in a mature nation who faced far greater expectation than he could deliver. Such observations have merit, yet they underestimate the impact of the Japanese attacks beginning in 1937, which lasted more than four years. The Japanese occupation of the coastal provinces and rocketing military spending drove the Nationalist government to a low point, while the winter offensive of 1939 clearly showed Chiang's inability to mobilize regional and local forces as he would like. In 1940 the national currency *fabi* fell so dramatically that a stabilization fund of 5 million English pounds could not prevent its depletion within several months. In 1941, another stabilization fund supported by American and British credit failed to prevent a new wave of devaluation of the *fabi*, which forced Chiang to centralize the collection of land taxes, thereby prompting severe strains with provincial governments and encouraging centripetal tendencies. Some of his trusted generals seemed to join the ranks of residual warlords such as Long Yun of Yunnan, Pan Wenhua of Sichuan, and Yan Xishan, all of whom posed serious threats to Chiang Kai-shek's government and drastically undermined his ability to make war (Chiang, *Riji* 1942, May 31). In a time of high inflation, Chiang had no choice but to tolerate corruption such as trading with enemies and other illegal practices, which further diminished the army's will to make determined resistance.

In 1941, while seeking to stifle Nationalist outside contacts, to take advantage of the near destruction of the Nationalist air force, and bomb the Nationalist government into capitulation, the Japanese army launched military action to pacify areas of the coastal China behind their front lines, where the Communist Party had maintained a vigorous presence and built grassroots power with the support of mobilized and organized peasants. The offensive reduced Communist territory and Communist-ruled population, forcing the Communist Party centre to evacuate many higher-ranking cadres to Yan'an to enjoy a safer environment while also simultaneously undertaking rectification campaigns. The Nationalist suspense of appropriations and tightening up of economic blockade in the Yan'an area, as well as shrunken territory behind the Japanese lines, meant that the Communists also suffered a financial crisis, which resulted in what Mark Selden (1971) called the Yan'an Way. Lowering peasant's burdens, the Communists initiated a series of reforms that aimed to reduce their military and administrative expenses. In desperation, the Party even began to plant and sell opium to make ends meet during this difficult time period, yet it was also able to implement rectification and cadre screening to strengthen the unity of its rank-and-file (Chen 1995, 263-98; Xiao 2013,1, 399-457; Gao 2000).

Three years later, in 1944, the Japanese Ichigo Offensive was aimed at three provinces of National China – Henan, Hunan, and Guangxi – respectively located in North China, Central China and South China. The major commanders of these three provinces can be separated into three groups. In Henan, the major commanders came from the Whampoa Military Academy, where Chiang Kai-shek had served as its first commandant. In Hunan, the major commanders came from Guangdong within the Northern Expeditionary Army. In Guangxi, the major commanders were residual warlords incorporated into the Northern Expeditionary Army. I will first discuss how Chiang Kai-shek directed them to resist the Japanese offensive respectively in these three provinces and later examine his measures in coping with military debacles and their consequences. The subtitles serve to highlight my characterization of the three battles in the three provinces.

1 Commercialization vs Mechanization: the Henan Battles

While the Imperial Headquarters considered the mobilization of 400,000 to 500,0000 soldiers to launch the Ichigo Offensive, the largest campaign ever undertaken by the Japanese army in its history, Chiang Kai-shek was preoccupied with the urging of both America and Britain for the participating in the Burma Campaign, not to mention the Russian bombing of the Xinjiang-Outer Mongolia borders. Actually, the Japanese attack at Impahal of India in the spring of 1944 surprised the Allied powers for its scale, and both General Stilwell and General Mountbatten urged Chiang to throw in his Yunnan forces in coordination with the attack of the Chinese army in India, but Britain's refusal to honour the commitment of a sizable naval presence in south Burma led him to refuse to send more troops to north Burma. Chiang strengthened his case by citing fears of a possible Japanese offensive in China, but his diaries suggest that he consistently underestimated Japanese intension and capability. Instead, he was so optimistic as to propose other actions to his generals in the China Theatre. Earlier, during a military conference in Hunan, Chiang considered it was time for his army to prepare for a counteroffensive, asking his field commanders to identify geographical goals and telling them what should be taken as guidance (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, February 9). In early April, he thought Japan had transferred its China Theatre troops to the India-Burma region, and that it was an opportune time for the Chinese to launch an offensive (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, April 9). Once Japan acted contrarily and began a serious offensive in the China Theatre, Chiang still thought that the Japanese were unable to amass an army larger than several infantry divisions.

The main goal that Japan's Ichigo Offensive aimed to achieve was the linkage of three railroads (Peking-Wuhan, Wuhan-Guangzhou, and Hengyang-Guilin), as well as the near destruction of American airbases nearby

that made the Japanese homeland and logistical lines vulnerable to strategic bombing. This offensive required the Japanese to mobilize troops from Manchuria and other parts of occupied China, particularly withdrawing troops fighting against the Communist guerilla forces. The concentrated Japanese force would first cross the Yellow River, which was then flowing southward to the Huai River and cut the Japanese occupied China into the northern and central parts. With the reinforcement of the attacking Japanese forces from the North China, the Middle Yangtze Japanese forces could then move to conquer and occupy Hunan province, especially its capital, as well as the valley and the railroad along the Xiang River. Finally, this Japanese army would receive support from the Japanese army in south China and northern Vietnam, and in a coordinated attack occupy Guangxi, especially areas along the railroad piercing its northern part. Guangxi was the home province of the Guangxi army, over which Chiang had only nominal control.

In early March, Chiang took notice of the Japanese attempt to repair the Yellow River Bridge near the railroad junction town Zhengzhou, but he thought the Japanese goal was to prepare a retreat route for its army in Wuhan, where Japan maintained the only offensive army corps in China. In his judgment, repairs would take several months and the best counter strategy was incessant bombing (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, March 4). Chiang thought it would take the Japanese more than two months to complete the reconstruction of the iron bridge, which meant that he had plenty of time to request aid from the American air forces in China. Even if the American air forces could not come in time, he thought his army was capable of delaying the Japanese offensive and in the meantime launching a counter offensive in the Three Gorges Area in the middle Yangtze to harass the Japanese army that might began a retreat from Wuhan (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, March 8, March 18).

In late March, Chiang read a digest of one British newspaper, which criticized the poor command of the Chinese army, the inappropriate use of the equipment and uneconomic use of human resources, and rampant corruption under cowardly leadership. Chiang considered the critical reports a "precious materials" worth pondering by his generals and civilian leaders and in the very day he endorsed the plan to reinforce Myitkyina from western Yunnan in view of the Japanese attack at the Indian border Imphal. He seemed to have been preoccupied himself with the situation in Burma rather than inside China (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, March 31).

Some intelligence reports about Japanese redeployment of troops failed to alert him into reconsidering his military plan about Beiping-Wuhan Railroad in Henan. He did not begin to pay serious attention to the Japanese offensive until two days after the Japanese overwhelmed the heavily fortified Haiwangcheng in April 17 on the south bank of the Yellow River (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, April 19). It was a serious signal, but still he took it lightly. The

Japanese redeployment not only sent serious signals in terms of unusual railroad traffic north of the Yellow River, but by the withdrawal of mopping up forces from Communist occupied Shanxi and the transfer of units from the Yellow River Bend front eastward to the Yellow River Bridge (Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987b, 206-7). It was understandable if the Communist army chose to withhold vital intelligence, but Chiang's own intelligence department also failed scandalously. Misled by successful resistance against the westward Japanese army, Chiang believed the Japanese meant to primarily attack southward along the Beijing-Wuhan railroad. Confident of Tang Enbo's Henan army, he thought he could stem the Japanese offensive, which he called a stupid move (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, April 22). He had secretly amassed a huge army west of the Beiping-Wuhan Railroad in the hilly and mountainous areas, and hoped they would win a victory in the plain west of the walled city of Xuchang, a key rail junction.

On 23 April, Chiang asked General Claire Chennault about bombing the Yellow River Bridge, but American air bombers went into action four days later. It was only ten days after a Japanese division forced the Yellow River 25 miles east of the Iron Bridge that the American bombers finally appeared, and their strikes proved totally ineffective. Chennault's bombers returned the next day, but this time due to reasons unknown they failed to even reach the destination. Far worse was their release of the unused bombs on their way to Kunming, southwest China, resulting in numerous deaths of Chinese refugees (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, April 23, April 26, April 28). The situation continued to deteriorate when a planned third bombing mission was aborted. By this time, Chiang had suffered a serious intelligence failure that resulted in his total unawareness of the Japanese moving a whole tank division other than infantry units across the Yellow River Bridge, preparing to launch a blitzkrieg against a Chinese army that had never seen tanks in formation, let alone the possession and use of anti-tank weapons. The Japanese army now including at least four infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade, kept its intension secret as their infantry units moved southward as Chiang had expected by this time. Unfortunately for Chiang, this seemingly stupid move by the Japanese army ended up easily breaking the defences of Xuchang, where Tang Enbo had assigned a division for the task. With only about two thousand men at his disposal, the division commander, a young Whampoa officer, fought heroically and committed suicide when his undersized force collapsed on May 1. It was a hard fight lasting slightly more than 24 hours (Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987b, 372-84, 389-90; Chiang, *Riji* 1944, April 30), but Chiang did not realize that a much more serious debacle lay in store.

Persistently misjudging Japanese ambition and overestimating the fighting capability of his own troops, Chiang made another strategic blunder. Originally he sought to use his Henan army to fight a decisive war near

Xuchang. In fact, Tang Enbo had responded to his opinion and asked for permission to fight, but after pondering on the fighting capability of Tang's troops Chiang ended up hesitating. Apart from a lack of confidence in Tang's army, he worried such an action might lure the Japanese forces away from their intention to link the Beijing-Wuhan railroad and attack instead at Luoyang, the ancient capital of China, which was located to the northeast of Xuchang along the Yellow River. He thus asked Tang Enbo and his army to withdraw to the nearby hilly areas, in the hope that constant menace from the west would prevent the Japanese from maintaining unimpeded railroad transportation, even though he did not doubt the Japanese capability to move southward along the railroad (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 2).

But the development of subsequent events surprised him and then caused him to panic. Just before Chiang made his strategic decision, a Japanese army of at least three infantry divisions had moved southward along the Beijing-Wuhan railroad. One Japanese infantry division suddenly made a turnabout and, spearheaded by a tank division and a cavalry brigade, launched a blitzkrieg strike along a river valley pointing towards Loyang (Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987b, 452). According to one Japanese estimate, this tank division was half strength of a regular one, with only 20 to 30 percent firing power of a Russian tank division (Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987b, 163). Nonetheless, having never seen such a large tank force, Tang Enbo's army immediately fell into disarray and broke into smaller units, running for safety into the mountainous areas of western Henan. In his own attempt to run for his life, Tang Enbo went further west and lost touch with his scattered troops. Chiang sought to reach these forces directly through phone calls, ordering them to stand and fight, even though the Japanese forces broke their positions. He also repeatedly ordered General Tang to return to the fronts and assume the actual responsibility of commanding troops. Despite his strict orders, the fronts did not stabilize as he had hoped. Instead, a contingent of the Japanese tank force followed the footsteps of the retreating Chinese army along a river valley, and soon reached the highland guarding the southern approach to Luoyang, while the main Japanese force continued to devote its energy to searching and destroying Tang Enbo's beaten and demoralized army (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 4).

In these desperate times, another Japanese division moved westward along the right bank of the Yellow River and the Longhai Railroad and penetrated the Chinese positions manned by Jiang Dingwen's troop of the First War Zone, thereby prompting another panicky retreat. Chiang tried to put a stop to this debacle, making numerous phone calls to the two generals, Tang Enbo and Jiang Dingwen, and, disregarding the chain of command, directly issuing orders to their subordinates. On May 4, he worked until three o'clock of the next day (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 4). With

several hours' rest, he continued to urge and exhort General Jiang, General Tang, and their subordinates to stand and fight, while also asking his air force to bomb the advancing Japanese vanguard and dropping copies of a letter he had written to encourage the front commanders both east and south of Luoyang (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 5).

When the Japanese stopped for a respite, Chiang found his army in a chaotic state he could not imagine. The Japanese pause in their attack at Luoyang did not mean the suspension of their offensive, just that they had made the destruction of General Jiang Dingwen and Tang Enbo's major troops their top priority. Unaware of the Japanese intensions, Chiang simply determined that his two generals unable to comply with his orders and maintain contacts with each other, as well as their scattered combat units. Chiang was extremely upset by General Jiang's false report of a serious Japanese breakthrough, which aerial reconnaissance proved otherwise. General Jiang also behaved despicably by moving his headquarters from Luoyang to further west without informing Chiang and his subordinate units. Chiang thought that General Jiang had hidden his whereabouts in order to prevent his underlings from looking for his guidance and instructions (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 7; Liu 1996, 656-7, 661).

Pained and grieved by the questionable performance of his generals, Chiang cursed them for their cowardly and incompetent behaviour. In his rage, he cited a long-standing public criticism that Tang Enbo had devoted too much time to smuggling with Japanese occupied areas and had failed to adequately train his troops (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 4). Though not blaming General Jiang Dingwen on the same grounds, Chiang certainly knew the latter had also amassed a fortune through commercial and smuggling activities. He instead focused his criticism on Jiang Dingwen's lack of commandership. Thanks to Jiang Dingwen's inability to command his troops in a military urgency, Chiang found he had to bypass the Ministry of Military Command chain and gave orders directly to Jiang's subordinate officers, thus acting like General Jiang Dingwen's "chief of staff", and enabling Jiang to shed his responsibility (Chian, *Riji* 1944, May 6, May 31).

On May 8, an aerial reconnaissance report that 200 Japanese vehicles were approaching Luoyang from the east suggested an imminent attack at the ancient capital. This information led Chiang to consider a plan for the defence of Luoyang. Without considering the serious consequences, he rashly ordered the withdrawal of Jiang Dingwen's motley forces from the east. On that night, he prayed five times to God for the defence of Luoyang (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 8). The subsequent quietness of the fronts led him to regret yielding the area east of Luoyang without a fight, and circumstances quickly worsened following a sudden crossing of the Yellow River by the Japanese army from Shanxi, threatening to attack Luoyang with more than a division from the west (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 10, May 11). Chiang now had to worry about a siege of Luoyang from three directions:

east, south, and west. Acting on their own and eager for an even greater victory, one Japanese tank division launched an offensive at the walled ancient capital, but the higher command immediately ordered a suspension of the assault. It harboured a different plan for conquering Luoyang (Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987b, 602-6).

Still trying to organize a counteroffensive, Chiang conceived of a strategic plan that would require the assembling of a large force to the southwest of Luoyang and with Luoyang as bait to lure and divert the major Japanese forces. While weakening the assaulting force by a positional war at Luoyang, he would then use his regrouped forces to strike a crushing blow on the Japanese army in a mobile war outside the walled city (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 10-16). To aid in the defence of Luoyang, Chiang urged air strikes but no airplanes were available. General Tang obeyed his orders, but in the face of Japanese tanks and other infantry units, he found it impossible to re-assemble his disintegrated force. He continued to run for safety further west. Tang failed dismally, but even if he had reassembled his army, he would only have played into Japanese hands, because the Japanese forces viewed decimating the Chinese field army far more important than capturing a well-fortified and already isolated Luoyang. Both the forces of Jiang Dingwen and Tang Enbo preferred to disappear into the mountainous regions of western Henan. Facing the same Japanese threat, General Jiang Dingwen acted differently from the obedient General Tang, making no attempt to regroup his army and running pell-mell for safety. In order to prevent Japanese discovery of his whereabouts, Jiang even cut radio contacts with the subordinate units and as a result, Chiang had no means to assess the condition of forces inside Luoyang. Chiang sought desperately to change his fortune.

By this time, the Japanese had assembled another attack force east of the Yellow River Bridge and secretly prepared to attack Luoyang, including the fortification in its northern suburbs. This Japanese attacking force, consisting of one division and two brigades, had taken advantage of the Chiang's yielding of land east of Luoyang and swiftly moved into the attacking lines while waiting for further orders to launch full-scale assaults. Once the offensive was launched, it took no more than two days to occupy the Beimang Mountains (the northern shield of Luoyang) and only another day to conquer the walled city.

Chiang chose generals Wu Tingning and Zhang Shiguang for the defence of Luoyang. Wu was a native who had made his military career in a warlord army, while Zhang was a Whampoa cadet who Chiang did not know personally. Wu led two divisions to defend the fortifications on Beimang Mountain, while had only one division which had recently been evacuated from the Taihang Mountains after serious setbacks at the hands of the Communists. Chiang could not reach them via telephone, and his attempts to assemble an attacking force did not go well either. General

Jiang Dingwen picked up his phone only reluctantly and responded using what Chiang thought as a disrespectful tone of voice. The attempt to reach General Tang failed because the Japanese hunt for his main force had driven his headquarters further west (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 11). He considered air supremacy vital for the success of strategy, but after a day's successful bombing near Luoyang the weather did not cooperate, hampering his use of air power. Unable to reach the defenders of Luoyang, Chiang asked his airplane to drop personal letters to them to strengthen their resolve (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 12).

Fooled by the Japanese crossing of the Yellow River from Shanxi, Chiang worried about a possible Japanese thrust into the neighbouring province of Shaanxi, and ordered General Hu Zongnan to prepare for the worse (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 13). Actually, by this time, the Japanese full-scale attack at Luoyang was still in the making. Luoyang was not in imminent danger. Thus, when Chiang dreamed about a bright moon and stars, he interpreted them as signs that God meant he would soon see the light despite the darkness. He also interpreted the sudden downpour of rain which had incapacitated the Japanese tanks as a religious miracle. Even more surprising was his promise to God that he would ask his eldest son to get baptized should the decisive war near Luoyang turn out to be a success (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 14). Through his diary, we can feel Chiang's anxiety in waiting for the Japanese to besiege Luoyang.

Only two days later, bad news poured in from all fronts. Both Generals Jiang Dingwen and Tang Enbo were still on the run. It was almost impossible to locate their headquarters, so Chiang had no means to reach the Luoyang defenders. Ten days later, when Chiang was in optimistic mood, the Japanese suddenly broadcast they had occupied the ancient capital, prompting both Generals Wu and Zhang to lead their survived troops in an attempt to break through the Japanese siege. The Japanese clandestinely moved a division from the east of Luoyang and focused their attack on the Beimang Mountains. Once the Beimang Mountains were taken, the ancient walled capital could hold out no longer. In reflection, Chiang thought he had no personal ties with both generals. Given that Wu was a conservative general, he should not have expected him to do more. He said nothing about his Whampoa student. In recalling the failure of the defence, he criticized himself for interfering in field manoeuvres and especially for oral instructions by telephone, admitting he had made strategic blunders (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 25).

During the Japanese attack at Luoyang, Chiang realized his plan to urge generals Jiang Dingwen and Tang Enbo to regroup their army was a mission impossible. Instead, he ordered Hu Zongnan to send reinforcements from Xian. The fall of Luoyang made that effort meaningless. As the Japanese pursuit seemed to have reached an end, Chiang gave no more heed to his instructions to Hu. In fact Hu Zongnan's troop had made no headway

in throwing back the Japanese army (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 23, May 31, June 3). Realizing that Hu was unable to handle any tank-led offensive, Chiang then asked Hu to withdraw his forces back to Lingbao, the gate to Xian, and left the surviving troops of the First War Zone to put up further resistance (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, June 6-10).

By this time, the Japanese army had already started their offensive in the Central Yangtze for several days, but to Chiang's surprise, the Japanese army also launched an attack at Lingbao. The Japanese headquarters considered this campaign an appended job, allowing the Japanese army which had crossed the Yellow River to join the attack in Henan to satisfy their eagerness for the sweetness of victory. Seriously constrained by both logistics considerations and military man power, the campaign was from its beginning considered a limited one, which would not last more than several days, but the sudden attacks from the flanks with the tank support still caught Chiang by surprise and put Hu Zongnan's army in panicky retreat. The offensive raised the possibility for the Japanese army to enter Shaanxi through narrow paths along a major tributary of the Yellow River. Chiang expected Hu's troops to make a determined and successful stand. Instead, faced by Japanese air bombings and tank assaults, Hu Zongnan's army held only three days and pulled back despite Chiang Kai-shek's orders to the contrary.

Chiang could not accept such a performance from troops which Hu Zongnan had spent five years training for fierce counterattacks against his enemies. Public opinion, both domestic and international, had considered Hu Zongnan's troops to be China's cream of the crop, which Chiang had wasted in watching the Communists in northern Shaanxi. It possessed the best-equipped units in the entire Chinese army, and those that retreated were the best of the best. Their defeatist attitude and lack of military discipline shocked Chiang, and embarrassed him to the extent that he felt unable to face his fellow countrymen.

To add to the humiliation, a small Japanese contingent suddenly appeared from mountains in the south of Lingbao, when Chiang congratulated for the success of air bombing in forcing a Japanese withdrawal. Misled by his field commanders, Hu Zongnan not only failed to make an attack as ordered by Chiang but also gave up the Lingbao county seat without even a gesture of resistance. The Japanese army abruptly halted its advance and began to withdraw as planned. Hu Zongnan claimed he had repelled enemy attacks and boasted the recovery of the county site. Not knowing that the Japanese had called off the fighting as part of their initial plan, however, Chiang accepted Hu's false reporting of victory. At any rate, the Japanese army withdrew as planned and the situation soon stabilized. Chiang deplored that he lost a chance to lure the Japanese army into an attack at the gates of Xian. Having second thoughts, however, he remarked that even if he had had the chance, he would not expect Hu Zongnan to be a triumphant general since Hu was both "immature and weak". Afterwards, he proceeded to shake

up Hu's army with court martial. Three division level officers, all Whampoa graduates, were accused of retreating without permission and secretly executed by firing squads. In fact, Chiang should have congratulated the Japanese army for not being bold enough to conceive an offensive on Xian. When the air force told him about the Japanese withdrawal, he gave thanks to God for protecting China (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, June 10, June 12, June 13).

Two days later, he pondered the implications of a Japanese conquest of Xian: it would be an end of his rule. He summarized the Lingbao campaign in the following words:

> In fact it was the last decisive key moment for the anti-Japanese resistance. If Xian or its gate Tongguan were attacked or occupied, it would doom our cause. The reason was not simply the geographical importance of Xian. It was because Hu Zongnan had devoted himself single-mindedly to training a force of ten army corps more than five years. If these two places were lost, the Nationalist government would be unable to hold the people's support. That is why the fate of Tongguan was far more important than even a warzone. For half a month, I could not have meals with a peaceful mind nor sleep well. Thanks be to God, who turned danger into safety. No human being could engineer such an achievement. (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, June 15)

In fact he should have thanked the Japanese army high command for its failure to push for further victory in the Lingbao campaign. If the Japanese generals had had more imagination and acted more boldly, they might have inflicted a deadly blow on his government, though they might have sacrificed the second stage of the Ichigo Offensive. For Chiang Kai-shek, the Henan battle was a disaster. Tang Enbo's troops fleeing towards western Henan, like earlier warlord armies, were often attacked by the Henan peasants and disarmed. Stories like this further intensified both international and domestic criticism of Chiang's military leadership. He removed both Jiang[1] and Tang, but spared Hu because he could think of no another trustworthy alternative. He knew the deficiencies of Tang Enbo, but was unwilling to push for further punishment, which means he should bear some responsibility for Tang's failure in strategic designing. He underestimated Japanese ambition and determination and never correctly foresaw the Japanese blitzkrieg. Tang Enbo proved loyal and obedient despite all charges of corruption, incompetence, and smuggling with Japanese occupied areas.

1 Chiang Kai-shek picked Jiang Dingwen's former subordinate at Whampoa Military Academy, General Chen Cheng to be his replacement. On departure, Jiang Dingwen asked his junior successor to turn a blind to ledgers of his commercial activities and to turn deaf ears to any reports of his wrongdoings, regardless of their source (Chen, *Riji* 1944, July 9, July 10; July 17, July 30).

2 Empiricism vs Strategic Reform: the Battles in Hunan

Soon after the Battle of Luoyang, the Japanese began to move their troops in Central China. In addition to auxiliary forces of two divisions and three brigades, they mobilized troops from the homeland, Manchuria and other parts of north China to strengthen the only strategically offensive army corps in the China Theatre, which had consisted of eight divisions and one brigade, into a force of eleven divisions and five brigades. The actual attacking forces included ten divisions, supported by an air division and a tank regiment. Including the forces used in the subsequent Guangxi battles, the Japanese army mobilized 326,000 men, 1,282 artillery pieces, 103 tanks, and 9,450 vehicles and 67,000 horses (Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987c, 72-3, 117-8). Chiang's intelligence was not solid enough for designing a counter strategy. First, he thought the Japanese imperial headquarters had mobilized nine divisions to occupy the Wuhan-Guangzhou railroad, but soon his military intelligence experts changed the estimate of the Japanese attacking forces to only five divisions, perhaps excluding the second line divisions that the Japanese later also used for the offensive. These attacking forces led him to believe the Japanese aimed at only the provincial capital Changsha and its surrounding counties, rather than linking the Hunan-Guangdong railroad and destroying the airfields nearby. He further inferred from the level of the mobilization that it was not difficult for the Japanese army to occupy Changsha, despite the fact that they had tried three times without success, but if it could maximize advantages in topography and transportation, the Chinese army could still win a victory as they had done earlier. The Japanese would have to trudge with their artillery pieces and other heavy equipment through numerous rivers and rice paddies. With air supremacy that General Stilwell had promised, Chiang had reasons for being optimistic (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 28, June 3).

During the earlier Henan battle, Chiang understood very well how vital air support was to the defence of his ground troops. He worked very hard to seek the cooperation of General Stilwell, but the American general was much more interested in wresting the command of several divisions and later the whole Chinese army from Chiang's authority through the leverage of controlling Lend Lease materials, on which an adequate operation of his air and ground forces would depend. While the Henan battles were raging, Chiang twice sent telegrams to Stilwell, only to fall on deaf ears. The American general wanted Chiang to commit more troops to North Burma, while Chiang saw no military sense for so doing unless Britain and the United States honoured their earlier commitment for more ground troop and navy support. Chiang swallowed his personal dignity and anger, doubling his efforts to enlist the cooperation of General Stilwell, particularly for the supply of airplane fuel (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 31, June 1).

Chiang also urged the commanders of other War Zones, especially the Sixth and Ninth, to launch diversionary attacks, but these later proved highly ineffective.

Preoccupied with the military situation in Shaanxi until mid-June, Chiang entrusted the defence of Changsha to the commander of the Ninth War Zone, General Xue Yue, a hero who had made fame for his three successful defences of the provincial capital. Xue Yue delegated the job to the recently promoted commander of the Fourth Army, Zang Deneng. In light of his earlier successful experiences, Chiang offered General Xue two bits of advice which Xue might have adopted anyway: first, fight an attrition war and delay Japanese movements; second, avoid the main Japanese army and focus the attack on smaller units. However, all this advice turned out to be obsolete because the Japanese had devised a strategy that remedied their mistakes in the three earlier attempts to occupy the provincial capital. The Japanese generals also threw much larger forces into this attempt, and launched the attack on Changsha twenty days earlier than expected, on May 27, before the Chinese forces could prepare an adequate defence (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, June 17).

The Japanese assembled their attacking force and divided them into three columns moving southward, placing their priorities on the eastern flank. The best divisions were put on the mountains that served as the sources of the waterways flowing westward to the Xiang River, with the column west of the Xiang River assigned to prevent reinforcements arriving from the Sixth War Zone. Only the central column followed the older route east of the Xiang, which pointed directly to Changsha (Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987c, 206-7). The powerful left flank attack freed the central column from falling into what General Xue called the "heavenly furnace" by depriving the defenders of the advantage for falling back to the hilly and mountainous areas. The central column then moved slowly but steadily with its heavier artillery and equipment through the rivers, swamps and rice paddies.

Overconfident in his previous strategy, General Xue Yue made a further blunder by situating himself far away from the combat zone, leaving Zhang Deneng, the commander of the Fourth Army, to handle the defence of Changsha. That force had won the name of Iron Army for its heroic fighting during the Northern Expedition, and the commander had obtained his promotion without the benefit of any ties to the Whampoa Military Academy. The defence of Changsha constituted of two tasks. The walled area was located east of the Xiang River and the Yuelu mountains across the river, where Chiang had constructed a supposedly impregnable artillery base overlooking the city. Two and half weeks after the beginning of the Japanese offensive, on June 15, General Zhang suddenly found two Japanese divisions approaching both south and west of the capital, a challenge he could not have imagined based on his previous experiences.

Chiang construed the Yuelu mountain artillery base as the guardian of Changsha, helping the defenders of the walled city to repel the Japanese invaders. Aware of the Japanese attempt to envelop Changsha, he urged General Xue Yue to keep open the road traffic to the west and prepare for a possible flanking attack from Hengyang in the south. In mid-June, Chiang was preoccupied primarily with the fall-out of the Henan battle and its impact on domestic and international opinion, particularly the sharp criticism within his party and government. Seeking comfort from what Hu Zongnan claimed to be a major victory at Lingbao, he paid no attention to the actual defence of Changsha (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, June 15, June 17). But to his dismay, two days after a morning radio contact, he was unable to reach General Zhang no matter how hard he had tried. The silence was then followed by a Japanese radio broadcast that claimed air bombing had effectively neutralized the Yuelu mountain artillery base and that the provincial capital was doomed. Chiang could not understand the radio silence. If the Japanese army still used the propaganda leaflets to urge the defenders to surrender, he reasoned, it should mean there was still some resistance from the Chinese defenders. Why could he hear nothing from General Zhang Deneng's headquarters (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, June 18, June 19)? Puzzled by the lack of radio communication, Chiang wondered whether the Japanese air force had used poisonous gas to knock out all of his soldiers, but he quickly realized that no gas attack was so effective as to silence a whole army. He then pondered how much truth the enemy broadcasting had revealed (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, June 17, June 18, June 19; Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987c, 267).[2]

To prepare for the Japanese attack, Chiang Kai-shek had strengthened the Yuelu Mountains base with the installation of the most advanced heavy artillery, as well as the storage of 50,000 artillery shells. General Zhang Deneng's 4th Army consisted of three divisions. Despite the opposition of Xue Yue's chief of staff, he insisted on putting two of his three divisions in the city and assigned an under-sized division, only about 3,000 combat soldiers, to defend the Yuelu base. The decision played into Japanese strategy which emphasized the attack at periphery rather than the core of Changsha, and focused on the occupation of the Yuelu base rather than a frontal assault on the walled city. The Japanese army started their attack at the Yuelu base complex on June 16; it took them only two days to achieve the victory. Once occupying the base, they immediately used the captured artillery and shells to blast Changsha. Exposed to the artillery attacks from the rear, General Zhang's army immediately fell into panic

2 Japanese compiled military history pays no attention at all to the attack of Changsha. It only mentioned 15 or 16 June as the D day, but never specified the real time for the assault. No details are provided about the process of offensive. This can be seen as the evidence that the Japanese saw it without any importance.

and he ordered a breakout. The defence of the walled city of Changsha did not last more than one day (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, June 20).

Chiang was so exasperated by the quick fall of Changsha that he ordered a court martial for the responsible officers, while blaming himself for not managing to know his officers and troops better. For political reasons he had to leave General Xue Yue aside, so he ordered the arrest of General Zhang Deneng. Later his chief military judge, someone who had made a name for winning over residual warlords rather than for the strict implementation of military law, recommended life imprisonment after protracted interrogation and investigation. Evidence suggested that General Zhang brushed aside the advice of Xue Yue's chief of staff that successful defence of Changsha should hinge on the defence of the artillery base and refused to adjust the deployment accordingly, thus depriving the artillery base of necessary infantry protection. Determined to make a show of his anger, Chiang overruled the verdict and ordered the execution of General Zhang during the subsequent battle in Hengyang (He 1986, 455-6, 464).

It has been rumoured that Chiang used the military defeat to purge officers who did not belong to his "faction". Such a malicious reading is not warranted, but it did occur to Chiang that he could not count on foreign or co-opt native troops for urgent and important missions. If he had a dependable, trained army, together with an air force at his disposal, he believed he could still have saved Changsha. Chiang emphasized loyalty and dependability far more than other qualities of his commanding generals (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, June 21). He did not know General Zhang had graduated from a military academy in Yunnan and attributed his military incompetence to climbing upward through the rank and file (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, June 26). Perhaps for this reason, he chose his Whampoa student General Fang Xianjue and his 10th Army for the defence of Hengyang, an important transportation centre south of Changsha. His dealings with Xue Yue reveal the importance of political considerations for military matter. As a hero of the resistance campaign, Xue Yue could not be held responsible for military defeat. Such a selective application of military law, however, encouraged wild speculation about Chiang's motivations and further harmed his prestige and authority.

The Hunan battle then moved southward to Hengyang, a key site that could be reached in several hours either by train or waterway from Changsha. The city faced the joining of two rivers along its southeast and lay against the Hengshan Mountains. After the loss of Changsha, Chiang faced an internal debate as to whether his forces should defend Hengyang at all costs. His deputy chief of staff, the Guangxi General Bai Chongxi, was so obsessed with the defense of his home province that he urged Chiang to abandon Hengyang and move all the available forces to the Hunan border with Guangxi. His deputy chief of staff, General Liu Fei, whom military observers would consider as a close follower of General Bai, saw things

quite differently. A native of Hunan, he argued from his position as chief advisor that aroused public opinion could no longer tolerate the loss of any more Chinese land; the army had to show determination to fight to the last. Chiang concurred, but asked his staff officers to make a contingent plan for the loss of Hengyang. When he was still hurrying supply officers to send provisions and ammunition, the Japanese began an attack at the airfield outside Hengyang on June 25. The next day when the Japanese army attacked Hengyang, Chiang still worked very hard to expedite the logistic and air support.

General Fang Xianjue's 10th Army was understaffed and ill-equipped. With about 17,000 soldiers, he was now facing two Japanese divisions, about 30,000 strong. General Fang was fortunate enough since the Japanese seriously underestimated the toughness and resilience of his soldiers, who effectively combined grenade attacks with excellent fortifications for resistance. The attacking army was initially beaten back after suffering heavy casualties, including the wounding of a division commander. When the news reached Guilin, General Bai Chongxi allowed the provincial newspapers to issue a special issue, which was then followed with celebratory fireworks the whole day. One higher ranking officer asked Chiang to do the same in Chongqing. Chiang refused because he did not consider it a conclusive victory. Several days later, the Japanese army attacked again with bombing and shelling far fiercer than the first round (Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987c, 347, 373-4; Xu, *Riji* 1944, July 5; Ge 2005, 141-5).

The Japanese failure in their initial attack at Hengyang, however, gave Chiang some cause for optimism. Given the Japanese performance in Hunan, he saw feasibility for a successful defense of Hengyang. After the Japanese movement of their troops from Guangdong, he even planned to make a decisive war south of Hengyang, where General Fang weakened the Japanese force from the north and lured another Japanese force from the south. Instead of rushing the Canton reinforcements, he asked the commander of the 62nd Army, the only army with full strength nearby, to slow down in his attempt to reach Hengyang (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, July 1, July 5). Chiang did not know the Japanese thought similarly. They prepared to use a second attack wave to lure more Chinese reinforcements into Japanese traps. Aware of the Japanese moves outside Hengyang, he chose to interpret them as attempts to divert Chinese reinforcements in order to enable the attacking divisions to withdraw from Hengyang. Actually, by then the Japanese were able to use three divisions to cope with the Chinese reinforcements, while ordering the two divisions to make fresh attacks at Hengyang after supplying them with more provisions and ammunition.

During respites between the two waves of attacks, Chiang did not have the luxury of relaxation. Domestic and international public opinion continually questioned his ability to lead the nation, or at least to command his

army. Various rumors about Chiang and his family had been circulating in Chongqing since the spring, but then an anonymous letter in British English reached Madame Chiang, listing the extra-marital affairs and other heinous deeds of Chiang and his two sons, particularly his eldest son's bastard twins. As his wife was preparing for a long absence for medical treatment in Brazil, Chiang found it necessary for the couple to swear their moral integrity in front of very high ranking officials, foreign missionaries and dignitaries. At the very same time, the clash between Chiang and his American chief-of-staff General Stilwell also reached a climax. Urged by General Stilwell, President Roosevelt sent a telegram to Chiang and used the poor performance of his Chinese troops in the middle Yangtze to justify his urging him to entrust the whole Chinese army to General Stilwell. The fact that this telegram reaching his hand on the seventh anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the beginning of the War of Resistance, pained Chiang to the extreme (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, July 3-8; Chen 2012, 2, 850).

Strengthened with raining artillery shells and supported by domination of the skies, the Japanese army launched a second attack. Again the Japanese underestimated General Fang's tenacity and resilience. Five days after the attack, Chiang finally realized that the Japanese had no intention of abandoning their ambition to conquer Hengyang and dispatched about 30,000 fresh soldiers to the front (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, July 15). The Japanese army used the attack at the 10th Army as an opportunity to lure the Chinese reinforcements for annihilation. The 62nd Army of Canton hurried to Hengyang, but only reached the outskirts, where the Japanese dug in and, despite heavy casualties, refused to yield the road. In spite of Chiang's personal letter of encouragement, Fang's army was indeed exhausted; it could not even find a battalion of soldiers to bear arms and go outside the walls to welcome the reinforcements. After repeated orders, General Fang finally put up a ragtag battalion to do the job, but they were ambushed and annihilated no sooner than they had stepped outside the city walls (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, July 15-19, July 20). Chiang blamed the commander of 62nd army for timidity and cowardice, but the real reason was Japanese adjustment of their strategy. They decided to leave Fang's army aside while focusing on the assault and destruction of the reinforcements.

As the reinforcements failed to reach Hengyang near the end of July, Chiang's desperateness grew and it can be seen in his prayers. The very day after General Fang's failure to link with the 62nd Army on July 20, Chiang prayed to God, saying that he felt "entrapped in a well, facing only pitch dark walls and with wounds all over his body. If not extended a helping hand, he feared he would be condemned to eternal shame, unable to fulfil his endowed mission" (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, July 21). Five days later when he realized the futility of sending reinforcements, he even promised God to construct a huge iron cross on the top of the nearby Hengshan Mountain on his 60th birthday if granted victory, and a mass conversion of

the whole 10th Army to Christianity was promised. As nothing came from the prayers, he examined himself, stating that, "I could face heaven and earth, as well as ghosts and gods, with clear conscience. If God wants to fulfil his will through me as his tool, what enemy forces can beat me?". But realizing the Japanese determination to occupy Hengyang as well as the Wuhan-Guangdong Railroad, he admitted his inability to prevent it from becoming a reality, unless God intervened on China's behalf. Gradually he resigned himself to the inevitable, but, quoting from *The Streams in the Desert*, he considered all sufferings the badge of being one of the elect (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, July 25-26, July 31).

Beyond Chiang's expectations, Fang was able to hold out due to the fact that the Japanese army gave higher priority to the interception of Chinese forces in flanks, particularly the reinforcements outside Hengyang. During the respite between attacks, Chiang allowed himself the comfort of imagination. He imagined the Japanese attacking force as an arrow now approaching the end of its flight (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, August 1, August 3). Actually, the superior Japanese army that spread outside Hengyang easily beat away the 79th Army which came from north-western Hunan to lift the siege of Hengyang. However, the 62nd Army, which received some air support, was able to inflict high casualties on the invaders. After eight days' fighting, a large Japanese regiment had to use non-combat soldiers to stop a breakthrough of their positions (Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987c, 488-91). Meanwhile, four days after Chiang made the first observation that the Japanese force acted as an arrow of spent force which he could be brought to an end by his reinforcements, the Japanese strengthened its Hengyang army with two additional divisions, preparing to strike a crushing blow on Fang's decimated forces. After powerful artillery shelling, as well as air bombing and strafing, the attacking army quickly broke the backbone of the resistance force. General Fang sent in almost simultaneously three consecutive radio messages: First requesting reinforcements, then reporting urgency, and finally confessing "we are finished". Fifteen minutes later Chiang found a wave of Chinese air bombing put a stop to the Japanese offensive. He misread the temporary suspension of the offensive as proof that his prayer fifteen minutes ago elicited God's response (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, August 4).

Again, Chiang promised Fang that he would send a tank regiment from Guangxi to relieve the siege. He could not sleep that night, and after a prayer he began to rework the directive he had sent to the tank commander three days before, reminding him that they should reach Hengyang the same day and rush to the front with a company of infantry troops (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, August 5). The promised tank regiment never materialized. It actually made little advance due to topographical problems and Japanese mopping up campaigns along their planned route (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, August 12). Two days after the urgent notes mentioned above, Fang found he

had less than 2,000 men still capable of bearing arms, and most of them had no combat experience. Realizing his end was approaching, Fang and his division commanders sent Chiang a farewell telegram, pledging to fight to death (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, August 6-8). Fang then committed suicide, but failed because of the timely intervention of his subordinates. Unable to die and unable to fight, Fang eventually chose to negotiate for something like an honourable surrender. He promised to lay down weapons in exchange for medical treatment for all the wounded soldiers. The Japanese army accepted the conditions but later honoured only part of the agreement. General Fang was incarcerated in a Catholic church on a nearby mountain, albeit without strict surveillance.

Having received the farewell telegram, Chiang still harboured hopes. He interpreted an aerial intelligence report as suggesting that the situation could be improved if reinforcements were encouraged to move fast. On the very night of the farewell telegram, he got up three times to say prayers. Pondering heavenly principles, human affairs and his devotion to God, he thought he deserved a miracle bestowed from above, but further aerial reconnaissance soon revealed without a doubt that there was no longer any sign of Chinese resistance. Gripped by shame, grief and deep sorrow, Chiang tried to seek comfort from his wife, but she was thousands of miles away. Unable to reveal his emotion to his sons, he chose to recite Mencius: "vast-flowing passion-nature (*haoran zhiqi*) is exceedingly great, and exceedingly strong. Being nourished by rectitude, and sustaining no injury, it fills up all between heaven and earth. It is the mate and assistant of righteousness and reason. Without it, man is in a state of starvation" (Legge 1895, 190). Someone translates "vast-flowing passion-nature" as noble spirit. Only by identifying with Mencius' noble spirit or vast, flowing passion nature, he was able to live through the long ordeal of military debacles (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, June 7-9).

Unable to see General Fang as a traitor, Chiang simply dismissed the Japanese broadcasts that claimed Fang had raised white flags, begging surrender like the British general in Singapore. Before the broadcasts, Chiang had edited a short biography of General Fang, hoping to use his heroic exploits to encourage the rank and file. His order to distribute the biography met opposition from his staff, who were concerned about a possible sharp turn of events. Now Chiang had even more to worry about. Some people cited Japanese broadcasting to question General Fang's patriotism and cursed him as a traitor. American officers buttressed such accusations with a photograph at the scene of the negotiations, which only showed Fang's back without any clear signs of begging for peace. Despite all this contrary and embarrassing evidence, Chiang insisted on trusting Fang's patriotism and spent several more days finishing the latter's biography together with a telegram about the enormous sacrifices the 10th Army had made at Hengyang. Later Japanese changes of their story about

General Fang gave him some relief and comfort, with subsequent broadcasts claiming that negotiations had started after finding General Fang in a dugout rather than waving a white flag (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, August 9-12). These events continued to haunt China, however, especially after General Fang escaped from Japanese hands several months afterward. Despite favouring a reinstatement of Fang, however, Chiang had to confront loud public opinion that sang for high-pitch patriotism and demanded complete sacrifices for the resistance cause.

What General Stillwell's staff officer predicted as a defence unlikely to last more than 7 days turned out to be actually a defence lasting 47 days under overwhelming Japanese shelling and bombing. Despite his failure to honour his promise of suicide, Fang had accomplished what no other Chinese officers could do – write one of the best chapters of the resistance war. Two days after the ravaged city of Hengyang fell, Chiang made the following reflection on the 47 days' battle:

> My failure to grasp opportunities in guiding the war explains the fall of Hengyang. False intelligence accounts for the mistakes I have made. First I thought the Japanese army would withdraw out of their own accord. Next I underestimated the Japanese strength, refusing to hurry reinforcements. I frequently missed opportunities. Finally, the troops from Guangdong and Guangxi lost the will to fight and break the siege. I gave the tank formations three more days to prepare, but when I ordered immediate reinforcement they excused themselves, citing problems with rivers and topography. My agony and anger rose to extremes. The officers' intellect and the troops' command over techniques are so low. How our army can be called an army? How can we be spared insults from foreigners? The state of our army seemed to force me to hand training and command of the entire force to Stilwell. (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, August 10)

Chiang admitted that he had made many mistakes in directing the Hengyang campaign, but he placed more blame on failures of military intelligence and the training of his troops. Actually he had already by this time begun to ponder a military reform that aimed at improving the fighting capabilities of his army, although no concrete methods were adopted about improvements in military intelligence. Before the reform could have any effect, Chiang still had to use those resources at his disposal to continue the resistance. Meanwhile, as a national leader, he had to face serious challenges to his leadership. Internationally, the Americans criticized his poor leadership and pressured him to give command of his troops to General Stilwell. Domestically, the Chinese Communists began to win increasing sympathy and support from public opinion, and pressured him for a political reform. Chiang considered suicide, but a sense of historical

mission encouraged him to stand fast. He told himself, "as long as I lived, the country would have a future. Neither the Communist bandits nor the Japanese invaders would succeed if I were around. If I kill myself due to discouragement and pessimism, my country and people would then perish together" (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, August 11). Besides the trust of the soldiers and people, he emphasized that control over military and financial power would guarantee his ultimate success in dealing with both domestic and international enemies (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, August 11). In other words, he had no intention to relinquish his powers, let alone to a foreigner or a foreign country.

Now let me turn our attention to the third stage of the Japanese offensive, which aimed at Guangxi, where Generals Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi had retained much control and where the political dissenters of the Nationalist government congregated.

3 Defeatism vs Momentum: The Battles of Guangxi

The defense of Hengyang delayed the Japanese invasion of Guangxi by at least one month, but subsequent mopping-up actions in the area west of Hengyang secured railroad transportation from Hunan to Guangxi and set the stage for Japanese incursions into Guangxi. Initially, Chiang Kai-shek hoped his army in Hunan could discourage the Japanese from crossing the provincial borders, and for this purpose he sent the American-equipped 93rd Army from Chongqing to the front. Commanded by Chen Munong, a Hunanese general with credentials from the Whampoa Military Academy, the army was nicknamed as Chiang's "Praetorian Guard" in Chongqing, and most of its officers had graduated from the same Whampoa Academy. Despite being equipped with American weapons, and including both a tank battalion and an anti-tank artillery battalion, Chen and his army did not have time to reach southern Hunan for action, and stayed in Guangxi (Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987a, 385; Zhang 2008, 363).

Chiang's initial plan was to make a determined resistance in Quanxian and Guilin, while withdrawing his forces from Hunan along the Hunan-Guangxi Railroad. Quanxian, the gate to Guangxi, had been fortified several years earlier, when the Japanese made attacks from south China. After General Chen gave his vow to defend the strategically important county for at least three months, Chiang hurried his quartermasters to transport all provisions and ammunition needed for promised resistance. About ten days later, the commander of Fourth War Zone, Zhang Fakui, came to inspect the military positions and concluded that these so-called fortifications were not up to the standard. Without walls, in his judgment, Chen Munong could not hold the county for more than three days. Zhang

Fakui thus asked Chiang to rescind the earlier order, but to defend for two weeks in order to evacuate the stored ten thousand bombshells, one million rounds of bullets, sixteen thousand grenades and sixteen thousand sacks of rice (Zhang 2008, 364-6).

General Bai Chongxi accepted Chiang Kai-shek's initial plan, but when Zhang proposed the evacuation he responded favourably, eager to strengthen the defence of Guilin. Bai told Chiang he would hold Guilin for four to five months with the help of Karst caves and rock formations in its surroundings. Despite his chief-of-staff's opposition, Chiang finally agreed with the change of the plan. Two days later, General Bai suddenly joined hands with Zhang Fakui and urged Chiang to airlift all available troops from Sichuan and Guizhou to Guilin. Astonished by the request, Chiang refused flatly. It is unclear why General Bai made the sudden request; we only know that, on the same day, the Japanese crossed the border without knowing the terrain in the area. Perhaps Bai realized that the enemy had mobilized far more troops than he could imagine for the offensive against Guangxi. While six Japanese army divisions had expanded their control over south-western Hunan bordering Guangxi, four additional divisions were sent from the southeast (Guangdong and North Vietnam) and headed towards Liuzhou, which lies at south of Guilin. Chiang, still conceived of the Japanese army as an arrow of spent force, viewed the Guangxi army and militia as sufficient for defensive purposes, particularly after he had agreed with the evacuation of Chen Munong's 93rd Army. What he could not tell General Bai was his great concern for the security of Sichuan, where the residual warlords and the provincial elite had become restive because of his huge requisitions of human and grain resources (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, September 11).

To Chiang's surprise, Chen Munong made no resistance at all when the Japanese army launched a formal attack two days later, and his army began evacuation immediately. Chen's army even burned all the provisions and ammunition Chiang had prepared for them. Informed of the occurrence, Chiang was furious and ordered the commander of the Fourth War Zone to execute Chen Munong, who by this time had reached Guilin for safety. If he had known that Chen Munong's soldiers were staring at the Japanese crossing the river shielding Quanxian, he would have had more reason to shoot Chen, and had he read a Japanese colonel's assessment of the fortifications of Quanxian, he would have been absolutely furious. After inspecting the fortifications, the enemy officer came up with a conclusion completely different from Zhang Fakui. These fortifications were designed by the Central Government, consisting of concrete structures and moats five kilometres deep. The pillboxes were well-designed and placed. This Japanese colonel wondered why the Nationalist army gave up Quanxian without firing a shot (Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987c, 608, 738, 748-9, 752). General Stilwell was very upset about the yielding of Quanxian, and soon began to destroy the airfield of Guilin and evacuate its personnel and airplanes.

General Bai planned to defend Guilin with three of his top divisions under Wei Yunsong. On September 14, Generals Stilwell and Zhang Fakui came to Guilin to inspect the topography and preparations, and concluded it would be nearly impossible to defend Guilin for half a year as General Bai had claimed. Zhang, however, understood the political considerations requiring the Guangxi army to defend the provincial capital for at least several weeks, or better yet several months. He asked General Bai to allot three more Guangxi divisions for the defence of Guilin and the vicinity. General Bai concurred with Zhang's assessment. Contrary to what Chiang Kai-shek thought, the Japanese actually mobilized a force much larger than the Chinese generals had thought and the attack along the Hunan-Guangxi Railroad was coordinated with simultaneous offensives from Guangdong and North Vietnam at Liuzhou, the south gate of Guilin.

To orchestrate their campaigns, the Japanese army gave Guilin a respite of one and half months. During the period, Chiang Kai-shek was beset by domestic criticism of his leadership, and challenges to his legitimacy following the debacles in Henan and Hunan. The Communist Party also took advantage of the occasion to launch a skillful propaganda offensive against the Nationalist government, urging the end of Chiang's alleged dictatorship. But the greatest challenge came from his main war partner, the United States. President Roosevelt decided to throw his support for General Stilwell's grabbing the commandership over all troops within the China Theater, including the autonomous Communist forces. Viewing the proposal a great insult to both Chinese integrity and personal dignity, Chiang chose to risk an irreparable rupture of the Sino-American relationship and asked for General Stilwell's recall in late September. He eventually won the confrontation, but would pay a high price. Be that as it may, for one and a half months, Chiang was so preoccupied with the problem of General Stilwell that he made no interference in General Bai's actual command of the defense of Guilin.

As the Japanese army met little resistance along the Pearl River, Guilin was now exposed to a much stronger attacking force reinforced from Hunan. The Japanese offensive punched open the gate to Guilin, a train station, around 28 October, which worried Chiang enormously (Xu, *Riji* 1944, October 30; Chiang, *Riji* 1944, October 28, weekly reflection). Two days later, General Bai flew back to Chongqing and he sought to enlist aid for his position on the Guangxi Battle. The next day, he hurried to see Chiang's chief-of-staff and told him that it was meaningless to defend Guilin unless he could defend Liuzhou, because the fall of Liuzhou would expose Guilin to Japanese attack from both south and northeast. For this reason, Bai moved the three top divisions to defend the airfield of Liuzhou and in its lieu sent some inferior units for the defence of Guilin. He then attended a meeting of the Department of Military Command and severely criticized the neighbouring Combat Zones for their failure to launch diversionary

attacks, highlighting the futility of the defence of Guilin. Deputy Chief-of-Staff Liu Fei challenged this position, declaring that China no longer had space to exchange for time. Unless determined resistance was offered, the Nationalist government would be soon doomed. In Liu's view, only sacrifice could buy time for the Nationalist government. He criticized General Bai's transfer of three divisions of troops away from Guilin to Liuzhou (Xu, *Riji* 1944, October 31).

It was strange for Chiang to miss the important meeting. On that day, he opened the Bible after morning prayers and found the paragraphs 26 and 27 from chapter 39 of Ezekiel. He deciphered as a prophesy for recovering lost land and a blessing for the nation (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, October 31). However, when General Bai came to see him at lunch time the next day, instead of bringing good news, he again pleaded for reinforcements. Chiang told him it was too late to send more troops to Guilin, and that the request contradicted the original plan. General Bai would have no choice but to make do with troops available in Guangxi. Chiang also told him Bai that the situation in Liuzhou was hopeless, so Bai should concentrate on the defense of Guilin. In a passionate plea, Bai raised his voice, reddening his face and showing defiance, but nothing could swing Chiang. The conversation lasted two and half hours. Chiang confessed the "prating" stretched his patience to the limits, but congratulated himself for tolerance, magnanimity, and reasoning powers. He believed he had finally persuaded General Bai (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, November 1, November 4).

The next day, Chiang's minister of military command Xu Yongchang received a report from the general he had sent to the Guangxi front. This general found the topography advantageous and the fortifications excellent, but military morale was extremely low. The major reason was General Bai's redeployment of troops without the authorization of the higher command. Two of the three divisions Bai redeployed to Liuzhou were commanded by the nephews of Guangxi military leaders, and all the redeployed divisions were crack Guangxi troops. The remaining ones had been recently put together, were under-trained and under equipped, and commanded by inexperienced young generals. The report did not mention how much ammunition, provisions, and medical supplies were transported and stored in Guilin, but the quantities were deemed only enough for one to two months' determined resistance. The general concluded that it would be lucky for the Guangxi army to hold Guilin for two months (Xu, *Riji* 1944, November 2; Zhang 2008, 367).

It is unclear whether Chiang was informed of this report, but on 17 October, the Japanese started to attack Guilin after clearing out the Chinese defences nearby. Wei Yunsong held Guilin for only two days. Before Zhang Fakui conveyed his request for permission to make a breakthrough, he had already given his own orders for such a manoeuvre. Despite some heroic

resistance, Guilin fell after a battle lasting all of two days, instead of the expected two months.

The Japanese actually used three divisions to attack the larger Guilin area, but only used slightly more than one division for the attack on Guilin itself. The defence of Guilin's periphery lasted about two weeks. Yet the city defences held for only 48 hours. The same day Guilin fell, the victorious Japanese army moved swiftly southward to occupy the almost abandoned Liuzhou and the nearby airfield. Guilin fell before Liuzhou instead of the other way around as General Bai had forewarned. Despite high praise for their fighting capabilities and supporting militia system, General Bai's Guangxi army had performed disappointingly. Chiang could not believe that, with such large stores of ammunition, the Guangxi army could not resist less than one Japanese division for more than several hours, or only about 200 hours including the peripheral areas. He might be wrong on the exact time the defenses lasted, but he was certainly right in the easiness with which the Japanese army conquered Guilin. The military debacle greatly depressed Chiang (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, November 11-12).

To prepare the defence of Guilin, Bai began the evacuation of the civilian and dispensable government employees in June. The fall of Quanxian also sparked a wave of evacuations. The Japanese victory set more than 100,000 refugees to the roads or trails. A few lucky ones could board trains or climb on the roofs, but the majority had to trudge under constant Japanese bombing. Exhaustion, cold, starvation, and sickness beset them, and no help was in sight on the part of either the provincial army or government. Chiang had to order the authorities to offer charitable relief (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, November 4).

The fall of the provincial capital opened the door for the Japanese army to penetrate further into another province, Guizhou. Moreover, for Nationalist government, the defeat led to Sichuan students' protests, behind which, Chiang believed, were the manipulating hands of underground Communists. The residual warlords such as Long Yun and Pan Wenhua began to assert their autonomy again (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, November 9). Not only did the residual warlords from the Northwest begin to rethink their support of Nationalist rule, but also the war zone commander Xue Yue began to take "free actions", sending his brother's troops to occupy an airfield in the hope of gaining direct military aid from America (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, November 6-7). To make the matter worse, the US President used the corruption and poor performance of the Chinese army as justification for urging Chiang to compromise with the Communist Party. Ambassador Hurley even flew to Yan'an and, without prior consultations with Chiang, accepted all the conditions the Communists hoped but never expected to be agreed upon (essentially they asked for sharing military and political power with the Nationalist Party) (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, November 19, November 21, November 23). Chiang considered Hurley's concessions

to the Communists as detrimental as the fall of Guilin (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, November 11). And, as if these misfortunes were not enough, Stalin began to take revenge for Chiang's reassertion of the Chinese rule in Xinjiang by inciting a separatist movement there.

Chiang Kai-shek asked Commander Zhang Fakui to order Guilin commander Wei Yunsong to shoot Chen Munong immediately, but now Wei Yunsong disobeyed his orders of determined resistance and fled almost as fast as Chen Munong. Wei was a close follower of the Guangxi clique, and helped General Bai arrange his nephew's avoidance of being ensnared in the hopeless cause of defending Guilin. General Bai thus joined hands with another leader of the Guangxi clique and the commander of the Fifth War Zone, Li Zongren, to come to Chongqing to help save Wei Yunsong's life (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, November 17). An open court martial for Wei Yunsong was thus out of the question. Therefore, Chiang contradicted himself and, during a public occasion, pretended to have issued an oral permission for Wei Yunsong's breakout. Solidifying his cooperation with the Guangxi clique, however, Chiang still had to face the two Japanese divisions that followed the railroad westward.

The collapse of the Chinese troops after the fall of Guilin and Liuzhou encouraged the Japanese pursue the collapsed Chinese army, including the Guangxi army, to the end of the Guangxi-Guizhou railroad (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, November 25). In desperation, Chiang turned General He Yingqin and General Tang Enbo, and asked them to take over the defence of Guizhou. A native of Guizhou, General He was the chief of the Military Affairs Department and had formed a powerful military faction under Chiang with his Whampoa students. General Tang was also loyal, so Chiang asked him to lead his reorganized troops from Henan, mostly by walking for weeks through mountainous areas.

By this time another Whampoa general, Chen Sunong, and his reinforced 97th Army had reached the area. The 97th Army was considered another Praetorian Guard, which had spent one month forced-marching in straw sandals to Guangxi earlier after the loss of Quanxian. On 25 November, Chiang specifically ordered Chen Sunong to make a stand near the end of the Guangxi-Hunan railroad. Through General Tang Enbo, he asked Chen Sunong to fight to the last man. He also specifically instructed them that they should not open fire in darkness unless seeing the approaching enemy, and that they should quickly launch a counteroffensive from the flanks if the Japanese broke through their positions (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, November 25-26). But General Chen disappointed and disgraced him. After less than two days' engagement, he was found alone in a nearby military camp that served as Zhang Fakui's headquarters, where the previous day the American air forces mistook it for a Japanese concentration of forces and bombed to death more than one thousand soldiers, including one lieutenant general and two major generals, as well as uncounted number

of civilians (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, November 28, December, 2; Zhang 2008, 361, 363-6, 376, 378).[3] Scrambling for safety, General Chen made no effort to bring his radio equipment and accompanying code book (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, November 28-29).

Not knowing what happened to General Chen's defence, Chiang began to blame his military difficulties on the mass media. He attributed these disappointments to the Western press which, in his view, exaggerated the shortcomings of his army, painting a picture of starvation and sickness among the ranks and files and even striving to speculate on Chinese military moves. Chiang accused western reporters of revealing military secrets and encouraging the Japanese to undertake bolder pursuits (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, November 27-28). However, such imputations could not reverse the course of the war, and no evidence shows the Japanese were helped and encouraged by the Western press. The hard reality was that the Japanese army pursued relentlessly, and General Chen Sunong's army failed to stop the Japanese drive.

While constantly deriving courage from reading the Bible and *Streams in the Desert*, the distraught Chiang found additional ways to find comfort in his Christian faith. For no clear reason at all, he claimed God had promised him that the Japanese army would not enter Guizhou and because of His grace, so he could feel relaxed (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, November 29). Another night he dreamed about cleansing fecal pollution, which he persistently interpreted as a sign for turning danger into safety. He also opened the Bible after prayers to find signs. For example, he found in the 26 chapter of Samuel one account that King David got rid of Saul, and interpreted it as a portent for his army's ability to get rid of the pursuing Japanese army. Similarly, after saying a prayer and asking God to reveal his will on the Communist problem, he found the third chapter of Joshua, and deciphered it as the heavenly father's protection of him to endure through adversity so that his nation would revive (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, December 22). Regardless of what Chiang considered as good signs, the military reality remained bleak. When his American chief of staff, General Albert Wedemeyer, criticized the disheartening performance of his troops, dilatory working style of their supporting institutions, and General He Yingqin's failure to hurry home to assume commandership, Chiang listened silently with shame and resolved secretly to make commensurate reforms (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, November 30).

3 Zhang never mentioned his ever ordering Cheng Sunong to withdraw, but he sought to clear himself from the execution of General Chen Munong because he was considered the culprit for the death. He wanted to revenge the execution of Zhang Deneng. In order to clear himself, he even emphasized his urging Chiang to allow Chen Munong to evacuate before the Japanese offensive at the county.

The hot pursuit by two Japanese divisions did not allow Chiang the luxury of relaxation. Regardless of God's "promise", they still entered Guizhou and reached the end of the Guangxi-Guizhou railroad, while General He remained in Chongqing. General Wedemeyer promised to airlift two divisions from Burma, but the British blocked the decision. Unable to send timely reinforcements from Sichuan and elsewhere, Chiang was so shaken by this chain of events that he decided to abandon the provincial capital of Guizhou if the Japanese chose to pursue further. General Wedemeyer saw the possibility of the Japanese entering Sichuan, proposing to consider moving the war capital from Chongqing to Kunming. Chiang understood what the abandonment of Chongqing meant for his government, and flatly rejected this proposal. His heart was warmed by General Wedemeyer's pledge to stay with him if worst came to worst, but he still lamented the same general's failure to understand his readiness to die for righteousness (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, November 30, December 1-4, December 10). Logistical considerations led the Japanese vanguards to stop pursuits, despite their having decimated many Nationalist units. Chiang soon came to his senses. Commenting that "God delivered his promise to protect China", he persuaded the American embassy in Chongqing to stop evacuating the Americans, a move widely interpreted by the local people as a sign of the imminent entry of Japanese soldiers and the collapse of the Chongqing government (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, December 5). Despite the improving situation, the British embassy intended to evacuate its citizens, and that night Chiang again dreamed of cleansing faecal pollution and even *heard* some strange sounds of "leaving credentials (*liu guoshu*)", which he again interpreted as a good sign for turning defeat into victory (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, December 7). When he heard of the recovery of the last terminal on the railroad line, he thanked God for realizing his promise (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, December 8). Despite the stabilization of the military situation, the damage of the authority of the government was done. Like the strongmen in Henan, local "warlords" and secret society leaders of Guizhou used the slogan of protecting one's home to disarm some of the disintegrated army (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, December 12).[4] Increasingly more intellectuals tilted to the Communist side and the warlord generals Long Yun and Pan Wenhua began to ponder bolder challenges to Chiang's authority. Even within the Nationalist Party, Chiang now faced more serious challenges than Sun Yatsen's son Sun Fo's criticism. Fortunately, he had the cooperation with

4 Chiang never mentions Tang Enbo's disarming of General Chen Munong's retreating army around this time. The army that was most officered by his Huangpu students played no role in the defence of Guilin. It soon fell into disarray, extorting and plundering local administration and people. Their misdeeds eventually forced Chiang Kai-shek to send in Tang Enbo's army to disarm them. See Zhang 1992, 34-8; Shi 1986, 188-200. General Shi Jue who was entrusted with the job mistook the 93rd army as Gan Lichu's 6th army.

the United States, which had sent Wedemeyer to serve him as his chief of staff; together they began to reorganize the badly mauled Nationalist army with American training and ammunition.

Chiang ordered a court martial for General Chen Sunong, who had fled the battle without permission from his commanding officer. He pleaded that his unit had been undermanned, and that despite this constraint he had fought the Japanese for seven days and seven nights. He also pointed out that Chiang's order reached him only after the decimation of his unit, and that it was the commander of the Fourth War Zone who urged him to leave the battlefield. Japanese accounts hinted at the unexpectedly strong resistance of his army, but do not show that such resistance actually constituted an obstacle to Japanese progress, with hard fighting lasting only for one day. Chen Sunong's claim about an order from the Fourth War Zone is doubtful. Without radio equipment, how could he receive any orders from Zhang Fakui? He should have seen the commander himself in order to get authorization for his departure from the battlefield. At any rate, his Whampoa instructor, Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin (nicknamed Grandma for his protection and indulging of his Whampoa Military Academy students) vouched for Chen's good conduct and worked with the chief military judge who had a reputation for socializing to seek his release. He was imprisoned only because of Chiang's adamant insistence. In the end, General Chen Sunong had to wait for three more years to secure a complete acquittal and reinstatement of military position due to the intervention of another Whampoa instructor, Gu Zhutong, who now served as the chief of staff of acting President Li Zongren, the Guangxi militarist who had forced Chiang Kai-shek to resign from the Nationalist government (He 1986, 560, 576, 679; Chen 1974, 65-80; Zhang 2008, 376-7; Nihon Boeijo boeikenshujo senshishitsu 1987a, 761).

4 Reform and Rectification of the Nationalist Army

No serious attempt at military reform could be detected in the military conference called in the Hengyang, Hunan, after the Lunar New Year of February 1944 (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, February 19). During the defence of Changsha, Chiang Kai-shek had ordered this conference to be reconvened in order to reform and rectify the army. This decision certainly had something to do with Roosevelt's support for Stilwell about the Chinese military command. Chiang found the military performance in Henan was so embarrassing that he had to do something to remedy the situation. The agenda Chiang had in mind included the following priorities: a system for military conscription, grain taxation from the rural sector, the elimination of unaccounted military units, the training and treatment of new recruits, reducing the size of the army by disbanding superfluous units, raising

wages for soldiers and officers, eliminating army's smuggling activities, minimizing and controlling army's commercial adventures, and last, getting rid of the army's habit of "eating the ghost soldiers", by which officers claimed a payment unwarranted by actual number of soldiers (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, July 8; agenda for this week). If this list can serve as an indicator of Chiang's sense of urgency, we see that he was concerned first and foremost with the extraction of resources from society, second the performance of his troops, and third breaches of military discipline by engaging in smuggling and commercial activities.

What he saw and heard about the military conscription gave him deep grief and pain. During the fighting of Lingbao, he witnessed a group of peasant recruits roped and herded like animals by county militiamen. He was so angry that he lost his temper and stopped his limousine, stepping down and beating two officers with a cane. He thought "If such an illegal matter can be seen here, we should have no difficulty in imagining what actually happens outside the capital" (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, June 7).[5] During the interlude between the Henyang and Guilin battles, one of his sons informed him about abuses against recruits by transport team. The angry father asked the responsible ministers and concerned officials to come to the scene to see the maltreatment with their own eyes. Having witnessing the sick, starving, and beaten recruits, he suddenly lost his temper and used his stick to hit the responsible platoon leader and even the lieutenant general in charge of the Bureau of Military Recruitment, who had reached the house late because the previous night his underlings gave him a farewell banquet, in which Beijing opera was staged followed by a game of mah-jong to celebrate his promotion (Shen, Lan 2003; Cheng 2012a, 2012b, 2012b).[6] Chiang did not know the cause of his being unable to appear on time at the scene, but, simply unable to bear such miserable sights and needing to vent his anger, he beat the two until they bled. Chiang instructed other higher ranking officers who were present to stay in the room and engage in self-reflection (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, August 30).

Unfortunately, Chiang's anger and punishment did not end these abuses, specifically the maltreating, scolding, beating, starving, and even killing of recruits, not to mention the inadequacy of clothing and medical treatment, all problems that continued to haunt the Nationalist army. Chiang sought to improve the system by issuing detailed instructions about the transport of recruits from their home to the front or by ordering the gendarmes to immediately report all the abuses and their perpetrators, while

5 Chiang asked for investigation into abuses of recruits in a county of the Fifth War Zone. The county was alleged to give recruits only a meal a day (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, January 24).

6 It is difficult to check the accuracy of the digital materials. According to these materials, Cheng was a local militarist with ties to the provincial networks of elder brother society.

specifying minimum provisions for recruits such as bed, quilt, and clothing (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, September 1). However, a list of factors such as budget constraints, institutional backlogs, the low standards of recruits, and the intervention of local elites all prevented Chiang him from putting an end to the reoccurring sights of roped recruits, despite the upgrading of the Bureau of Military Recruitment to a ministry, which was asked to double its efforts to send recruits after the loss of the human resources from the three provinces of Henan, Hunan, and Guangxi (Lu et al. 2011).

Chiang also knew that the loss of Henan, Hunan, and Guangxi meant the doubling or tripling of the grain burden for the peasants in the unoccupied areas, particularly Sichuan. During the Japanese offensive, he had also noticed the increasing impact of grain requisitions. He never mentioned Tang Enbo's alienating peasants by the army's direct and relentless grain acquisitions from the rural areas, but he certainly noticed heavy taxation had already led to local uprisings in Guizhou and that the abuses of military men had led to a large-scale rebellion of peasants in northern Hubei in early November 1944, which ended in the killing of 20,000-300,000 people (similar riots occurred in Sichuan) (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, November 4). Chiang asked landlords and rice merchants to shoulder larger burden by purchasing national bonds (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, September 2, September 10, September 12), but unlike his Communist foes, he never exploited the class antagonism and the redistributive mechanisms behind such policies as reasonable burden (actual tax burden redistribution) and rent and interest reduction to mobilize peasants into pressuring the wealthy (landlords, rich peasants and other rural elite) to shoulder larger financial burden. Later, nobody could miss the alienating effects Chiang's extractive policies engendered, actually prompting many Sichuan local elites and strongmen to turn a blind eye to and to even support the Communist conquest in 1949. To increase peasant incomes, the Communist Party encouraged cooperative movements, but even though Chiang meant to duplicate these experiences, he could not make progress due to the failure of his grass-roots officials to mobilize and organize peasants.

Like their Communist counterparts, the Nationalists suffered from inflation fed by rapidly growing war expenses. However, the difference of scale was enormous because the Nationalist government had to finance a much larger army and bureaucracy, the latter of which had grown by leaps and bounds because of the urgency to control and mobilize national resources. Unable to cover these expenditures with tax incomes, whether in currency or grain, the state sought stringent methods to control the price of commodities, but this often prompted hoarding and therefore drove the inflation rate even higher. These experiences led to much more detrimental effects in the Nationalist than in the Communist areas. Other than alienating the business sector, Chiang could only seek means to lower the financial spending of his government, but, unlike the Communists,

he could not adopt a similar policy of mobilizing soldiers to engage in production. Needless to say, any effort to cut down the size of the bureaucracy also failed. Instead, Chiang began to overlook military involvement in smuggling and commercial activities, because he knew very well that the army suffered from insufficient military budgets. While such profits could relieve the commanding officers of their financial anxiety, venturing into the spheres of smuggling and commercial activities gave rise to rampant corruption. Some of the commanding officers even allowed their dependents to step into the forbidden fields of fortune-gathering. During the Henan debacle, Chiang noted that General Tang Enbo's doing business with the Japanese occupied areas had handicapped efforts to train his army (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, May 4), and later he also considered smuggling and commercial activities a key cause of his military defeat, second only to the appearance of many Chinese traitors. The commanding officers' involvement in smuggling and commerce in the name of the insufficient provisions not only alienated the people but also eroded military morale (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, July 24). However, being unable to eliminate such practices, Chiang later only specifically forbade military dependents' engaging in smuggling and commercial activities (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, October 31).

Due to public accusations that he had amassed a private fortune, General Tang Enbo handed Chiang all of his ledgers for judicial investigation, and simultaneously promised to hand over all of his earnings. However, he seemed to be alone in so doing. To put things in a comparative perspective, the Chinese Communists in at least the Yan'an areas in 1943 also encouraged their military units, as well as the branches of their regime, to find other means of raising funds and actually acquiesced in their commercials activities. The difference was that the Communist authority could later terminate these widespread practices and urge all the military units to turn over their hidden "treasures". In contrast, Chiang could not find ways of curbing ranking officers' undertaking of the smuggling and commercial activities, particularly among the top brass.

While encouraging the self-reliance of military units, the Communists also resorted to the planting and trading of opium to tide over their financial difficulties (Chen 1995; Xiao 2013, 399, 457). Chiang Kai-shek could not imitate similar policies, even though his anti-opium policy failed to eliminate the opium sale and addiction in the area under his control. For him, Western credits and loans became the only way out, but neither the United States nor the British were willing to provide the needed sums, and both powers used corruption to justify their asking for stringent supervision of these funds' use, even though they had agreed to extend a helping hand.

As a military man, Chiang placed top priority in training and equipping his army with weapons and expertise provided by the United States, a task now possible after General Wedemeyer had replaced General Stilwell

as his chief of staff. Other than mobilizing students to form a new army, Chiang sought to reform his army into one blessed with adequate pay, equipment, and training. Minimizing starvation and sickness, as well as guaranteeing minimum provisions to soldiers and adequate payment to his officers, became his top concerns, and he severely scolded his chief quartermaster for not paying soldiers on time and even dismissed him from the job temporarily in a fit of rage (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, September 6, September 12-13; Xu, *Riji* 1944, September 9).[7] He also blamed Minister of Military Affairs He Yingqin for only knowing the need to save money without any sympathy for soldiers' starvation (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, August 18).

Be that as it may, Chiang first had to reduce the discrepancy between authorized strength and actual strength, and standardize all the Nationalist military units. Resistance from commanding officers seemed overwhelming, for they inherited a military culture that saw their forces as private property. While facing strong resistance to his determination to reduce the size of the Nationalist army, Chiang still had to do something about the starving, sickness, and malnutrition of his forces. He did try to increase payments for the officers and soldiers, but his reforms could simply not stand up to the eroding power of the inflation; financial constraints set severe limits on what he could achieve.

Once the military crisis the Japanese offensive had engendered was over and US-China relations had improved, Chiang found more time to ponder military reforms and the concrete measures needed for implementing them. His top priority was to take advantage of American expertise and equipment to create a completely new army, including the mobilization of junior and senior high school students to join a new youth expeditionary army, a move he had already started. A more important task was to have 50 army divisions equipped with American weapons and trained by American advisors. At the same time, Chiang sought to reorganize the forces already under his control, and sought to eliminate rampant factionalism and cronyism, both of which he had inherited from the warlord period and compounded by his mishandling of the problem of military personnel, a job handicapped by his seemingly favorable treatment of former Whampoa instructors and graduates, who usually had no training commensurate with their assignment.

The Communists had initiated similar reforms by introducing a hierarchal system of compensation, albeit starting from a very low point in a seemingly egalitarian world. Chiang's bureaucracy and army had suffered tremendously from the war induced inflation. The purchasing power of their payments only amounted to 20% in 1940 and 10% in 1944. He faced

7 Thanks to the pleading of General Feng Yuxiang, the chief quartermaster retained his job on probation.

far more difficulties in improving their material lives. The Communists faced criticism from intellectuals who craved an egalitarian social order, but Chiang faced different challenge, namely finding resources to pay the rapidly growing military budget. Now with the help of General Wedemeyer, he set one US dollar a month as the goal for improving his soldiers' treatment. Furthermore, he began to see the urgency in reorganizing his central and regional military headquarters, strengthening the troops directly under central control (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, December 10). It was difficult to find generals up to the challenges, but he finally prevailed upon General Chen Cheng to take over the difficult task of reforming the Ministry of Military Affairs (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, December 14).[8] On the basis of his recommendations, Chiang began to reshuffle major military personnel and allocate them with American weapons (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, December 10, December 13, December 15, December 16, December 20, December 23, December 2). With American help, he also sought to establish personnel and logistic systems (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, December 19), but despite his numerous moral exhortations and official injunctions, these reforms were slow to make an impact. The way of reform and rectification was long and protracted, and abuses within the military forces plus their negative repercussions on society continued to haunt him. Late in 1944, he continued to face difficulties in dealing with the factionalism rampant in the military forces, as his officers continued to act with personal interests and sentiments as topmost concerns (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, December 27). He also still saw his soldiers clothed like beggars (Chiang, *Riji* 1944, December 28). After one year, he did equip about 50 divisions with American training and equipment, but once the civil war broke out the military expenses again rocketed and without a sound financial base and American's consistent and sympathetic help, Chiang had to cope with the inevitable super inflation, which seriously eroded military morale and fighting capabilities. In contrast, the Communists armies had built themselves a solid supporting structure in the countryside, and the peasants readily responded to the Communist calls for supplying soldiers and logistical support. In time, these factors contributed to the defeat of Chiang's army.

8 Chiang gave a list of people whom he planned to use, but it is unclear what he would do with the list. The list includes Whampoa generals Liu Zhi, Wang Maogong, Song Xilian, Du Yuming, Kang Ze, Liu Kan, non-Whampoa generals Xu Yongchang, He Guoguang, He Yaozu, Wang Zuanxu and the professionals of the political science group Wu Dingchang, Zhang Gongquan, Chen Yi, Xiong Shihui,and a CC clique related technocrat Zhen Yangfu.

5 Conclusions

Based on the data presented above, I would like to offer some concluding observations about the Ichigo Offensive. Despite his determination to fight the invaders to death, whether for nationalist dignity, personal ambition or both, Chiang persistently underestimated the Japanese ability to launch attacks on a scale larger than the 1941 campaigns against either Changsha or Changde, which his armies had resisted until the Japanese were forced to withdraw. While Chiang's intelligence people are hardly free from blame, his temperament and misjudgements also played a role in undermining Nationalist military campaigns. Once the Japanese launched their unprecedented scale of attacks, Chiang had no strategic alternative other than holding a city, weakening the attacking forces, and mobilizing a much larger force to hopefully inflict a crushing blow on the Japanese forces. Unfortunately, this strategy backfired on three accounts. First, the Japanese army often placed higher priority on the attacking peripheral forces in order to isolate the chosen city. Second, the Japanese placed higher priority to the interception and annihilation of the Chinese reinforcements than the occupation of important cities. Third, the Chinese defenders with the exception of the Fang Xianjue's 10th Army barely lived up to Chiang Kai-shek's expectations. Zhang Deneng's 4th Army, Chen Munong's 97th Army, Chen Sunong's 93rd Army and Wei Yunsong's Guangxi Army all failed to deliver on their promised performances. The Luoyang defenders were essentially satisfactory, but Chiang was simply unable to amass enough troops to take advantage of their defense. At the same time, Chiang was lucky merely because the Japanese army allowed serious logical constraints to dictate their strategy. Moreover, enemy forces were unable to think boldly in their penetration into China's hinterlands.

In contrast, the Chinese Communists fully understood their weaknesses in the face of the Japanese pacification army, and chose not to meet enemy attacks headlong while also trying to avoid enemy attention. As a result of the so-called One hundred regiment offensive in 1940, the Japanese army wreaked large-scale retaliation against the base areas behind the Japanese fronts. By all accounts, Communist base areas shrank enormously, and the population declined almost by one half. The Communist party state barely survived, but still managed to consolidate rural support. No public opinion compared them to the Nationalist armies and blamed them for their failure to hold Chinese land. Eager for victory, the Japanese army instead dealt deadly blows on the Nationalist regular armies, which actually coexisted with the Communist guerrillas in the same north China areas, particularly the Nationalist armies in southern and eastern Shanxi. The Nationalist regular army was also forced to evacuate from Shandong and Chiangsu. The shrinkage of the Communist territory resulted in the transfer of cadres *en mass* and financial burdens to the Yan'an area. Similar effects occurred

in Chongqing after the loss of Henan, Hunan, and Guangxi, with the Communist army taking advantage of the chaos for territorial expansion. The Communist base areas behind the Japanese front also expanded because the Japanese army had to shift its garrison forces to fight the Nationalists. In short, the Communists actually experienced a revival during and after the Ichigo Offensive. As a result, when the civil war finally broke out, the Communist base areas behind the Japanese front could delay and dilute Chiang Kai-shek's offensive, thereby enabling the Communist army to compete for the control of Manchuria. The Communist forces also reversed their military fortunes after Chiang's forces overextended their logical lines and brought about a period of unprecedented inflation.

Chiang Kai-shek's military reforms assumed whole-hearted support of the United States, and the Nationalist army he reorganized with American help initially performed well once the civil war broke out. However, once the United States withdrew its military and economic support, his army immediately faced insurmountable difficulties. Chiang could neither build solid grass-roots support nor recapture the acquiescence of the upper strata of the society, such the intellectuals, the landlord-gentry and the commercial interests. These cascading series of military debacles ended up sealing Chiang Kai-shek's destiny.

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Chiang Kai-shek and His Time
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The Relationship Between Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Cheng in Taiwan as Appears from Chen Cheng's Diary

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Abstract In recent year Chen Cheng's personal diaries have been donated to the Academia Sinica's Institute of Modern History. This is a very valuable source to study Chen Cheng's personal history as a military and a politician, but also to gain a better understanding of the inner history of the Guomindang and its government and political dynamics before and after 1949. Using both Chen Cheng' diary and Chiang Kai-shek's diary, this paper investigates the relationship between Chen and Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan as transpires from these documents. It focuses on some key moments of their relationship in the after-1949 period, as the first month after the Guomindang's retreat to Taiwan, and the span of time between 1958 and 1961, just before Chen Cheng's withdrawal from the political scene.

Keywords Diary of Chen Cheng. Chen Cheng. Chiang Kai-shek. Taiwan Years.

In recent years, the opening of the Chen Cheng Archives at the Academia Historica in Taibei (officially "Vice President Chen Cheng Heritage") and the publication of Chen Cheng's memoirs, letters and other historical materials concerning him have made the study of Chen Cheng and of the history of the Republic of China and of contemporary Taiwan much easier.

My own research focuses on Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan and during a visit to Taibei in September 2012, I was informed that the scanning of another important source, that is Chen Cheng's personal diary, donated by the family to the Institute of Modern History at Academia Sinica, had been completed. Since I had never heard of the existence of Chen Cheng's surviving diary before, I was very happy, and immediately applied to view these documents before I left Taiwan. Unfortunately, on that occasion I could work on them for just a day. In fact, when I had the chance to go

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back to Taiwan and applied again to read the diary, I was told that, in accordance with the wishes of Chen's family, it was temporarily unavailable. To date, I am the only scholar who has had the opportunity to read Chen Cheng's diary held in those archives.[1]

Due to the very short time (just one day) I was able to dedicate to this work, I concentrated on the sections of Chen Cheng's diary concerning Chiang Kai-shek. In this paper, I first introduce the diary and then investigate the relationship between Chen and Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan as transpires from these documents.

1 A General Introduction to Chen Cheng's Diary

Chen Cheng's diary represents one important part of the material donated by Chen Cheng's family to the archives of the Institute of Modern History at Academia Sinica and it is available as digital images. Since I could read these documents only as computer files, and I have not been able to work on the originals, the documents quoted in this paper are indicated with their "digital image file number".

The diary consists of 28 volumes, which cover a period of 33 years from 1931 to 1964. Some years are missing, and in some cases even if the diary for that year exists, there are actually no daily entries.

The specific situation for each year is given below:

- 1931: two volumes, the first covering the period from January to June, 94 pages long; the second, 177 pages long, from July to December;
- 1932: one volume, 12 pages;
- 1937: one volume, 163 pages.

These first four journals were written in the "soldier's diary" issued by the Central Executive Commission of the Guomindang.

- 1939: four volumes, the first one is 85 pages long; the second just 4 pages, the "work diary for the inspections in Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan and Chiangxi"; the third one is 61 pages long; and the fourth, 137 pages long, consisting of an ordinary notebook;
- 1940: one volume, 53 pages;
- 1942: one volume, 140 pages, on its cover is written "The Diary of Shi Sou (the old man of the stone, a pseudonym of Chen Cheng's)".
- 1943: one volume,163 pages;
- 1944: three volumes, the first is 274 pages long; the second is just 58 pages long, and consists of the work diary of the inspections to Shaanxi and Henan; the third, the "Diary of Shi Sou" has 82 pages;

1 According to a friend in Taiwan, the publication of *Chen Cheng's Diary* has already been planned.

- 1945: two volumes, the first is 31 pages long; the second 10 pages long, an ordinary school exercise notebook that says "army demobilization meeting";
- 1946: one volume, 73 pages;
- 1950: one volume, 103 pages;
- 1954: one volume, 40 pages;
- 1955: one volume, only 7 pages;
- 1956: one volume, 32 pages;
- 1958: one volume, 239 pages;
- 1959: one volume, 190 pages;
- 1960: one volume, 241 pages;
- 1961: one volume, 267 pages;
- 1962: one volume, 266 pages;
- 1963: one volume, 252 pages;
- 1964: one volume, 27 pages. Chen Cheng's last diary covers the period from 24 January 1964, to the date of his death on March 4, 1965, 13 months overall.

Starting from 1931, Chen Cheng's diary covers fifteen years overall, since the diaries for the years 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1938, 1941, 1943, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1957, 1965 are missing; moreover, he did not write every day in each year. Until 1961, there are only 267 pages, all told. Conversely, the diaries from 1958 to 1963 (six years) are relatively intact, and rich in content. As work diaries, they mostly did not concern Chen's private life and feelings.

I do not know whether the Chen Cheng diaries held in the archives of the Institute of Modern History include all the diaries that Chen Cheng kept, or just the ones which were preserved or which his family decided to donate. It is my contention that it is just what survived. Since the diaries donated by the family also include a lot of information about the conflicts between Chen and Chiang, it is hardly likely something could have been hidden because of its sensitive nature. Nevertheless, Chen Cheng's intermittent diary and Chiang Kai-shek's long-term, continuous diary are in stark contrast. From the perspective of content, Chen Cheng's writings are more similar to a "work journal", describing work and travel activities as "records schedules", barely touching on his personal life and emotions.

Despite the flaws, Chen Cheng's diaries do cover the period of the anti-Japanese War, the Civil War and his life in Taiwan. Considering Chen's status within the Guomindang, his diaries not only enrich what we know of his personal history, but also provide more insight into the history of the Guomindang, of the Republic of China, and of contemporary Taiwan.

The author is interested in offering a parallel reading of Chen Cheng's and Chiang Kai-shek's diaries in order to compare how some events were recorded by each in these sources.

2 Chen Cheng's Questioning of Chiang's Capacities After the Withdrawal to Taiwan

At the end of 1948, before Chiang Kai-shek stepped down, he hastily appointed Chen Cheng, at that time recovering from illness in Taiwan, to replace Wei Daoming as the Chairman of the Taiwan Provincial Government. In the struggle between Chiang Kai-shek and Li Zongren, Chen Cheng stood firmly by Chiang's side, and took several measures to stabilize the situation in order to lay the foundations for Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang regime's retreat to Taiwan. Chiang praised Chen Cheng's capacity to pacify Taiwan in 1949 highly:

> At that time, if Cixiu [the *zi* name of Chen Cheng] had not been in charge of the political power and had not actively done the clean-up work, the situation would have been more dangerous than the February 28th Incident in 1947. (Chiang, *Riji* 1949, "This year's most depressing and difficult events", December 31)

Nevertheless, as it concerned the loss of the mainland, Chen Cheng initially raised doubts about Chiang's ability and approach. These doubts were not rare among the Guomindang's senior generals, an instance being Zhou Zhirou's complaints about Chiang's meddling in the military aviation's affairs (Chiang, *Riji* 1949, June 6).[2] Chiang was very sensitive regarding his generals' doubts (Chiang, *Riji* 1949, May 25).[3]

By the end of 1949, the United States were opposed to Chen Cheng's rule of Taiwan, and they put Chiang under pressure to replace Chen using American economic assistance as bait, "they use intimidation, if I do not replace the old leaders, I will not get any American aid" (Chiang, *Riji* 1949, November 16).

Aware he could not trust the Unites States and without any way out Chiang Kai-shek decided to "risk once again", and he replaced Chen Cheng with Wu Guozhen, whom the Americans preferred.

2 In Chiang Kai-shek's diary we read "after the morning prayers, I read the letter of Zhou Zhirou to Jingguo, it said 'the President still has direct control over the cadres, and this could potentially damage the power of the aviation's commanders'. When I read this I became very upset. I think that because Zhou did not agree to go to Taiwan and has some resentment towards Cixiu, he is unexpectedly jealous of my power, this is really unbelievable" (Chiang, *Riji* 1949, June 6).

3 As Chiang wrote in his diary on May 25th "I feel that the civil and military officers are arrogant, their attitude towards me is not the same as before, and Guo and Chen all like that". On June 6th he wrote: "This afternoon I summoned all the commanders, Liu Ruming, Wang Jingjiu, Shen Facao, Gui Yongqing, and Tang Enbo, to again discuss the defense of Taiwan with Cixiu and Xueting. The opinion of the commanders is quite strong, they complain that I interfere improperly; Zhou Zhirou's letter is quite revealing, it is really sad".

At that time, as governor of Taiwan, Chen really meant to make a difference and was very reluctant to resign, but eventually he complied with Chiang's decision. In his letter of resignation addressed to Chiang Kai-shek he wrote:

> I would not accept to resign for the relationships with the Communist bandits; nor would I stand to resign for the relationship with Taiwan compatriots; I would be willing to do it just for our personal relationship and for these diplomatic relations there could be only resignation. You said that we must take the risk, and I will accept and stand humiliation. While serving, I encouraged myself to think that "in order to carry out an important mission you have no reason not to endure humiliation; if you want to complete it, you must necessarily accept it", and now I console myself with this. (Chen, *Riji* 1949, 740)

The passage from "I would not accept to resign" to "there could be only resignation" shows that Chen Cheng was surprised and puzzled, and that he even felt wronged by Chiang's decision. Eventually, though, he obeyed loyally.

On January 5th, 1950, while chairing a meeting of the Research Institute on Revolutionary Practice as president (*congcai*), Chiang Kai-shek acknowledged that the Guomindang's policies on the continent "must be considered as a complete failure", and that the causes of that failure were his own retirement and the fact that "the Guomindang had lost its center and was disorganized", stressing that "in the future we must start again" (Chen, *Riji* 1950, January 5).[4]

Chen Cheng spoke at the meeting, and pointed out that the withdrawal of a large number of troops and institutions to Taiwan had brought the island's economy close to collapse, and that it was imperative to consider how to stabilize the economical and financial situation:

1. As concerns military expenses, we must use what we need, but we must abide by the principle of not weakening the whole economy and finance; about the sale of public properties and goods, we must know who the purchasers would be, and once everything is sold what can we do?
2. (a) I hope that the funds regarding military expenditure will be kept in the Bank of Taiwan. (b) The number of personnel must be verified. (c) Smuggling must be banned. All these three points must be accomplished, especially the verification, and to verify the officers is the most important thing (Chen, *Riji* 1950, January 5).[5]

4 Digital File Number (hereinafter DFN) 085-05-0018.

5 DFN 085-05-0018.

Chen Cheng's questions and suggestions show that he did not agree with Chiang Kai-shek's initiatives. Chiang sent Wang Shijie to persuade Chen not to be so negative. Chen Cheng said he was not negative, "but I do not know how I can be positive. Now, if we are taking a self-destructive way (selfish and self-deceptive), should we not change this destiny? Or should we commit suicide?" (Chen, *Riji* 1950, January 7).[6] Chen Cheng believed that Chiang Kai-shek's priority should be to deal with the great issues, and he personally persuaded Chiang not to waste time on details, but "to focus on what was really urgent" (Chen, *Riji* 1950, January 8).[7]

A few days later, again chairing a meeting on political work, Chiang Kai-shek stressed that the most important reason for the loss of the mainland was the failure of the political work inside the army and that it was necessary to reconstruct.

Chiang specifically asked Chen Cheng to speak out, pushing him to express his opinions. Chen believed that the reason for the defeat in the mainland was first of all political, and only secondly military, and that "the political work in the army cannot bear the full responsibility for the military defeat" (Chen, *Riji* 1950, January 12).[8] Holding a meeting on the political work was not urgent, so he said:

> I do not oppose this policy, but in doing things there are some priorities. According to my observation the Communist objectives regarding Taiwan are: first, they expect that there may well be domestic unrest; two, they can infiltrate and instigate rebellions; three, they can carry out a military attack. The area we control in Taiwan is only 3/1000, and the population is 1/60; as for the time, January, February and March are the most valuable period, during this period we must not procrastinate, we must not be chaotic, nor make bad mistakes. As might be considered from the position of the President, the most urgent matters are: since nowadays there is anarchy and the people's hearts are shaken we must think how to improve the government and to reassure the people. The most urgent tasks of high functionaries and officers are: first organize the army, second prepare the war. Today we are not doing these things, it is frightening. (Chen, *Riji* 1950, January 12)[9]

Moreover, Chen Cheng did not agree with Chiang's proposal – raised at the meeting – to promote the policy of military farming units (*bingnong*

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heyi) as Yan Xishan had did in Shanxi Province, "[I] simply do not agree with such a backward idea". As it concerned Chiang's proposal for hiring former Japanese officers as advisers(which later became the 'white group'), for "both the political and academic aspects", Chen Cheng did not publicly express his opinion, but wrote in his journal, "with regard to this proposal, those in favour are few, only Wan Yaohuang does his best to support it because of his servilism" (Chen, *Riji* 1950, January 12).[10] Obviously he disagreed.

During that time, Chen Cheng conducted a comprehensive self-examination regarding the causes of the failure of the Guomindang on the mainland. He wrote:

> There are many causes for today's defeat, but the most important factors have been that the leader did not distinguish the good from the evil, and this made the high officials self-deceptive and selfish to the point that in the domestic field they lost the support of the people, and in relations with the outer world, they refused the right help.
>
> The critical key to the survival of the Party and the State, to the success or the failure of the revolution is that if the leader does not examine things he will be unwise, and if he does not decide he will not act with humanity; and if the cadres do not speak out they will not be loyal, and if they do not act, they will not be just.
>
> Without wisdom and humanity, how can it not be a general evil?
>
> Without loyalty and justice, how can the guilt not be deep?
>
> In the domestic field, losing the heart of the popular masses, in the relations with the outer world, refusing the correct help, how can you expect anything other than defeat? (Chen 1950, January 12)[11]

Chen Cheng pointed out that the main reason for the loss of the continent was Chiang: "A leader that does not distinguish the good from the evil, makes the highest officials self-deceptive and selfish, in the domestic field losing the support of the people, and in the relations with the outer world refusing the right help!". He expected that Chiang did not want again to "not control" and "not decide".

Basically Chiang Kai-shek thought he had Chen Cheng's support, and when Cheng actually unexpectedly raised a divergent opinion, Chiang became very angry, as he wrote in his journal:

> I went to the Institute [Institute on Revolutionary Practice] for a meeting; we discussed the problems of the political work. In the end Cixiu

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> spoke, full of resentment and disgust; he considers my words and deeds to be tortuous, and thinks that I interfere in all affairs, delaying everything and that Taiwan's chaotic situation has been caused by this. The listeners were all stunned. I politely cut it all, since I think that his psychological state suggests he is sick, so I forgave him. (Chiang, *Riji* 1950, January 12)

Chiang Kai-shek was not satisfied with Chen Cheng, but in any case, Chen Cheng was the most trustworthy of his subordinates. Chiang sent Wang Shijie to persuade Chen Cheng, conveying two requests: Chen was to cooperate with the President of the Provincial Government, Wu Guozhen, and had "openly to solve his problem with Chiang Kai-shek". Chen's replies were: with regard to his non-cooperation with Wu Guozhen, "I cannot grant endless cooperation"; with regard to Chiang Kai-shek, "I can only obey", but as concerns the issue of things that "cannot be done" or "must not be done", "I think that a loyal officer must stand and talk, and he absolutely cannot deceive" (Chen, *Riji* 1950, January 17).[12] Wang Shiji had raised the hope that he could cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek, but Chen explicitly said: "I and the President cannot cooperate with each other, I just have to obey him" (Chen, *Riji* 1950, January 19).[13]

In that period there was no direct communication channel between Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Cheng. Chiang informed Chen of his wishes through other people.

On January 20, Huang Shaorong visited Chen Cheng informing him that Chiang intended to nominate Chen as Minister of Defence. Chen Cheng asked Huang to transmit his wish to decline the offer: "When I made my report this year, I offended too many people and I have only increased the difficulties of the President. I would not be of any help and I cannot take the position. Please inform the President". He recommended Gu Zhutong and Lin Wei, inviting Chiang Kai-shek "to choose the one to put in charge" (Chen, *Riji* 1950, January 20).[14]

Chen Cheng supported the plan that Chiang should become reinstated as President as soon as possible. Chen thought that Chiang should not have too many scruples and himself limit his actions, "I think that a revolutionary action should be taken. Basically it is not possible to act according to the Constitution; at the very least he must first be restored to the office of President" (Chen, *Riji* 1950, February 5).[15]

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On February 19th, the 3rd day of the first month of the lunar year, Chiang Kai-shek summoned Chen Cheng, in order to discuss how to force Li Zongren to accept the 'reinstatement'. Chiang proposed that if Yan Xishan were to resign as Premier, the position could be taken up by Chen Cheng. Chen declined the offer saying that "his physical condition did not allow him to do it", "his personal character did not fit", as a soldier he "was not so at ease as to accommodate himself in that place", and he invited Chiang "to consider someone else" (Chen, *Riji* 1950, February 19).[16] At that moment, Chiang agreed to reflect on the issue. The following day, however, he unexpectedly summoned Chen Cheng again, to force him to accept the position. Chen recorded in the diary:

> At 7 pm the President called me for a meeting, to discuss once again the question of the position of Premier. I strongly recommended Wang Xueting [Wang Shijie], and reported that Wang was afraid that Mr. Li-fu [Chen Lifu] would not be cooperative. In the event Wang should not agree, it was possible to consider Chen Lifu, Wu Tiecheng, Zhang Lisheng, Zhu Liuxian [Zhu Jiahua]. In the end, he intended to ask for Wang' s consent, but said that if Wang did not agree, he still hoped that I would take up the office, urging me to prepare myself in advance. (Chen, *Riji* 1950, February 29)[17]

On March 1 1950, in Taibei, Chiang Kai-shek took up his post once again ("I again shall serve") and was appointed President, with Chen Cheng appointed Premier. Chiang's decision was opposed by the Governor of Taiwan Province, Wu Guozhen, who was no friend of Chen's. When Chiang Kai-shek reflected on how to reconcile the two men, he blamed Chen's attitude and style above all:

> Wu Guozhen is anxious because of Chen Cheng's appointment as Premier. He demands his dismissal. Since this is his intention, I have to reassure him, and how can I make him serve with tranquillity? Cixiu's temperament is narrow and intolerant. He is always overcritical, embarrassing many people. How can I deal with it? (Chiang, *Riji* 1950, February 22)

Chen Cheng reluctantly took up the office, but two months later he wrote a letter of resignation to Chiang Kai-shek, saying that his personality and skills "were not suited to a longer stay in the present position" (Chen,

16 DFN 085-05-0018.

17 DFN 085-05-0018.

Riji 1950, May 6).[18] Chiang sent Huang Shaogu and Wang Shijie to appease Chen, and persuade him to stay on.

Chen Cheng was thoroughly dissatisfied with Chiang Kai-shek who would not listen to others' views and insisted on pushing forward his own ideas. At the time, Chiang Kai-shek was planning the retreat of the Nationalist forces from Zhoushan in order to have a better control of Taiwan. On May 9th, morning, Chiang presided over a military meeting to discuss the withdrawal plan. Chen Cheng opposed the military retreat [saying] that if it was necessary to retreat, it should be asked the officers, "to study how to remedy this". Moreover Chen warned that the recent military defeats were all caused by the habit of "deciding without investigating the situation and violating principles". Nevertheless, Chiang insisted on his decision, and that night he informed Chen Cheng that the navy had been sent to Zhoushan to carry out the military retreat.

Chiang pretentiously asked for Chen Cheng's opinion, and Cheng replied: "It is already decided, why quibble?". He recorded his deep disappointment in his diary: "It is very risky when the will of just one becomes action" (Chen, *Riji* 1950, May 9).[19]

These examples show how, during the first period following the retreat to Taiwan when Chiang Kai-shek did not yet control the situation, Chen Cheng questioned Chiang Kai-shek's capacity and style of action, and that Chiang was also aware of Chen's dissatisfaction.

3 The 1958 Divergence of Opinion Regarding Chen Cheng's 'Cabinet Reorganization'

In late June 1950, the Korean War broke out and the United States proceeded to help Chiang Kai-shek's regime. After he had cleared the difficulties, Chiang reshaped his autocracy and reinforced his control on the Party, the government, the military and Taiwan society adopting several measures. Chen Cheng was one of Chiang's most important collaborators in this process. During the 1954 'elections' Chiang chose Chen as 'Vice President'. Chen Cheng did not intend to take up this new position, and wrote in his diary about the discussions among Guomindang high level cadres about the candidates for the 'Vice Presidency':

> In the evening, at Huang Shaogu's home we studied the President's political report. The Secretary-General Zhang raised the issue of the President

18 DFN 085-05-0018.

19 DFN 085-05-0018.

> asking if a Vice President could or could not hold another position at the same time and said that both Zhang Yuejun [Zhang Qun] and Yu Youren had expressed their desire not to run for Vice President. My idea is that Wang Lianglao [Wang Chonghui] is the best candidate for the position, and that also Zhang Yuejun could fit the profile. If Wang is elected as Vice President, Zhang can be the Premier. Moreover, I mentioned He Jingzhi [He Yingqin]. Zhang thinks that the President will not consider He. (Chen, *Riji* 1954, January 5)[20]

> Chen Cheng considered Wang Chonghui and He Yingqin as the most suitable candidates. But Chiang Kai-shek preferred Chen Cheng, and he went on to nominate him. After Chen Cheng was elected, he resigned his position as Premier and became full-time Vice President. In 1957, during the 8th Congress of the Guomindang, Chiang Kai-shek proposed creating the role of Vice Chairman [of the Party], to be taken up by Chen Cheng. Chiang's reasons for creating the position of Vice Chairman were quite complicated: "The position of Vice Chairman is necessary for the success and safety of the current and future political affairs of the Party, but also more necessary for Chen Cheng and Chiang Jinguo as well". (Chiang, *Riji* 1957, September 27)[21]

After Chen Cheng became Vice Chairman of the Guomindang, his position as the second leader in Taiwan's political arena was fully acknowledged. By the end of 1957, Taiwan's political world was shaken by the case of the impeachment of the Premier Yu Hongjun by the Control Yuan, a case that was to cause political instability for more than six months. In the end, Chiang had to accept Yu Hongjun's resignation and invited Chen Cheng to take up the position of Premier. Chen Cheng was unwilling to accept. In his 1958 diary, this was especially evident in the list of great events detailing the situation.

> February 13: the President has expressed the intention to reorganize the Executive Yuan after two or three months and chose me as Premier.
>
> June 5: tonight I went to Jiaofanshan [Daxi], the President has again raised the issue of the reorganization of the Executive Yuan no later than mid-year (i.e., July 1) and asked me to take on also that position. I think it is not possible.
>
> June 6: today he has mentioned again the reorganization of the Executive Yuan. I will reflect and I have not answered yet. In the afternoon at 2.00 he mentioned the issue again.

20 "Table of main events", DFN 085-05-0019.

21 Here, Chiang makes a comparison between Chen Cheng and Jiang Jingguo, but at that time Jiang Jingguo's position within the Guomindang cannot be compared to that of Chen Cheng.

> June 26: the issue of the Executive Yuan has been raised again.
> June 30: during the meeting of the Standing Committee, the President has brought up my name as Premier. I have again invited him to reflect on it. (Chen, *Riji* 1958)[22]

During those four months of negotiations, Chen Cheng did not agree to act as Vice President and Premier at the same time. He was aware that there was a contradiction between the two positions: "According to the Constitution, the Vice President and the President should not have different opinions, but, as Premier, I have no way to avoid having different views from the President" (Chen, *Riji* 1958, July 28).[23]

Chiang also recorded that Chen Cheng refused the position several times, including on June 26th when the two men talked of the matter, Chen "vowed he would not take up the position" using "quite vulgar expressions". Chiang insisted again and in the end Chen was forced to "accept this order" (Chiang, *Riji* 1958, June 26). On June 30th, at the meeting of the Central Standing Committee of the Guomindang, Chiang officially nominated Chen as Premier. After the nomination, Chen Cheng "stood explaining", with evasive words:

> A Party member must obey the Party and the President totally, but I am unsuitable for the position of Premier. I repeatedly stated my view to the President. I cannot be redundant, I invite all the comrades in the Standing Committee to consider carefully so as to choose some other more virtuous and capable. (Chen, *Riji* 1958, June 30)[24]

Chiang went to a lot of trouble to ensure that the appointment of Chen Cheng would be approved smoothly by the Legislative Yuan. The evening of the day of Chen's election, during his walk, he expressly went to Chen's home "to visit a sick person" (Chiang, *Riji* 1958, July 4).

Originally, Chen Cheng was forced by Chiang to accept the new appointment, which he did reluctantly, but after Chen Cheng began to organize the Cabinet, Chiang felt less sure about him and constantly interfered with his work, which occasioned serious divergence between the two.

In his selection of the members of the new Cabinet, Chen Cheng consulted Chiang Kai-shek several times. On July 6th, Chiang stressed to Chen that in future all policies were to be coordinated with regard to personnel matters, [saying that] "education is the most important", and hoping that "the position of Minister of Education" would be taken by Zhang Qiyun (Chiang,

22 "Table of main events", DFN 085-05-0022.

23 DFN 085-05-0022.

24 DFN 085-05-0022.

Riji 1958, July 6). Nevertheless, Chen preferred the rector of Qinghua University, Mei Yiqi. Because of this, Chiang thought Chen's political stance was not stable, that his way of acting was weak, since, when he selects staff, "[he] does not examine what is good and what is bad, he listens to the nice words of mean people; with regard to the people he does not pay attention to their fundamental political profile, moral attitude and academic qualities, but he takes their administrative role as criterion of his choice" (Chiang, *Riji* 1958, July 7).

Initially Chiang was ready to accept Chen Cheng's proposal. However, when Chiang knew that the reason Chen did not want Zhang to remain in the position [of Minister of Education] was that Hu Shi and the others in the 'Beijing University faction' were jointly opposed to Zhang, his attitude changed drastically.

On July 10th, Chiang wrote: "Cixiu does not tell the truth and he is tricky, he makes the others nurture doubts, and have the feeling that he is not sincere. This is one of the greatest losses, and especially a worry for Cixiu's future. How to make him be more impartial, and take greater responsibilities?" (Chiang, *Riji* 1958, July 10).

Chen Cheng did not notice Chiang Kai-shek's change of attitude and, in the choice of Deputy Premier he continued arguing with Chiang. Chiang indicated Wang Yunwu as Deputy Premier, but Chen Cheng unexpectedly wanted Huang Shaogu to keep the position. On July 10th, Chiang asked Zhang Qun to inform Cheng he should "rapidly decide the issue regarding the Deputy Premier and have Wang Yunwu succeed to the position" (Chiang, *Riji* 1958, July 10).

But three days later, Chen Cheng again met with Chiang Kai-shek, and continued to put forward the name of Huang Shaogu. Chen clearly perceived Chiang's dissatisfaction for in that day's entry in his diary he noted not only Chiang's intransigence, but also his grievances for having been wronged twice:

> 9 o'clock, Chen Xuebin came to discuss nominations-tomorrow will the list of nominees for the Executive Yuan be ready to be submitted to the Standing Committee? I shall wait to meet the President before making the final decision.
>
> 10 o'clock, I met with the President, and he insisted on Wang Yunwu as Vice Premier and Huang Shaogu as Minister of Foreign Affairs. From his actual words you would think that he was just giving me advice, but the meaning of his words… in truth I had never heard anything like it in my life – it was stressful.
>
> At noon, Yuejun, Lisheng, and Shaogu came for talks. I hoped that Shaogu would be encouraged to take the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, and I waited for each one to take the final decision. In the afternoon, at 4 o'clock, I had a personal interview with Wang Yunwu, hoping

> that he would accept to act as Vice Premier. He let me speak and after an hour and forty minutes, he only replied that he would think it over for a night, and would give me his answer tomorrow morning. I immediately called Yuejun by phone to inform him in order to jointly persuade Wang. After an hour's talk between Yuejun and Yunwu he agreed, I did my best (he was not willing) and leave the rest to fate (there is no way to resist orders). (Chen, *Riji* 1958, July 13)[25]

Chen Cheng eventually gave in and complied with Chiang's will. But Chiang felt that Chen was not wholly persuaded, and thought that Chen "was false and not sincere", a disappointment after three decades of painstakingly cultivating him (Chiang, *Riji* 1958, July 13).

Chiang and Chen's respective status and responsibilities were different, so the fact that they had different views on the make-up of the Executive Yuan should have been unsurprising, but Chiang had a preconceived prejudice that Chen did not tell the truth and intended to deceive him, and this angered him greatly. After Chen Cheng's Cabinet was complete, Chiang's anger did not disappear and he secretly went on hindering Cheng's policies. In early August, Chen Cheng accepted the Control Yuan's request and agreed to improve the economic conditions of civil servants and Forces men. But Chiang Kai-shek, while chairing the meeting of the Financial and Economic Commission, did not mention the matter, his intention being to let Chen understand that Chiang was the only one who could take the final decision concerning political directives.

Chiang, with some pride wrote in his diary: "The day before yesterday Cixiu at the Control Yuan arrogated to himself the right to announce that from this month on, the allowance of officers and lieutenants would be raised to 10 *yuan*, but his behaviour was not in line with the correct process with all his eagerness to win, so I ignored him" (Chiang, *Riji* 1958, August 15).

As regards the reason why he could not follow all Chiang Kai-shek's orders, an interesting conversation is reported in Chen Cheng's diary. Chiang Menglin once reported to Chen the following observation made by Zhang Qun: of what Chiang says, Chen just listens to one half, Zhang Qun to just two-thirds and only Yu Hongjun to one hundred percent. Apparently Chen Cheng agreed with this observation, but he replied that "listening to one hundred percent is equal to not listening at all; first Hongjun just listens but does not act, secondly, when you act just obeying orders, not necessarily will society and officials listen too" (Chen, *Riji* 1958, April 12).[26]

25 DFN 085-05-0022.

26 DFN 085-05-0022

4 Chen Cheng's 1960 "Trip to Jinmen"

Notwithstanding his support for Chen, Chiang Kai-shek was also increasingly suspicious of him and hindered him in several ways.

When, in 1958, Chen Cheng in difficult circumstances complied with the order to take up the position of Premier, he had shown an exceptionally positive attitude, hoping that it could make a difference, and make him live up to Chiang's trust and expectations. Nevertheless, Chen Cheng did not understand Chiang's intentions. Chiang hoped that he would prove the kind of head who was a hundred per cent obedient, like Yu Hongjun, but Chen Cheng's keen determination to go ahead and to maintain his opinions seemed to such a suspicious person as Chiang Kai-shek just like an inclination for disrespectful rivalry and restiveness.

In 1960, presidential elections were to select the third President of the Republic in Taiwan. According to the Constitution, the President could be re-elected only once, so Chiang Kai-shek could not be elected again. The general opinion was that Chen Cheng would have no trouble being elected to succeed him. However, Chiang decided to run for office just the same, using various means to legitimate his 'illegal' behaviour, thus revealing his lust for power and the selfishness of his old age.[27] Inside and outside Taiwan where Chen Cheng's smooth succession was already taken for granted, the fact that Chiang stood for election, considering the climate then prevailing, seemed to convey the following message: according to Chiang, Chen Cheng was not yet qualified to 'take over'. Worse still, the envious within the Party thought that Chen Cheng's rise ought to be considered a joke. This was a severe blow for Chen.

There appears to be no hint in Chen Cheng's diary of his dissatisfaction with Chiang's participation in the elections. On the contrary, he always helped Chiang, putting pressure on opponents to persuade them to support him. On January 31st, Wang Yunwu expressed his "basic disapproval" of Chiang's re-election, arguing that, even if Chiang could have kept his position, it was not possible to justify it by means of a modification of the *Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion*. He said "it is not possible to re-promulgate the *Temporary Provisions*" and I absolutely oppose any change of the maximum term of office, it will create endless troubles". Chen Cheng proposed: "at this point, if the President continues in his position, this will be quite legitimate and cannot have too many implications. In the current situation, fundamental reforms are excluded, for all the problems cannot be solved in a short time! In sum, the

27 The most widely shared opinion is that Chiang Kai-shek, after his retreat to Taiwan, began to weigh up the opportunity of handing over power to his son, and to deliberately cultivate Jiang Jingguo. Chiang Kai-shek's election in 1960 was supposed to stop Chen Cheng, until conditions were ripe to transmit the power to Jiang Jingguo.

national situation must necessarily be steered and the President cannot but be re-elected" (Chen, *Riji* 1960, January 31).[28] His words helped Chiang.

The next day, Wang Shijie went to visit Chen Cheng to discuss the "issue of the presidency". Wang argued that the international situation did not favour Chiang's re-election and suggested "a government led by the Party" approach, with Hu Shi as President and Chiang holding political power as Premier. Chen Cheng disagreed with him, saying "we cannot ignore the reality that the President needs to be re-elected, and the current situation is unlikely to change". Wang agreed with Chen's judgment, but said "for the sake of the nation in the long term, I hope there could be the chance to change" (Chen, *Riji* 1960, February 1).[29]

Among the voices of those who opposed Chiang's re-election, Hu Shi's was the most influential. He expressed his opinion on every occasion, infuriating Chiang (Chen, Duan 2011).[30] Chen Cheng and Hu Shi had a good relationship so Chen took the initiative to "have some consultations" in order to persuade Hu not to express his opposition publicly. Hu said in conclusion, "my opinion is still the same concerning the problem of the total duration of the roles published the day before in the *Independent Evening Post* (*Duli wanbao*), but I have decided not to express this opinion anymore" (Chen, *Riji* 1960, February 14).[31]

Election results returned Chiang as President, and Chen as Vice President. Chen Cheng immediately wrote to Chiang, resigning from his position as Premier. But Chiang refused Chen's resignation, saying that "the difficulties for the nation have not yet been relieved: there are still heavy responsibilities to bear; there is no discussion as far as your resignation from the position as Premier is concerned". Chen then resolutely stated once more that "I should no longer serve and can no longer serve as Premier", urging Chiang's approval. Chiang again replied that he would not give permission:

> We are personally committed to the Party and the State. We've been engaged in revolution for decades, have shared joys and sorrows, experienced dangers and difficulties. Now our country is in this critical situation and the people have placed their trust in us. We must expect to work harder, and bear the hardships. This means that it is not possible to resign. Your informal request has been kindly returned. Do not talk of resignation again. (Chiang 1960a, 795).

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30 Chiang speculated that Hu Shi and the others' opposition to his re-election was aimed at promoting his substitution by Chen Cheng, and afterwards having Chen as a 'puppet' controlling and managing political affairs.

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Chen Cheng had often in the past submitted his resignation so his resolve in the matter came as no surprise and could hardly be ignored. Yet from this moment on, Chen assumed a clearly passive attitude. When it was time again to reorganize the Cabinet, Chen disagreed with Chiang only regarding the roles of Huang Shaogu and Chen Xuebin, but it was not such a dispute as it had been two years earlier.

Chiang accepted the Cabinet list submitted by Chen, and moreover thought he had succeeded in his scheme: "I will listen to his will... and observe what follows. In this way, I have not enforced anything, and this will make him comfortable and encourage his self-efficiency, isn't this the way to employ a person?" (Chiang, *Riji* 1960, May 25).

This time Chiang was quite satisfied with Chen's demonstration of compliance, especially when compared with the rivalry which had beset the choice of the 1958 Cabinet: "In the talks with Cixiu about ministry personnel, everything has been quite arranged, generally, all has been decided; his proposals for the nominees mostly acknowledged my own intentions. He has demonstrated more loyalty in comparison with the previous reorganization of the Cabinet" (Chiang, *Riji* 1960, May 23).

What Chiang did not know was that this time Chen Cheng's compliance and 'acknowledgement' was a demonstration of passivity due to the loss of any hope of 'succeeding' him and of resigning. Chen Cheng expressed his repressed feelings when he replied to the accusations raised by the members of the Legislative Yuan during the June session. On June 9th, 161 members of the Legislative Yuan raised the issue to the Cabinet about the fact that Chen Cheng had remained Premier without authorization from the Legislative Yuan. On June 14th, Chen Cheng's proposal for adjusting the pay and conditions of the military, the civil servants and the professors, was again criticized by the Legislative Yuan. Chen complained that "with their envious attitudes, comrades' hatred has made them enemies" and angrily criticised the rhetoric of "cynical prejudices". The situation was evolving into a crisis as "the Premier waged war on the Legislative Yuan". On July 3rd,Chiang Kai-shek talked to Chen, persuading him to "train himself to keep calm", and as far as possible to have a "tolerant and calm temperament" (Chiang, *Riji* 1960, July 3). On July 7th, Chiang wrote to Chen Cheng and, using the admonition taken from the *Conversation of a Man Who Lives on Vegetable Roots* (*Cai gen tan*)[32] he advised Chen to "cautiously restrain his words", asking him to go to Jinmen island to rest:

> My younger brother, this time you should go to the outer islands and take a rest, for in all discussion you cannot show signs of anger, dis-

32 *Cai gen tan* is a morality book written by the late Ming scholar Hong Zicheng, first published around 1590.

> tress and discouragement. You should be more generous and carefree. If something unhappy occurs, I will deal with it properly, do not worry. (Chiang 1960b, 800)

However, we do not know why Chen Cheng not only did not listen to Chiang's advice, but although many years had passed since his retirement from the military and his entering politics, he actually went to Jinmen dressed in uniform and with great fanfare. On July 17th he wrote two letters to Chiang, one quite formal and solemn, reporting his inspection of Jinmen defences, the second directly addressing the harsh political environment in Taiwan and his personal grievances, indirectly replying to Chiang's July 7th admonitions, and once again asking to resign. Chen Cheng half affectionately, half complainingly wrote:

> In these thirty years that I have accepted your guidance, I never avoided difficulties, when I had to face problems, have never been negligent, complaining or lazy, negative or pessimistic. Moreover, I have never searched for undeserved gain, nor have adopted an avaricious or selfish attitude. From winter 1930 when I received the order to go to Jiangxi against the Communist bandits until now, I have always motivated and consoled myself following the rule of 'for what is right or wrong decide by yourself, for praise or criticisms listen to others, for gain or loss just follow destiny', and 'in order to carry a heavy burden, why hinder shame', 'if you desire to realize everything you will need to pursue tortuous paths'. Especially after the fall of the mainland and the Central Committee's move to Taiwan, I was ordered to leave military activities and enter politics. Though I was not interested in politics, I knew that our country's political environment was so bad, and then in these ten years, my entire attitude has ever been 'having a sense of guilt, working hard to expiate'. But in the end my training has not been sufficient, my knowledge and capacity lacking, and my contribution has been minimal, worse, I raised resentment and hostility, increased your burden and damaged your reputation, how can I remain in office with a feeling of peace and endurance? On May 21st in addition to the request to remove me from the role of Premier, I personally explained that I don't have the mind and feelings to be able to cover the position of Premier. But unfortunately I have not received your approval. So, as it has always been that 'to be afraid of danger is the way to ensure safety; to be afraid of perishing is the way to survive' and that 'people who have the same benevolence share the same worries', and 'people who are wicked all consort to each other', and is this not this case? (Chen 1960a, 801)

Chiang Kai-shek was furious when he received this letter, concluding that Chen had "a serious psychological problem", and that the question was very serious, Chen Cheng:

> is a narrow-minded person with a low degree of tolerance, recently he has been criticized by the opposition faction in the Legislative Yuan, which has contributed to today's situation, but actually all this has been caused by his inclination to speak a lot, being gullible, angry and doubtful, self-praising and arrogant. The excellent advantages of having him usually in charge of managing things are now overshadowed by his shortcomings, and he reflects not at all on this, is unaware of it in fact. What a pity especially for the future of the Party-State! (Chiang, *Riji* 1960, July 19)

Since he felt that there was a risk of losing control since Chen had left, on July 19th he sent the General Secretary of the President Zhang Qun to Jinmen with a personal letter, sternly commanding Chen to return immediately to Taibei: "In recent weeks, you have not been able to conceal your inner anger nor to control your emotions, I wish for us to solve all the problems of the present circumstances... this cannot come to be if you stay away, it is better for you to come back as soon as possible, and discuss the overall situation" (Chiang 1960c, 804).

As is proved in Chen Cheng's diary, he did not want to create any problems for Zhang Qun: "I decided to take the afternoon flight together with Yuejun to fly back to Taibei" (Chen, *Riji* 1960, July 20).[33] The day after, back in Taibei, Chen Cheng went to see Chiang. He has described this meeting in detail:

> 5.30 I had a meeting with the President. In addition to the inspection report and my impressions of the Jinmen situation, the President asked me to consider the present and the future of national issues. I said that from the very start I did not have any interest in politics, and since I was ordered to leave the army and to get into politics, I have only increased the President's burden and anxiety, and I feel guilty deep in my heart, actually I cannot solve this problem by myself, and often feel that I would be happy to die before the President.
>
> In this conversation, I felt that the President's expectations in my regard were apparently great, but actually his doubts were deep. Moreover, mentioned when he travelled with Hu Shi, Wang Xueting, Jiang Menglin, and Mei Yiqi in past years, and for this he had decided to act as President for the third time, since he was the only one who could deal in the political world and said that I had my organization, and so on. (Chen, *Riji* 1960, July 20)[34]

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Chiang apparently showed he had great expectations of Chen, but actually, raising the issue of how two years earlier he had 'beaten' Chen, he said that Chen had his own faction. From what we can see from the diary, Chen believed that Chiang seemed to have great expectations but this was on the surface, while his doubts were "too real", and this was the basic truth. Chen was compelled to defend himself, and in desperation, he went so far as to say "I often feel I would be happy to die before the President" something close to a curse, hoping this would dispel Chiang's doubts. It is worth noticing that Chen Cheng was born in 1898, and was 11 years younger than Chiang Kai-shek.

Cheng's explanations did nothing to make Chiang Kai-shek change his mind, on the contrary he thought that Chen had a "hypocritical and deliberately false attitude in words and deeds" (Chiang, *Riji* 1960, July 23*).* Subsequently, he required that Chen Cheng read *The Biography of Von Moltke*, so as to make him understand his responsibilities and limits as a subordinate and an aide. Chen understood Chiang's intentions, and he specifically reported his impressions to Chiang after reading the book:

> I honestly feel that an aide, in addition to understanding the international situation and the political environment, must especially :(a) know the cardinal principles, consider the overall situation, with loyal and fierce dedication, working unremittingly. (b) connect the higher and lower, transform the differences to similarities, temper losses and gains, and search to deal with them properly. (c) tolerate the words that people do not tolerate, and accept insults that people cannot accept. Otherwise, is it so surprising that he should harm himself and the country? (Chen 1960b, in He 2007, 805)

Chen Cheng, who was well acquainted with Chiang's personality, had no ambitions of 'succession'. He considered himself an "aide" and, to Chiang, showed that he had to put into practice the three lines of "know the cardinal principle, consider the overall situation". This was what Chiang had expected to see.

5 The 1961 "Caoshan Controversy"

In his record of great events of 1961, Chen Cheng wrote: "July 2, unforgettable day" (He 2012, 45). What happened on that day was so memorable that he had to write it down. On that day, for the first time, he had a personal confrontation with Chiang Kai-shek which developed a great quarrel.

Previously, the contradictions and differences between Chiang and Chen Cheng were in most cases a hidden war consisting of reciprocal insinuations, in 1961 they had a serious disagreement about the issue of 'counter-

attacking the mainland', and since they both were impulsive and unable to control themselves, the conflict came out into the open.

'Counter-attacking the mainland' was the basic policy and objective of Chiang Kai-shek's rule in Taiwan. It was not easy for anybody to question it. Chen Cheng served as chairman of the Committee for the plans to recover the mainland, and he had been an active supporter and promoter of 'restoring sovereignty on the mainland'. But with the passing of time, Chen Cheng began to doubt the likelihood of success of the counter-attack and between the two goals of 'counter-attacking the mainland' and 'Taiwan's reconstruction' he gradually began to be more inclined to pursue the second, since he considered that 'Taiwan reconstruction' was the foundation of any plans to counter-attack the mainland (He 2012, 127). In 1958, while he served as Premier, he had raised the concern that the plans for a counter-attack had to take international factors into consideration. Indeed, by the late 1950s, Taiwan's psychological mood at any level was that to counter-attack was hopeless. In early 1961, Chiang Kai-shek drafted the "wild dragon plan", whose goal was to "take advantage of the opportunity to relieve the famine and hunger on the mainland", in order to carry out air attacks and launch an airborne invasion and to promote a "full-blown anti-Communist revolution on the mainland" (Chiang, *Riji* 1961).[35] By the end of June, Chiang received a secret report from Peng Mengji, which revealed that Chen Cheng had lost confidence in the 'counter-attack and recovery of the mainland'.

Chiang thought that, since two months earlier Chen had agreed with his decision "to start the counter-attack phase" and affirmed that "we have already decided wartime financial measures and military expenditures", now that Chen was suddenly opposed to the previous intent, not only had he lost faith in the enterprise, but also he did not care at all about Chiang's prestige (Chiang, *Riji* 1961, July 30). Chiang angrily discussed this with Cheng Chen. Unexpectedly, the July 2nd argument, as Chen Cheng persevered in his divergent opinion and the quarrel was an angry one, turned into the famous 'Caoshan controversy'. Chen described the situation in detail:

> The President intends to begin military operations in August. I think the counter-attack is right and I never thought the contrary, but we have to reflect if now is the appropriate time for the offensive. The President did not wait for me to finish talking, he was furious, thinking that I had doubts about the capacity of the army to fight and that I was going to destroy the commanders' prestige and obstruct the counterattack. I said that if the President spoke in that way it meant that he had doubts about

35 *Minguowushinian dashi nianbiao* (Table of the main events of 1961).

> my personality, not only about my ability to do things, but also about the correctness of my behaviour. When we counter-attack, though we cannot calculate everything, we cannot be fatuous about the war, for however slight, there is always a degree of risk to one's life in war. Can we ask how we can make the army not afraid to risk their life? And talking about the transportation, if we do not give enough time to the Ministry of Communication, how can it gather the naval forces? Not to talk about the other issues. When we began to quarrel violently, the First Lady came out to make peace. After the President was quite calm, he said that it was necessary to prepare actively (for the war). (He 2012, 45)[36]

In his diary Chiang Kai-shek also recorded this event in detail:

> I discussed the counter-attack with Cixiu: plan, guidelines, dates, and the reasons why this opportunity is difficult to take and easy to lose, and the fact that he should be responsible enough not to say that "the national army cannot fight", and this is an attack to the fighting spirit, to the prestige and leading capacities of the commanders. In this way it would not be possible to revive the confidence in the counter-attack in the future and I ordered him to pay particular attention to this. I informed him that I have already given the order of mobilization, and that I cannot cancel it myself, unless, because of his disapproval, he cancel it on my behalf. But since I want the counter-attack to receive domestic approval, the only thing to do is to sacrifice my position.
>
> After he heard this, conscious that his conversation with Peng [Mengji] two days before had contradicted the position and dates agreed with me two months ago, he could not say a word as a reply, but only acknowledge he would proceed according to my ideas and dates. Was not this a great occasion to turn defeat into victory for my policy of counterattack? (Chiang, *Riji* 1961, June 2)

Perhaps because of their different positions and different feelings about the debate, Chiang and Chen's accounts were quite diverse in focus: Chiang did not remember the quarrel and Chen's opinions. He gives the impression that he was always instructing Chen. Chen Cheng not only describes the quarrel and his views, but he also mentions the detail of Song Meiling's pacifying role. Both men stressed their respective positions and reasons, so it seems that at last the other side had made a concession, and each had prevailed. Chiang Kai-shek recorded, "[Chen] did not say a word in reply, he could only acknowledge he would proceed according to

36 Besides his diary, Chen Cheng had also a "Work journal", where he recorded the schedule of meetings and visits; the July 2nd 1961 record is especially detailed.

my ideas and dates". Chen Cheng wrote, "After the President was quite calm, he said it was necessary to actively pursue the preparation". It is only from this point that we know that their differences were not solved, the knot was not untied. Actually, Song Meiling, after this event, again went to Chen's residence to appease him, after which she informed Chen's wife, Tan Xiang, that "the two have an irritable character, they quarrelled for national affairs" (He 2012, 273). The arrogance shown by Chiang during the discussion greatly provoked Chen Cheng, who in his notebook "The Caoshan Controversy" recorded in some detail Chiang's criticisms and his answers and feelings:

> The President met me and set out his criticisms of me. In this meeting his rage was very explicit, in a way that I've never seen in the forty years I've followed him. His criticisms can be summarized as follows:
>
> (a) He blamed me for having destroyed his commanders' prestige (referring to the armed forces personnel);
>
> (b) He accused me of obstructing his policy of counter-attacking the mainland (vaguely referring to military expenditures);
>
> (c) he expressed his disappointment about these forty years of training and said that if he is no good, he will let me do all things.
>
> My answers and thoughts:
>
> (a) I am aware and I understand by myself that my learning is not good and my training insufficient, but I am second to nobody in believing in the decision and preparation for the counter-attack of the mainland. Moreover, with our ancestors' spirit and ethics of "knowing that it is not possible but doing it anyway", I will necessarily carry out the struggle against the Communist bandits until the end.
>
> (b) My shortcomings are numerous and great, but I've never forgotten my responsibility and the ethical values.
>
> (c) If there are doubts about my character, not only am I not able to act as Premier again, but I shall not even be able to be a moral person. My choice is to behave according to ethical values, I do not want to be an official.
>
> (d) My intent is to follow the President in order to realize Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People, rather than being an official, especially a high-ranking official.
>
> I'm more than sixty years old. For decades I have worked hard without any complaints and without caring about slander, but in the end why?
>
> If I had been just a little self-interested, I would never have been so stupid – careless of fame and blame and of physical exhaustion. (He 2012, 273)

After this quarrel, Chiang received the reports and Chen Cheng changed his attitude, becoming willing to make active preparations for the coun-

ter-attack (Chiang, *Riji* 1961, July 6). The Cabinet had already issued the "Provisional costs of the war", and ordered the Ministry of Transportation to schedule the gathering of the fleet, coordinating mobilization. Actually, Chiang Kai-shek's counter-attack military plans were limited by several factors, especially the containment of the United States. They were just illusions, and could not be implemented. On July 18th, Chiang looked for a way to sidestep: "I have decided to extend the preparation of the mobilization for the counter-attack by two months to conclude it by September. This is necessary because of the situation and moreover due to the common domestic psychological attitude; we must stoop to public opinion and relieve the financial pressure". At the end, he added one sentence: "Cixiu will be happier" (Chiang, *Riji* 1961, July 18). This sentence did not contain the previous wrath towards Chen. If anything, it held a somewhat self-deprecating tone, something very rare. In his heart of hearts, also Chiang thought that in these circumstances the counter-attack was really hopeless.

According to Chen Cheng's records, during the quarrel Chiang had said in wrath that, "if you think that I am not good, then you [Chen] should do it". This was tantamount to frankly saying in desperation that Chen Cheng was 'forcing him to abdicate'. Listening to these words Chen Cheng was shocked, and replied that this meant doubting his loyalty, and that if Chiang had this in his heart, he could be neither an official, nor even simply a moral person. These words really show that his profound worry was that Chiang should 'misunderstand' him, thinking that he aimed to replace him.

Not longer after this controversy, something else was to make Chen unhappy. In 1961, the UN General Assembly discussed the issue of 'China's representation', and Taiwan and the United States argued over how to keep the status of Taiwan in the United Nations. US President Kennedy asked Chiang to send "his closest officer" to the United States to negotiate. Chiang evidently knew that the United States meant Jiang Jingguo, but he preferred to send Chen Cheng as his personal representative to the United States. In the July 17 diary entry, Chen records that he was summoned from Taibei to Sun Moon Lake to see Chiang:

> At noon I arrived at Sun Moon Lake. The president had summoned the minister Shen Changhuan to report on President Kennedy and Vice President Johnson's letter. This letter invited our President to send a trustworthy representative to the United States. I met the President at only half past twelve. I was not really happy. We talked a little and then had lunch, and resumed talking at half past five p.m. when he called me to go together with Minister Shen to the United States. I said that that my ability to speak is not good enough to convey his intentions, and I do not understand English, and I invited him to take

> into consideration Madame Chiang or the elder brother Jingguo, or the elder brother Changhuan. The President felt that I am generally appropriate for this. (Chen, *Riji* 1961, July 17)[37]

Since Chiang Kai-shek had treated his 'Vice President' Chen Cheng quite coldly, first directly talking alone with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chen's feeling of being "not very happy" is certainly understandable. Chen Cheng's refusal was not entirely an act of courtesy. Two days later, when Chen and Jiang Jingguo had a conversation, he again expressed that "he was unfit" to go to the United States, "because he was not good at talking and feared to damage the face of the President and the Nation" (Chen, *Riji* 1961, July 19).[38] Nevertheless, Chiang insisted on sending Chen Cheng on an official visit. Fortunately, when he was in the United States, Chen faithfully implemented the guidelines decided by Chiang and withstood American pressure, insisting on Taiwan's 'original position'. This made Chiang very satisfied and "even delighted" (Chiang, *Riji* 1961, August 5).

The 1961 July quarrel was a final catharsis and Chen Cheng's last protest, after which he completely abandoned his feisty spirit, and repeatedly submitted his request to resign. In December 1963, Chiang approved Chen Cheng's resignation as Premier for health reasons. Chen immediately sent a letter to Chiang to thank him: "After my reiterated requests, I am finally relieved from this burden. I accept your caring concern and will keep it always in my heart". He further requested Chiang to permit him "to be exempted from the circulation of all the documents and from the participation in various meetings and ceremonies" in his various posts as Chairman of the Committee for projecting the recovery of the mainland, as Vice Chairman of the Study group of the Constitution, as Vice Chairman of the Guomindang, and as Vice President, in order to focus on health, recovery and rest (He 2012, 833). The public motive for Cheng's retirement was health, but afterwards in a letter to his daughter he plainly said, "I am in good health".

Chen Cheng's last diary record was written on January 24, 1964, but after 1961, in his diary there is no longer anything which concerned his relationship with Chiang Kai-shek.

As mentioned earlier, Chen Cheng's diary does not concern his personal life and feelings, however, as can be seen from the above examples of his dissatisfaction concerning Chiang Kai-shek, it does give us a new understanding of the relations between Chiang Kai-shek and Chen Cheng in Taiwan, since besides their long close co-operation, there were also contradictions and conflicts between them.

37 DFN 085-05-0025.

38 DFN 085-05-0025

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Chiang Kai-shek's Diplomats Abroad
Ambassador Fu Bingchang's Perspective at the First United Nations Peace Conference in 1946 with Reference to the 'Iran Crisis'

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Abstract On 21 December 1945 General Chiang Kai-shek authorised Fu Bingchang, his ambassador in Moscow, to attend the forthcoming 1946 UN Peace Conference in London. Two weeks later, after Fu advised Stalin that he was to attend the conference, Stalin asked Fu to liaise with his leading delegate, A.J. Vyshinsky, and stated further that if the Chinese delegates would cooperate it would be advantageous for both countries. To Fu, the undertone was obvious. Keen to keep Soviet support for Chiang Kai-shek's government on the eve of China's civil war, and the emerging Cold War, Fu had every intention of taking Stalin's advice seriously. But when Iran filed a complaint to the UN accusing the Soviets of continuing their troop presence in Iran as an excuse to meddle in Iran's internal affairs, the Chinese delegation faced a terrible dilemma. Using new and previously unseen records this conference paper uncovers, from a Chinese perspective, behind-the-scenes negotiating between the US, Soviet and Chinese delegates concerning Iran's situation at the first United Nations Peace Conference.

Keywords Fu Bingchang. Foo Pingsheung. Chiang Kai-shek. Iran Crisis. United Nations Peace Conference.

Based on the personal diaries and records of Fu Bingchang, a high-ranking official and diplomat in General Chiang Kai-shek's government, this paper explores Chinese perspectives at the 1946 London Peace Conference with regard to the Iran crisis; a crisis that historians have long viewed as a pivotal event in the Cold War (Leffler, Painter 2005). Fu Bingchang is not a particularly well-known figure in the diplomatic history of Modern China, but significantly, he was General Chiang Kai-shek's last ambassador to Moscow serving in Soviet Russia from 1943-49. As such, Fu's knowledge of Chinese-Soviet and Allied wartime relations made him a key contributor and member of the Chinese delegation (Fung 2012, 195). By the time of

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the peace conference events in Iran had already influenced the formation of the major components of the Cold War: the tendency of Britain and the United States to ally in order to confront widening Soviet influence in strategically important regions of the Near and Middle East (Yegorova 1996, 22). Essentially, the Iran crisis was the result of Soviet support for a minorities Azeri nationalist movement in Iranian Azerbaijan, and Soviet refusal to withdraw their occupation forces as specified by treaty. The roots of the crisis, therefore, lay in great power rivalry and internal Iranian politics (Leffler, Painter 2005, 5). As we shall see later, China's involvement with the Iran debate was also tied to her geopolitical interests.

From Ambassador Fu's diaries we can discover much about the role of diplomacy under Chiang, as well as what it was like to be a diplomat under his regime. Because of China's international standing at the end of the second world war, there can be little doubt that Chiang's diplomats felt disadvantaged when compared with their western equivalents. China, along with America, Soviet Russia and Britain, was officially one of the so-called Big Four nations. But, given her status as the weakest player by far of the Big Four, Chinese diplomats were by necessity accorded a lower status in the diplomatic arena, much like the poor relative. This meant that even the best of Chiang's representatives were not on an equal footing with their counterpart players of the international stage. For example, the US ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman, boasted to Fu that he had gone over Foreign Minister Molotov's head on any number of occasions to contact Stalin direct, and in this way he had obtained good results. Ambassador Fu simply did not have that authority (Fu, *Riji* 1945, November 11). Effectively, Chinese diplomats were constrained within the limits of their own country's geopolitical circumstances. A key aspect of this paper therefore is to consider, through the eyes of Fu Bingchang, how Chinese diplomats coped within their constraints and what avenues were open to them when negotiating foreign policy matters. Dittmer, Fukui and Lee (2000) argue that Chinese diplomats were masters of behind-the-scenes diplomacy, achieving goals through informal channels. Informal diplomacy was certainly practised at the peace conference and was endorsed, even encouraged, by Chiang himself. Indeed, Fu's diary illustrates very clearly the way that informal diplomacy was used as a key strategy at the conference–an arena where he and the Chinese team found themselves embroiled in a key international issue with capacity to put China's geopolitical interests at serious risk (Leffler, Painter 2005, 5). The pressure to avert the crisis concerning Iran, therefore, was doubly important for the Chinese delegates. Fortunately for them, Fu's record shows that by the time of the end of the conference the Chinese team was satisfied that in January 1946 they had made a positive contribution to world events without jeopardising their country's interests.

1 China's International Position

By the time of the conference Fu had been stationed in Moscow for over three years, and in that time he had not set one foot out of Soviet Russia. No wonder he was elated when it was confirmed that General Chiang wanted him to fly out to London and attend the peace conference as vice-chair of the Chinese team. Not only was this his chance to escape Moscow and see Europe; it was a major opportunity to be involved in an event of historic proportions. As the US president, Harry Truman, had pronounced six months earlier in the plenary session in June 1945, "The Charter of the United Nations… is a solid structure upon which we can build a better world" (Truman 1955, 211).

At the time of Truman's declaration Ambassador Fu was satisfied that China's international position was better than it had ever been. The long war of resistance against Japan had been won. China was a member of the Big Four nations, a position that gave her international recognition and a permanent power of veto in the new United Nations Security Council. Fu himself had signed the Moscow Declaration paving the way for China's membership back in October, 1943 (Foo 2011, 111). Further, Fu was satisfied that the Chinese-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed in Moscow just five months earlier, in August 1945, gave Chiang Kai-shek a formal guarantee from Stalin that Soviet Russia would not support his enemies, the Chinese Communists, and that to this end there would be a smooth handover by Soviet troops in China's northeast over to Chiang's central government forces (Foo 2009, 203-5). "Things look hopeful", wrote Fu on New Year's day after hearing the BBC's welcome announcement that President Truman's special envoy to China, Ambassador General George C. Marshall, was in Chongqing working strenuously to mediate a peaceful settlement between Chiang's national party, the Guomindang (GMD), and the insurgent Chinese Communists led by Mao Zedong. At the time Fu was hosting Chiang Kai-shek's son, Jiang Jingguo. Jiang had been sent to Moscow by his father to hold exploratory talks with Marshal Stalin on the Soviet handover of China's northeast, and he and Fu had celebrated the New Year together at an all-night private party in one of Moscow's finest hotels (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 1). Fu knew, having been in attendance already at the first Jiang-Stalin talks starting 30 December, that despite misgivings by Stalin concerning certain "reactionary elements" in the Guomindang, Stalin still supported Chiang's government as the legitimate government of China and felt that cooperation between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communists was feasible and to be encouraged (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 4). Fu's job had been to accompany Jiang Jingguo during the latter's late night meetings in the Kremlin.

It was at one of these meetings that Fu was able to tell Stalin about his forthcoming mission to London. Stalin replied that he was pleased to

hear of the news and that his own chief representative at the United Nations' conference was to be Andrei Vyshinsky, his vice minister of Foreign Affairs; a man that Fu knew and had had dealings with since June 1944. Andrei Gromyko was to be the Soviet Union's permanent representative to the United Nations. Stalin advised Fu to keep in contact with Vyshinsky and suggested that if the Chinese representatives in London cooperated fully with the Soviets at conference, it would be of great advantage for *both* countries. Stalin's undertone was obvious. With thousands of Soviet soldiers still stationed in China's northeast and clear evidence, from circles in Chongqing and Moscow, that Stalin was still giving support to the Chinese Communists, Fu was well aware that the Soviet leader had plenty of leverage. He took Stalin's advice seriously (Fu, *Riji* 1945, October-December).

2 London

Fu left Moscow for London on 7 January 1946. The conference proceedings began on the afternoon of 10 January and were held in London's Methodist Central Hall of Westminster (Fu, *Riji* 1945).[1] China's ambassador to Britain, Dr. Wellington Koo, (also known as Gu Weijun) headed the Chinese delegation with Ambassador Fu as his vice. The team included China's ambassador to the United States, Wei Daoming, China's representative in Turkey, Dr. P.C. Chang, and the diplomats, George Yeh (also known as Ye Gongchao) and Victor Hoo (also known as Hu Shizi). Altogether, Fu stayed in London for a total of five weeks (Fu, *Riji* 1945, December 21).

From the start of the peace conference, the international arena was very much concerned about the tensions between Soviet Russia and her western Allies over Iran. In 1941, under a wartime agreement with Britain, the Soviets had deployed their troops into northern Iran. British troops (alongside 30 thousand US troops) were stationed in southern Iran. By the terms of a 1942 Tripartite Agreement signed by Britain, Soviet Russia and Iran, Allied occupation troops were to be withdrawn from Iran six months after the end of the war. This arrangement had been useful to the Allies. The foreign troops could safeguard Iran's oil, and they could protect the movement of lend-lease supplies through the Persian Gulf from the United States to the battlefields of the Caucuses and the Ukraine (Scheid Raine 2005, 93). US troops evacuated Iran by 1 January 1946, and British troops would leave by 2 March 1946. Regarding the Soviet troops, their presence in northern Iran had awakened Soviet economic and political interests. By the end of the war, the fact that the Soviet position in Iran had been significantly strengthened gave Stalin grounds to

1 'Invitation to First United Nations Peace Conference', in private possession of the author.

hope that Soviet Russia would manage to enhance her geopolitical and economic standing and interests in the Middle East and he had no intention of withdrawing the Soviet presence (Yegorova 1996, 8). If he could gain access to Iran's oil it would be good for the economy, and good for Soviet prestige (Yegorova 1996, 2; Harbutt 1981, 624). Also, an oil concession in northern Iran would give him an advantage over rivalry with Britain for political influence in Iran. Already, the Soviets had succeeded in reducing the influence of the Iranian army and Iranian administration and cultivated the establishment of the communist-led Tudeh Party (Yegorova 1996, 28). In addition, Soviet troops were supporting and activating a national-liberation movement for a 'minorities' Azeri movement in northern Iran (Yegorova 1996, 9).

The Iranian government did try to bring up the 'Iran question' earlier at the mid-December Council of Foreign Ministers meetings in Moscow, but found themselves unable to do so because the question was not on the agenda. It had been deliberately omitted from the Moscow conference communiqué (*Foreign Relations United States,* hereafter *FRUS* 1945, 512-3). Still deeply concerned about Russia's territorial encroachment, the Iran government resolved instead that they would put forward a formal complaint before the General Assembly of the newly formed United Nations Organization. Their grounds would be that the political independence and territorial integrity of Iran was impaired, in violation of the Charter, by Soviet-inspired developments in Azerbaijan Province (*FRUS* 1946, 289). The Iran government's decision to bring the issue to the United Nations for mediation now meant that Iran's internal affairs were international in character (Yegorova 1996, 15-7). Conference discussion on Iran started 15 January and would draw to a close by the end of the month. Iran's chief conference representative was Seyed Hassan Taqizadeh, Iran's ambassador to London.

3 Iran Asks for Chinese Support

On the first day of discussions, Ambassador Fu noted simply that Ambassador Taqizadeh had outlined the source of Iran's troubles, and had asked delegates to consider a proposal to the Security Council for resolution of his country's delicate situation with Soviet Russia. Three days later, Fu's diary mentions the Iran question again. Ambassador Taqizadeh had approached Wellington Koo and wanted to know if he could rely on Chinese support *were* he to bring up the Soviet-Iran question before the General Assembly. Knowing that support of Iran's request could embarrass the Soviets (and upset Chinese-Soviet relations) Koo advised Taqizadeh not to bring up the issue at this time. Later on in the day, Koo discussed the matter with his team. The situation had to be handled with care, he cau-

tioned, because Chongqing could not afford to make enemies, even if Iran's situation was a compelling one. Wei Daoming, China's ambassador to the United States, disagreed. In his opinion appeasing the Soviets would not be helpful and Iran was entitled to protect her territorial integrity. Fu must have supported Koo's stance because Wei accused him hotly for being too close to Moscow. Fu counter-argued by pointing out that Chinese interests should come first, and that Soviet appeasement was a policy matter to be decided by the central government alone. He said that they should make every effort to dispel Soviet doubts about China's sincerity of purpose in this matter so as to retain Soviet support for Chiang's government. Perhaps the team was reminded here about Soviet troops still stationed in China's northeast. Further, Fu was concerned that the Soviets might even walk out of the United Nations altogether. He reasoned that the Soviets were already suspicious that the General Assembly was being controlled by Britain and the United States. "This incident would only embarrass them", he said, "and the United Nations could dissolve. The assembly is like a newborn child; if we put too much weight upon it, it could be smothered". Equally, Fu knew that it was vital also to keep on side with China's western allies, especially the United States. China needed US support as a counterbalance to Soviet influence (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 4). Unable to agree on a joint policy, the team decided to seek guidance from Chongqing. Fu drafted the report. It was approved by all the members and sent promptly off to Chongqing (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 18). Meanwhile, Koo decided to pursue a diplomatic initiative.

The following day he asked Ambassador Taqizadeh, for the second time, to rethink. He also talked with Britain's foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, and the US secretary of state, James Byrnes, to see if they might also help to dissuade Taqizadeh. Bevin told Koo that Britain had not wanted Iran to raise the matter in the first place (Britain had her own areas of control to consolidate) but that he would have to approve the case if it were to be mooted before the Security Council. In actual fact, Britain's ambassador to Washington, Lord Halifax, had in early January informed the United States that Britain wanted the US to join with them in urging the Iranian government not to bring the case before council (*FRUS* 1946, 293; 299-301). Secretary Byrnes told Koo that he, also, was not keen for Taqizadeh to raise the issue, thus showing a degree of support for China's position. At the time US policy was still to accommodate the Soviet Union (Harbutt 1981, 623-9), although the official US State Department position was that it would support the Iranians to assure the preservation of the United Nations (Hess 1974, 131), a position that Fu understood, albeit from a different standpoint. Fu wrote, "The Soviet Union fears that Britain and the United States will take advantage of this organization and use it as a tool against them. Why support a tool against oneself? I am pessimistic for the future of the United Nations" (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 19).

In spite of external pressure to withhold the Iran complaint, on 19 January, Ambassador Taqizadeh requested formally that the Acting UN Secretary General, Gladwyn Jebb, bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council for investigation and recommendation for the appropriate terms of settlement (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 19; *FRUS* 1946, 304). It was world news. In the US, American newspapers interpreted the Iran dispute as a test for the United Nations (Hess 1974, 132). On BBC radio news bulletins, Fu could hear that the language had changed from "Iran situation" to "Iran dispute", thus escalating the matter. "It's a pity", he noted (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 21). As a rebuke, the Soviets raised their own grievance to the Security Council contending that "the continued presence of British troops in Greece is fraught with grave consequences for the maintenance of peace and security" (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 21; *FRUS* 1946, 306).

4 Instructions from Chongqing

On 22 January, the Chinese team received a cablegram from Chongqing: they were to mediate as best they could *outside* the conference. Such vague instructions from Chongqing meant one thing: they would have to work through informal channels to bring about a resolution. It would not be easy. As leaders of their team, Ambassadors Koo and Fu resolved to make every effort to put off the Iran affair in the manner they had been instructed. They started with a charm offensive aimed at the Soviets to reassure them that China was on their side. Wellington Koo would speak to Andrei Gromyko, Russia's permanent representative to the United Nations, and Fu would speak to Vyshinsky. Fu's diary does not record the full extent of their conversations, but clearly from talks with US officials that occurred later, there must have been some discussion concerning a face-saving solution.

Fu describes Koo's talk with Gromyko as having been amicable enough, but not before Gromyko was persuaded that Koo supported him. Gromyko said that he opposed the methods of the Security Council, and claimed that there was nothing to discuss, since by previous agreement Soviet troops had no obligation to withdraw from Iranian territory for six months. Presently this was the month of January and the agreement did not run out until March, therefore this was an empty case. Koo acknowledged Gromyko's point, and the discussion ended with recognition from both parties that Chinese support was solid. Fu's conversation with Vyshinsky was equally supportive. He took advantage of an evening reception at the Savoy Hotel to approach Vyshinsky. In warm tones, Fu explained that the friendship between their two countries was the policy of both Chongqing and Moscow. He assured Vyshinsky that Ambassador Koo was cooperating along those lines and that if there were any issues at all, Vyshinsky could be frank and

honest with him. Vyshinsky replied that he understood this policy and that he would cooperate fully with Ambassador Koo (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 22).

Two days later on 24 January, Vyshinsky sent a long statement on the Iran question to the president of the Security Council, Norman Makin. In it, Vyshinsky categorically refuted the allegation that Soviet officials had interfered with the internal affairs of the northern districts of Iran – and denied that the Iran government had made efforts to enter into negotiations with the Soviets on this question. Then the tone changed. The statement pointed out that relations between the Soviet Union and Iran could, and should, be settled by means of *bilateral* negotiations. He stated that in view of this, the Soviet delegation regarded the appeal of the Iranian delegation to the Security Council as devoid of any foundation, and that they were opposed to the consideration of the Iranian appeal (*FRUS* 1946, 24). The same day, a senior advisor to the US delegation recorded a conversation he had had with US secretary of state, James Byrnes. Byrnes had informed the advisor that when a state files a complaint, that state is entitled to a hearing in the Security Council; but the entitlement policy was not intended to preclude a recommendation by the Security Council that *bilateral* negotiations, for example, between Soviet Russia and Iran, be attempted first – so long as the Security Council was kept closely informed (*FRUS* 1946, 309).

5 Talking with the Americans

On 26 January, the Chinese saw a chance to pursue their diplomacy a step further. Ambassador Koo met with the new US ambassador to the United Nations, Edward Stettinius Jr. According to Fu's record, Stettinius wanted the Iran crisis settled, and he proposed to Koo a tripartite discussion between Britain, the US and the Soviet Union on the matter. Koo disagreed, saying it would embarrass the Soviets. Instead, Koo hoped that Stettinius would ask the Iran government to hold *bilateral* talks with the Soviets – something that had been mooted by the State Department two days earlier (*FRUS* 1946, 309). This would be a face-saving solution for the Soviet Union, and was consistent with the statement on Iran that Vyshinsky himself had put forward two days previously. Koo offered to smooth the way forward by broaching this strategy with British representatives ahead of time. With that, Stettinius replied that if Britain would agree, he would speak with the Soviets (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 26).

A memorandum by Stettinius of this exact conversation is held in the Foreign Relations United States (*FRUS*) record, but it differs slightly from Fu's version in terms of what he had agreed with Koo. In his memo Stettinius observed, correctly, that Koo was "very anxious to have the complaints before the Security Council handled in a manner that would not

cause ruffled feelings". Stettinius recorded that Koo had informed him that the Soviets were willing to negotiate *bilaterally*, but that they were firmly opposed to the Security Council's passing of any resolution of any kind. Stettinius acknowledged Koo's alternate plan to hold bilateral talks, with the Security Council stating in public that they were "delighted the two governments were willing to negotiate". Koo suggested this could be followed up later with a statement to the effect that the Security Council would be kept informed of the progress, thus negating the need for a formal resolution. Stettinius then wrote that he had refused to make a commitment to Koo because of his confidence and respect for the Security Council. In fact he would only drop the matter if the Iranians themselves asked that it be dropped, and that they be given a chance to negotiate with the Soviets (*FRUS* 1946, 316-7). Thus Stettinius put the bilateral decision squarely in the hands of the Iranian delegation. As will be seen later, Ambassador Koo immediately took his cue from Stettinius as the opportunity he was looking for to seek out Iran's cooperation for a bilateral solution to be followed up by a Security Council statement, as per his discussion with the Soviets. As Chongqing had advised, Koo was working strenuously behind scenes with all parties. Interestingly, the mood of the Chinese team was noted. At a House of Commons lunch hosted by the British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, Fu found himself sitting next to Sol Bloom, a US Republican senator. Bloom advised Fu not to give any concessions to the Soviets (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 26).

As the informal diplomacy continued in London a new political development in Iran changed everything. On 27 January a new premier, Ahmed Qavam, was appointed to office by the Majlis, Iran's national assembly (Westad 2006, 61-4).Qavam, an astute politician with a record for political radicalism, was well known to be a friend of the Soviet Union, and his timely assumption of power on this date coincided with the all-round agreement to hold bilateral talks between the Soviets and Iran. Naturally, with Qavam's appointment, Soviet Russia had her ally and a face-saving solution. In a message to Wallace Murray, the US ambassador in Iran, Secretary of State, Bynes, wrote: "If the new government in Tehran agrees to enter into direct negotiation with Russians on the matter, its hand will be greatly strengthened by the fact that its case is pending before UNO. I insisted in London that Iran should have a full hearing" (*FRUS* 1946, 317). Murray's response was that if the Soviets had really wished to settle the dispute by legitimate bilateral negotiations it had had ample opportunity before now to initiate such negotiations (*FRUS* 1946, 319). That day in London, Vyshinsky thanked Ambassadors Koo and Fu for their help in solving the difficult situation (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 27).

6 Iran's Complaint

The Security Council met twice to discuss Iran's complaint – first on 28 January, and then on 30 January. Newspapers around the world announced the onset of a major crisis as the wartime coalition, already fragile, seemed to be dissolving (Scheid Raine 2005, 93-5). As the first case since the founding of the organization Iran's complaint excited worldwide attention, and as the organization members filed into the Central Hall, journalists and photographers spent over an hour jockeying for the best camera shots. When all was ready, Ambassador Taqizadeh took his place in front of the council and outlined the points of his case. Fu noticed that Taqizadeh's tone was temperate, showing that he wanted to enhance Soviet-Iranian relations. Vyshinsky spoke next, sounding equally confident and with an equally moderate tone. He acknowledged Iran's new Soviet-friendly government, and said that Moscow was in direct contact with Tehran, therefore, the Security Council had no reason to consider the Iran case further (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 28). So ended the first meeting.

After lunch, Ambassador Taqizadeh and his deputy, Mr. Kazemi, met with US officials. Taqizadeh told them that he had indeed received authority from his government to open discussions freely with Vyshinsky, but that he did not believe his government would negotiate directly with the Soviets in Tehran. Therefore although he still wanted bilateral talks, he wanted to keep the negotiations firmly under the jurisdiction of the Security Council. To this effect, Mr. Kazemi told the US officials that Ambassador Koo had already agreed to draft a statement and raise it to council. That said, Kazemi felt it would be better if the United States could do it instead (*FRUS* 1946, 320-1). Clearly, Ambassador Koo had taken the opportunity presented to him earlier by Stettinius to negotiate with the Iran team a bilateral solution under Security Council's jurisdiction. This had enabled the US to support a bilateral solution, and the Iranians could now use China's backing to strengthen their position and get full US agreement. With Iran's full backing, the US also had a face-saving solution. Later on in his rooms, Fu wrote, "The reason for Taqizadeh's change in attitude is that the new premier, Qavam, has a history of understanding with the Soviets, therefore Vyshinsky thinks there is a better chance of negotiating directly with the Iran government. We Chinese, who feared most that this issue would have an adverse impact upon the UN itself, tried our best to mediate. According to their positive attitudes it is possible that our efforts achieved something" (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 28). As far as Fu was concerned, the team's efforts through informal channels had smoothed relations and contributed towards a more positive environment, and he thought it important enough to record.

7 The Final Meeting on Iran

On the morning of 30 January, before the final meeting on Iran, US officials met in preparation for the afternoon (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 28-29). They had with them Koo's draft proposal outlining a bilateral solution with Security Council oversight. Koo's proposal was described as a "poor statement" and so a new one was drafted by an American policy advisor for Stettinius to use. As in the Chinese draft, the US agreed to bilateral negotiations between the parties so long as the Security Council was kept informed. A US advisor was sent out to seek Ambassador Taqizadeh's approval. Taqizadeh agreed with the US statement, but asked that it be approved first by Ambassador Koo. In seeking China's endorsement, the Iranians recognized the Chinese contribution and wanted to keep the Chinese involved. Ambassador Koo was in full agreement with the American statement (*FRUS* 1946, 322-4).

The final meeting on Iran was long and drawn out. It took four hours of passionate discussion by all sides to reach a unanimous resolution. Taking Fu's record again, Ambassador Taqizadeh spoke first. He said he would not oppose direct negotiations with Soviet Russia so long as those talks were managed, supervised and reported to the Security Council. Vyshinsky appeared unhappy. He could not agree on those conditions, he said. It would damage the dignity of the Soviet Union as well as the conference. Britain's foreign minister, Ernest Bevin, intervened. He accused the Soviets, among other things, of violating the 1942 Tripartite Treaty. Furthermore, Bevin said that he wanted to keep Iran's case on the agenda. With such an atmosphere, the Chinese team foresaw a deadlock. Ambassador Koo spoke up. "Whether or not the case remains on the agenda is irrelevant", he said. "The General Assembly welcomes the agreement to negotiate; the General Assembly would accept and hear the case if there is no result and one of the parties proposes at a later date to the General Assembly. Therefore the Chinese commission suggests the debate of this issue is not necessary". According to Fu, Ambassador Koo's intervention seemed to have a calming effect. On the quiet, one of the Chinese delegates, Victor Hoo, crept out of his place to ask US aides if they would approach Bevin and Taqizadeh personally with a quiet word. The result was positive. Bevin agreed to drop his insistence that Iran's complaint stay on the agenda in his draft statement. Fu recorded that Bevin laughed and then said, "I am the most conciliatory person in the room". Vyshinsky answered, "Unless there is a hothead out there who wants to stop us from achieving a good result, I emphatically answer to Mr. Bevin, yes" (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 28).

At last the resolution was adopted, and with it the United Nations met its first test as the world's authority in disputes. Once again, Fu's entry for the end of the day indicates the satisfaction of the Chinese team. "Our efforts at mediation in the Iran affair have achieved some success at this

early stage, and we can compliment ourselves" (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 28). Upon reflection, Fu had recognized in his diary that Vyshinsky would calculate on a successful bilateral solution based on Iran's new Soviet-friendly government under Qavam. Therefore although Fu put resolution of the issue squarely down to Iran's change of government, he was still confident that Chinese efforts to mediate between the parties had yielded a positive outcome and fostered a better understanding between the Powers (Fu, *Riji* 1946, January 28-29).

To weigh up Chinese perspectives at the peace conference it would be fair to conclude that Ambassador Koo's attempts, with the backing of Fu, his deputy, did bring about a good result for the Chinese. Their charm offensives ensured that there would be no misunderstanding between Moscow and Chongqing. Koo's strenuous efforts as a third-party negotiator alongside the US, the Soviets and the Iranians helped to mollify and smooth the way towards a better understanding between the parties. Iran made full use of the Chinese intervention, and even asked US officials to seek Chinese endorsement for their Security Council statement. By early 1946, Cold War divisions were already becoming apparent. Stettinius was right when he noted that Wellington Koo was concerned about causing ruffled feathers. Fu had had a clear warning from Stalin himself to work closely with Vyshinsky and to cooperate fully. It suited Chiang Kai-shek to have Fu keeping up good relations with the Soviets, because he needed Soviet as well as US support. Although China's position as the weakest player of the Big Four nations placed limits on the power of Chiang's diplomats, he encouraged them to use their negotiating skills behind the scenes. Informal diplomacy based on friendly, but persuasive, tones was a reasonable option. Chiang had given his diplomats exactly the same instructions when Fu was in Moscow months earlier at the negotiating tables of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty (Foo 2011, 188-208).

In the end the Soviets did withdraw their forces by spring 1946, and Iran was able to assert control over Azerbaijan by the end of the year. The United States dropped the matter in May, and the upshot was that the crisis ended and the US solidified her position in Iran. Thus the United States achieved its first diplomatic victory of the Cold War (Hess 1974, 117), a victory made just a little bit easier from behind the scenes by Ambassador Koo and his team. Ambassador Fu left London on 23 February in order to attend the Second National Government's Plenary Conference in Chongqing, where he spoke in detail about China's diplomatic role at the 1946 Peace Conference (Fu, *Riji* 1946, February-April).

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Chiang Kai-shek and His Time
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Difficult Years: Italy's Policy Towards Chiang Kai-shek's China, 1945-49

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Abstract This article deals with Italy's policy towards Chiang Kai-shek's China from the end of the second world war to Chiang's defeat in 1949. It will first introduce some general questions and aspects related to Italy's foreign policy in the postwar years and then it will discuss some trends and problems about Italy's policy towards China, taken in consideration two main periods: first, the period from the last months of the war to the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty in February 1947; second, the post-1947 period to Communist victory and the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Keywords Italy China postwar years. Italy. China. Chiang Kai-shek. Postwar years.

In the aftermath of the second world war, Italy's international position was a very weak one: actually, although in summer 1943 Mussolini had been overthrown, the Badoglio Government with the support of King Victor Emmanuel III had been able to disengage the country from the alliance with Nazi Germany and with Japan, and Italy had achieved the status of a co-belligerent nation, Italy was however perceived by the major victorious powers as a defeteated enemy country. During the negotiations that would lead to the drafting of the Italian peace treaty, a punitive approach had prevailed and in February 1947 (signing of the Paris treaty) the Italian Government had been compelled to accept a sort of diktat: territorial losses (Dalmatian territories and the Istria peninsula, African colonies, Dodecanese islands), heavy reparations to pay, severe limitations especially in the military field (Lorenzini 2007, 169). From the end of the war and for more than two years Italy was thus subject to the armistice terms and to foreign occupation, and foreign troops (basically American) would leave the country only at the end of 1947.

Italy's international status sharply contrasted with the aspirations nurtured by the Italian antifascist political class, by the diplomatic corps and by many Italian opinion makers: in their opinion, Italy had to recover the role of a middle-rank power which would exert its influence in the two

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traditional areas of Italy's foreign policy: the European continent and what was called "an enlarged Mediterranean" (possibly widened to some parts of Africa and the Middle East). Thus, the recognition of the nation's international status and the revision of the most severe clauses of the peace treaty became the main goal of Italy's foreign policy after the end of the second world war and especially after the signing of the Paris peace treaty in early 1947.

It must particularly be stressed – as a general question but also as an important aspect, as we will see, in the bilateral relations between Italy and China – that Italian politics and diplomacy considered Italy's admission to the United Nations (UN) as a fundamental step in the process of the recognition of its international status: actually, the first application for the admission as a member of the UN was presented by Italy in May 1947 and was rejected mainly for some juridical controversies. Following applications were presented then many times starting from that of October 1947, but always met the veto of the Soviet Union, clear results of the growing contrasts between Washington and Moscow.

Only in 1955 such a dream will became a reality and Italy was admitted to the UN (for the development of Italys' foreign policy after the end of the war, see Monzali 2011, 47-65; Varsori 2001).

This article deals with Italy's policy towards Chiang Kai-shek's China from the end of the second world war to Chiang's defeat in 1949. It will first introduce some general questions and aspects related to Italy's foreign policy in the postwar years and then it will discuss some trends and problems about Italy's policy towards China, taken in consideration two main periods: first, the period from the last months of the war to the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty in February 1947; second, the post-1947 period to Communist victory and the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Main sources I have used in my paper are: general studies about Italy's foreign policy; selected memoirs left by Italian foreign ministers and diplomats; published diplomatic documents and in particular the *Documenti diplomatici italiani* collection (DDI, Italian Diplomatic Documents), series X and XI, which covers the post-war years.

1 Italy's Foreign Policy in the Early Postwar Years

Italy's post war foreign policy was clearly rooted in an antifascist spirit even if the lack of expert and talented diplomatic personnel made quite necessary, in the years 1946-50, to resume activities of quite a few diplomats who had made their career during the fascist period.

A leading personality in the new italian foreign policy was Carlo Sforza (1872-1952), who had been Italian Minister in China during the late

Qing-early Republican period. Sforza become the Foreign Minister in early 1947, taking the position which had been of Alcide De Gasperi (from July to October 1946) and, for a very short period (from October 1946 to February 1947), of Pietro Nenni: he will be Italy's foreign minister and the main actor in the Italian diplomacy from February 1947 to July 1951, thus a very crucial period for Italy and a very fundamental one in the history of Italy-China relations during the post-war period.

Sforza clearly indicated that the main focus of his action would be the international rehabilitation of Italy and its firm stand within the western political and economic bloc headed by the United States. Sforza made particular efforts to create a solid and competent team within the Ministry and relied for that in particular from June 1948 as his general secretary on Mr. Vittorio Zoppi, a recognized expert of Africa. Zoppi was asked to work in order to resume the former prefascist policy to consult regularly Italian ambassadors in the main countries and include their evaluations as part of the Ministry Foreign affairs decision-making process. Sforza also basically confirmed the decision, taken in the previous years by the former Italian foreign ministers, to appoint some political men representative of the different political parties which were supporting the government, instead of professional diplomats, to lead some of the most important italian embassies abroad: that's the case of Alberto Tarchiani (Washington), Manlio Brosio (Moscow) and also Sergio Fenoaltea in China (Giordano 1992; Di Nolfo 2006; Zeno 1999).

2 Italy's Policy Towards China: the First Period

During the first period (last months of the war to the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty), contacts were organized between the new democratic Italian government, headed by Alcide De Gasperi, and Chiang Kai-shek.

Italy was at that time represented in China from January to July 1946, by a low level diplomat (*chargé d'affaires*), Mr. Enrico Anzilotti, who resided for some months in Chongqing and then, from May 1946, in Nanjing.

It was only in July 1946 that the first Italian ambassador to China in the postwar period settled in Nanjing: he was the above mentioned Sergio Fenoaltea (1908-95), who discussed with Chinese foreign minister Wang Shijie and Chinese diplomats problems related to the future of China-Italy relations. A special meeting was organized, in particular, on August 14,1946 at the Chinese Embassy in Paris among the Italian Prime Minister (and concurrently Foreign Minister), De' Gasperi, and the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Shijie, in order to evaluate solutions to pending problems within Italy-China relations and at the same time to look at possible Chinese support to Italy's requests and demands at the Paris Peace conference (Mae 1994c, document 153).

As indicated, Fenoaltea was a political personality rather than a professional diplomat: he was a member of one of the then Italian moderate parties and had been Undersecretary to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Bonomi Government, 1944). He was formally appointed in March 1946 as the first Italian ambassador to China after the end of the war. Actually, the diplomatic who had been initially chosen was Francesco Fransoni (1886-1974), nominated as the Italian representative to China on November 9, 1945, but he declined due to the reasons which have never been clarified. Fransoni later became general secretary of the Ministry from November 25, 1946 to May 31, 1948: after his resigning, he was substituted by Vittorio Zoppi.

Fenoaltea was able to assume his functions in China only in July 1946, due to the serious difficulties Italy was at that time meeting in finding financial resources and also to find a ship to transport the newly appointed ambassador, with his family and staff and all his belongings, to China. He will basically lead the Italian embassy in Nanjing for more than 3 years, from July 1946 to the fall of the Chiang Kai-shek government and the birth of the People's Republic of China.

In this period, two main question were at the center of Italy's policy towards China and Italy-China relations.

The first question. During the last months of the war, before Japan's surrender, the problem of Italy's possible entry into the war against Japan was raised: a participation which was regarded basically as symbolical by many countries, including the United States (which in any case seemed to support almost in theory such a choice), but which was regarded as rather important by Italy in order to demonstrate its complete break with its past and confirm its firm stand to the democratic and antifascist front.

Various sources maintain that the US Department of State clearly indicated to the Italian ambassador in Washington, Tarchiani, that Italy's declaration of war against Japan will surely enhance Italy's international profile and facilitate Italy's passage as a co-belligerant country to an allied country. It must be also said that such a choice will surely be welcomed by China, who obviously considered in a positive way a further strengthening of the anti-Japanese front (Borzoni 2004, which stresses the role of Roberto Prunas, till November 25, 1946 the powerful general secretary of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; Mae 1992a, document 304; Mae 1992b, document 332; Mae 1994a, document 85; Mae 1994b, document 93: reply to 85).

As we know at the end this option did not become concrete.

The second question. The problem of the contents of the peace treaty between the two countries within the larger context of the Paris peace treaty (Italian colonial legacy in China, repatriation of the Italians, Italian properties, etc.). At the end, within the above mentioned Paris Peace Treaties of February 1947, a special section (Section V), articles 24, 25 and 26 concerned "Italy's Special Interests in China".

Articles 24, indicated that "Italy renounces in favour of China all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Pekin on September 7, 1901 and all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto, and agrees to the abrogation in respect of Italy of the said protocol, annexes, notes and documents. Italy likewise renounces any claim thereunder to an indemnity". Article 25 stressed that "Italy agrees to the cancellation of the lease from the Chinese Government under which the Italian Concession at Tientsin [Tianjin] was granted, and to transfer to the Chinese Government of any property and archives belonging to the municipality of the said Concession"; and Article 26 maintained that "Italy renounces in favor of China the rights accorded to Italy in relation to the International Settlement at Shanghai and Amoy [Xiamen], and agrees to the reversion of the said Settlements to the administration and control of the Chinese Government" (text in Unts, 49, 1950, 18-19; Italian text in Lorenzini 2007, 169; see also Mae 1993a, document 372; Mae 1993b, document 610; Mae 1997, document 423; Cm 1998a, 832; Cm 1998b, 988)

3 Italy's Policy Towards China: the Second Period

During the second period (from the 1947 Peace Treaty to the fall of Chiang Kai-shek's government), two different political and diplomatic questions became central in Italy's foreign policy towards China and in Italy-China relations: first, Italian analysis and evaluation of China's political and military situation and China's future perspectives, based largely on the reports send by Ambassador Fenoaltea and also by reports provided by Italian ambassadors in Washington and in Moscow; second, the question of a new treaty of friendship and cooperation to be agreed between Italy and China in substitution of that signed in 1928.

Considering the weak international position of Italy and especially its difficulties to build an autonomous foreign policy in China, Fenoaltea managed to have its own vision of the Chinese Civil war and to transmit it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was obviously looking to establish new positive and friendly relation with Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang but at the same time he seemed willing to find and to suggest in some way that Italy should take a kind of cautious attitude towards the Communists, provoking critical comments by some Italian political actors who saw in such an approach a kind of equidistance position between the Nationalists and the Communists. Fenoaltea's views seemed also to be influenced by his desire to do his utmost to protect the small Italian community and the Italian interests – however limited – on the spot.

In his periodical reports sent to Rome about the development of the political and military situation in China between 1948 and 1949, Ambassador Fenoaltea tended to stress some points:

- The growing deterioration of the "economic, military and psychological" situation in Nationalist China. Fenoaltea stressed that Chiang Kai-shek had no real chance to maintain a real control in Manchuria and also in Central China and that while Chiang Kai-shek's troops had been able to control Communist expansion they are subject to a heavy military pression by the Communists especially in various area (Mae 2000b, document 357; Mae 2000c, document 408; Mae 2005, document 328);
- United States attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek: the Italian ambassador reported how Americans in China largely considered Chiang as a old and intransigent leader who continues to refuse to listen to military and political suggestions advanced by Washington; at the same time, however, he notes that Americans were quite aware that there seems to be no real alternatives to Chiang and that in China there were no moderate and anti-Communist forces which at the same time are anti-Communist and have a popular support. Fenoaltea is also rather critical of the American endorsement of Chiang Kai-shek which seems to him due mainly to the desire of President Truman to find a mediation with the opposition (Republican Party) and to appease Nanjing in order to get its fully support in American's political and military plans and strategies regarding Japan;
- He stresses that within the international community in China there is people who suspect the United States are prepared, if the military and economic situation for Chiang Kai-shek is going to become more and more critical, to assume directly the leadership of the Chinese troops or almost to create within China some special areas completely controlled by American armed forces with the idea to maintain such positions for a long time;
- Fenoaltea also indicates that there are no concrete perspectives of a possible mediation between Chiang and Mao Zedong, especially considering that the Chinese Communist Party at this moment has no real interest to give to Nanjing any chance to reorganize its forces nor to give to the Americans a concrete hope that there will be in the future an anti-Communist china.

Fenoaltea considerations about the Guomindang regime serious difficulties seem to be largely shared by Italian ambassadors in Washington and Moscow. For instance, Manlio Brosio, who became the Italian Ambassador in Moscow in late 1946-early 1947 in substitution of Quaroni, reminds us of a long talk in early 1948 in Moscow with the Chinese ambassador Fu Bingchang (Foo Pingsheung 1895-1965). Brosio stresses that Fu had informed him that the war on the Manchurian front had turned quite in favour of the GMD troops and that actually Communist agrarian reform is not so popular as usually depicted in the west. Brosio indicates that Fu's views seem rather optimistic and that, even if the Communist troops

have been defeated in the area of Mukden, this does not mean at all that this may represent a starting point in the defeat of the People's Liberation Army (Mae 2000a, document 81; see also Foo [Foo Yeh Wah, granddaughter of Ambassador Fu] 2011).

In early January 1949, Fenoaltea in another detailed report on the Chinese situation indicates that the situation is becoming worser, it is quite probable that Chiang Kai-shek is preparing to leave his political power and that a peace will be signed between Nationalists and Communists. According to him, American diplomats here in China seems to be convinced that at the end the Chinese Communist Party will moderate its political conditions to gain a peace agreement because they are aware that China will need USA's economic assistance and support (Mae 2006a, document 2).

However, only few weeks later, the Italian ambassador notes that the Chinese Communist Party seems no more interested in a negotiated peace with the Guomindang government: "That's not surprising, the game is over even if it will take long time before the Communists will be able to take over all the country" (Mae 2006b, document 206; Mae 2006c, document 213).

In the following weeks Fenoaltea send a series of despatches further stressing the extraordinary advance of the Communist troops (see for instance: Mae 2006d, document 557; Mae 2006e, document 663; Mae 2006f, document 750; Mae 2006g, document 1097).

However, in April 1949 the Italian Government decided to sign a new Treaty of Friendship with Chiang Kai-shek Government.

4 Conclusions

In the aftermath of the second world war and the first post-war years was rather weak: from the end of the war and for more than two years Italy was subject to the armistice terms and to foreign occupation, and foreign troops (basically American) would leave the country only at the end of 1947. Italy's international status sharply contrasted with the aspirations nurtured by the Italian antifascist political class, which thought that Italy had to recover the role of a middle-rank power which would exert its influence in the two traditional areas of Italy's foreign policy: the European continent and the Mediterranean. Thus, the recognition of the nation's international status and the revision of the most severe clauses of the peace treaty became the main goal of Italy's foreign policy after the end of the second world war and especially after the signing of the Paris peace treaty in early 1947.

Within such a general context, Italy's relations with Chiang Kai-shek's China were marked during those years by some fundamental questions and aspects: the problem of Italy's possible entry into the war against Japan, a participation which was regarded basically as symbolical by many

countries but was considered fundamental in Italy in order to demonstrate its complete break with its past; the problem of the contents of the peace treaty between the two countries within the larger context of the Paris peace treaty (Italian colonial legacy in China, repatriation of the Italians, Italian properties, etc.); after the signign of the Paris Treaty in 1947: Italian evaluation of China's political and military situation and China's future perspectives, based largely on the reports send by Ambassador Fenoaltea; second, the question of a new treaty of friendship and cooperation to be agreed between Italy and China in substitution of that signed in 1928, which was obviously linked to the above mentioned evaluation. As already indicated, few months before Chinese Communists' victory in the civil war against the Nationalists (April 1949), the Italian Government decided to sign a new Treaty of Friendship with Chiang Kai-shek's Government for some main and important reasons:

- The need to obtain China's support to the Italian request to be admitted to the United Nations, considering that Chiang Kai-shek's Government was one of those which had signed in 1945 the Charter of the newly established United Nations;
- The need not to weaken Italy's relations with the United States, which were considered fundamental for the future of Italy.

Between late 1949 and the first half of 1950, after the founding of the People's Republic of China, the break of the Korean War and China's partecipation into the Korean conflict, an intense political debate was developed in Italy about the problems if continue to support Chiang Kai-shek or open the path to a dialogue with Mao's China. The final decision, largely criticized especially by the Italian Communist Party but also by various associations and personalities of different political and cultural areas, was to continue to support the Republic of China in Taiwan, before in late 1970 the process of normalization of the formal relations bewteen Rome and Beijing was made possible (on these questions, see Meneguzzi Rostagni, Samarani 2014; Pini 2011; Samarani, De Giorgi 2011; Cm 1998c, 760).

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Chiang Kai-shek and His Time
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Revolution Deconstructed: Chiang Kai-shek and the Northern Expedition in the Japanese Press, 1926-28

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Abstract The Northern Expedition (1926-28) was a turning-point in the rise to power of the Nationalist Party in China, and instrumental in Chiang Kai-shek's own meteoric rise from the position of military commander to top political leader. Scholars have examined the international consequences of this turning-point in Republican history from many angles. Most studies, however, have focussed on inter-state relations at the institutional level, leaving public opinion rather on the sidelines. In an attempt to fill this gap, this paper discusses Japanese press coverage of the Expedition, with a particular focus on the changing perception of Chiang's role in the Nationalist Party. The analysis brings to light the articulate response of the press and of other national figures to the events in China. If on the one hand the Expedition gave cause for anxiety because of the threat it posed to Japanese interests, on the other it raised the hope that a stable government would emerge after years of civil war. While some commentators expressed cautious optimism, however, other observers held strong reservations about Nationalist leadership. Furthermore, coverage of the Jinan Incident shows that even the advocates of a policy of conciliation could assume a hardline stance when the Japanese military took the initiative on the ground. These findings suggest that further research into the early years of the Nanjing government could help explain why public opinion shifted rapidly in favour of an aggressive policy in China after the Manchurian Incident in 1931.

Keywords Nationalist Party. Sino-Japanese Relations. Jinan Incident. Public opinion.

1 Introduction

The Northern Expedition of 1926-28, the military campaign which led to the formal reunification of China under the Nationalist Party, has been con-

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sidered in a number of studies as a turning-point in the Republican period (in English, recent publications are Van de Ven 2003, 94-130; Zarrow 2005, 230-47; Taylor 2009, 52-85; the most detailed account is in Wilbur 1983). Debate has concentrated on the significance of the Expedition in terms of revolutionary movement, seen from the two opposite perspectives of the Nationalist (GMD) and Communist (CCP) Parties. For the latter, the breakup of the United Front in 1927 was a grave setback in the fight against the forces of reaction. For the former, on the other hand, it represented a 'purification' from deviant radicalism. From these mutually exclusive viewpoints, scholars have explored a wide range of Chinese and foreign sources in an attempt to reach a balanced assessment of the political process.

Research on Japanese documents has largely been confined to the institutional sphere (for instance, see Iriye [1965] 1990, 125-59; Satō 2009, 21-71, 224-82; diplomatic correspondence has been collected in Gaimushō 1989-90, vols. 1-2). Only a few scholars have examined those crucial years through the lens of Japanese public opinion. Gotō (1987, 248-97) has analysed editorials from the *Ōsaka Asahi shinbun* as part of an extensive study on how this leading newspaper closely observed the Chinese Revolution from its beginnings, in 1911. Eguchi (1972, 355-60) has praised the liberal magazine *Tōyō keizai shinpō* for its strong criticism of Japan's military intervention in China. The official histories of the two largest newspaper companies also consider their coverage of the Shandong Expeditions in 1927 and 1928 (Asahi shinbun 1995, vol. *Taishō–Shōwa senzen hen*, 299-301, 310-2; Mainichi shinbun 1972, 155-7; Mainichi shinbun 2002, vol. 1, 674-82). Underlying each of these works is an effort to present the relevant editorial line in a positive light, with the emphasis on the intention to establish a constructive Sino-Japanese dialogue. Eguchi, however, has stressed that the *Tōyō keizai shinpō* was the only voice that stood uncompromisingly against imperialism and militarism, while major newspapers held on to the notion of preserving Japan's "special interests" in Northern China.

More recently, other researchers have dealt specifically with the issue of Chiang Kai-shek's leadership. Yamada (2005, 643-53) has analysed the writings of journalist Tachibana Shiraki, who spent most of his professional life in China. Tachibana, who supported the Northern Expedition as a popular struggle against the warlords, criticised both the excesses of Communism and the reactionary character of the Nanjing government. Soon disillusioned with Chiang, he dismissed him simply as a military dictator who had betrayed the revolutionary cause. Matsushige (2013) focuses on the main Japanese newspaper in Manchuria, the *Manshū Nichinichi shinbun*, showing how expatriates responded with growing apprehension to the Expedition. Finally, Iechika (2013) has compared press coverage of Chiang's trip to Japan in the autumn of 1927 with the account left by Chiang himself in his diary, pointing out the difference there was between the public reception actually awarded him and Chiang's expectations.

Research based on Japanese press sources has a double merit. On the one hand, it presents additional viewpoints which contribute to balancing our understanding of the facts. On the other, it provides essential information on Sino-Japanese relations beyond government level. This paper, which presents a survey of major newspapers and magazines, aims to contribute in both ways to the literature on the Northern Expedition. The period examined covers July 1926 to June 1928, from the start of the military campaign to its completion after the capture of Beijing. The two newspapers considered are the *Ōsaka Mainichi shinbun* (OM) and the *Tōkyō Asahi shinbun* (TA or simply *Asahi*), which were among the most widely read in Japan. According to police reports, at the end of November 1927 the *Mainichi* had a daily circulation of 1,166,432 copies, while the *Asahi* was selling about 400,000 copies; neither purportedly had a political bias (Keiho kyoku [1927] 1979, 7, 29).[1] Both *Mainichi* and *Asahi* had a partner in the same group: the *Tōkyō Nichinichi shinbun* and the *Ōsaka Asahi shinbun* respectively (about 450,000 and 1,260,596 copies; Keiho kyoku 1979, 7, 29). It is important to point out, however, that *Nichinichi* editorials tended to coincide with those of the *Mainichi*, while the two *Asahi* acted more independently. Therefore, a review of the Tokyo-based *Asahi* can highlight the differences with its Osaka counterpart. The other sources selected are *Chūō kōron* and *Kaizō*, which were among the most popular general-interest magazines of that period (about 20,000 and 100,000 copies, respectively; Keiho kyoku 1979, 21). Being specialised publication, *Gaikō jihō* is not considered here. As the main forum on foreign affairs, however, it will be discussed in another paper.

When dealing with press sources, the question of the extent to which articles may be representative of public opinion in the broadest sense arises inevitably. Japan was at the time a nation of 61 million people, 77% of whom resided in rural districts (Naikaku tōkei kyoku 1940, 5). The editorial market, on the other hand, catered chiefly to the urban middle class. The publications cited here, then, could hardly be said to be the 'voice of the people'. Nonetheless, they do shed light on the political leanings of an important section of Japanese society, which debated foreign affairs with a critical spirit.

The following paragraphs track press coverage of the Northern Expedition in its various stages, with a focus on the changing perception of Chiang Kai-shek and his role in the Nationalist Party. The first section addresses the question of GMD-CCP cooperation in the initial phase of the campaign. The next traces the widening of the Left-Right split in the GMD in the first months of 1927, up to the start of the 'red purge'. The central part then discusses later developments from the standpoint of

1 Higher figures (1,304,262 and 575,838 copies) appear in company figures, which refer to sales on New Year's Day. Mainichi shinbun 2002, *Bekkan*, 97; Asahi shinbun 1995, *Shiryō hen*, 320.

GMD factionalism. The final section re-examines the Expedition comprehensively in relation to Japan's interests in China. The conclusion ties up the results of the research comparatively with those of previous studies.

2 The Spectre of Communism Looms Over National Revolution

Japanese press coverage of the Northern Expedition started in a rather low key. Attention was still focussed on Beijing, where control of the nominal government of China had recently shifted to the Fengtian clique as a result of the latest clash of arms between the regional factions. Political instability brought with it concern over a range of international issues, such as the stalemate in negotiations for the revision of Chinese tariffs (TA 6 July). When the GMD officially launched the Expedition in Canton, reporters summed up the news in a few lines (TA 7, 10 July; OM 11 July). Only one of these articles commented on the appointment of Chiang Kai-shek as commander-in-chief of the Nationalist forces. Because of the extensive powers which accompanied the post, the article stated, "the position of Mr Chiang as dictator (*dokusaikan*) of Canton has been publicly acknowledged" (TA 7 July; a similar remark in TA 3 August).

Further explanation regarding Chiang's standing in the GMD and the Expedition in general, however, would soon follow as the Nationalists scored their first victories in Hunan. The *Asahi* (21 July) noted that the campaign against the Zhili-Fengtian coalition

> is not a mere struggle for power between North and South, or military cliques; it is a fight between a nationalist, conservative military clique and a Communist Party that uses foreign power. It has to be looked at as a grave development in a struggle that will condition the fate of China.

Regarding the GMD leadership, in the same article the opinion was that

> the Canton government has now become completely the realm of the Communist Party. Former chairmen of the central executive committee as Hu Hanmin and Wang Jingwei have lost their position one after the other; the last Right-wing leader, […] Wu Tiecheng, has suddenly been removed, arrested and imprisoned […]. In this way the central executive committee has lost half of its members and actual power in the Canton government has shifted to the despotic arbitrariness of Mr Chiang Kai-shek and the supreme political advisor, Mr Borodin.[2]

2 For a portrait of Mikhail Borodin, see Furushō 1927.

This editorial introduced three key themes that would later crop up again in discussions on the Northern Expedition, namely: the role of the Soviet Union as foreign power behind the GMD; factional strife within the GMD; and Chiang's relationship with the Communists.

Concerning the first point, the *Mainichi* agreed that the Expedition was a Soviet-sponsored venture, which aimed to extend Communist influence over a vast territory. Russia, "after the failure of its Far East policy in Northern China [...] is injecting tremendous strength into Canton as its only foothold in Southern China" (10 August). This explained why, "taking the opportunity of disturbances in Hunan" (that is, Tang Shengzhi's rebellion against the local warlord), Russia "has supplied large amounts of weapons and ammunitions and has had [...] Mr Chiang Kai-shek carry out the Northern Expedition, in the attempt to stretch its arm over the Chang Jiang region" (10 August; a more detailed discussion of Russia's China policy is in TA 4 January 1927). According to this view, Moscow was manipulating the GMD:

> It is no exaggeration to say that at present all foreign and domestic policies of the Canton government are based on Russia's guidelines. Mr Chiang Kai-shek and others embellish this truth by claiming that they have allied with Russia from an international standpoint as a first step towards the achievement of a world revolution, and internally for the grand ideal of accomplishing national revolution". (OM 10 August)

The same article concluded that, since the ultimate Russian goal was to "expel the powers' influence from South China and replace it with a red kingdom", the issue of GMD's relations with the foreign powers was deserving of careful consideration.

Such an emphasis on Soviet dominance was toned down somewhat elsewhere, by recalling that the Expedition had been a plan cherished by the GMD since the time of Sun Wen's leadership (OM 12 August, 21 November; TA 17 August). It was the Russian advisors, in fact, who in early 1926 had rejected as premature Chiang's appeal to launch the Expedition. This had also been the mainstream position of the CCP, until Chiang staged a coup in Canton – the so-called 20 March Incident – that forced the Communists to re-negotiate the terms for cooperation with the GMD. Chiang had acted pre-emptively, spurred by the suspicion that a conspiracy was about to strike him. It seems, however, that these fears were only the product of a climate of mutual distrust (Wilbur 1983, 573-5; Van de Ven 2003, 98-104). At the time, the Japanese press gave credit to the story of the aborted Communist coup (TA 28 March, 4 April; OM 1, 12 April; also OM 21 November, quoting from the GMD Right journal, the *Guomindang zhoukan*). Allegedly, the Communists wanted to get rid of Chiang because "while on the surface he takes the attitude of joining hands with Russia, on the other side he has

an anti-Communist colour" (OM 1 April). At the same time, Chiang seemed to behave independently from the Right-wing leaders of the GMD, whom he had already ousted from Canton (OM 1 April).

Gotō (1987, 247) notes that the Incident received little attention in the *Ōsaka Asahi*. This newspaper, indeed, only conjectured that the expulsion of "many Russians" from Canton would induce the Soviet Union to moderate its China policy (8 April). The *Tōkyō Asahi* took a closer look at the consequences of the coup in the GMD. Initially, it seemed that the purge of the radical Left had placed the "moderate faction" in a dominant position (3 April). Shortly after, though, it was reported that Communists within the party were still strong; as long as factional strife continued, a Northern Expedition stood no chance (19 April). Rather, there was a risk that Canton would fall into "a state of anarchy" (21 April). Finally, there came news that Chiang had managed to negotiate an agreement between the pro- and anti-Communist factions in the army, which would voluntarily dissolve their organisations (24 April).

In conclusion, at this stage, Chiang's political leaning certainly appeared ambiguous. Because of his role in the repression of Right-wing leaders back in 1925 (as remembered in Ikeda 1927, 52; Yamamura 1927a, 42) and again after the renewed agreement with the CCP, journalists at times would portray him as a Leftist (as in OM 12 August 1926; TA 5 January 1927). Still, the economist Negishi Tadashi remarked that Chiang's pro-Russian stand was only opportunism: he "has not turned red from his heart; rather, he is said to be an anti-Communist, but there is no way he could denounce Communism" (TA 5 January).

The tendency to associate Chiang with the Communists was in part the standard reaction to his appointment as commander of a Soviet-backed campaign. The *Mainichi*, however, also pointed to some incipient reasons for friction, which would become increasingly evident in the following months. In the first place, the Communist Party and labour unions were not necessarily ready to comply with the instructions of the GMD government, as proven by the authorities' recourse to an order labelling strikes as "counter-revolutionary" activity to stop them (OM 12 August). Although the Nationalist Army claimed not to be responsible for violence committed by the labour union corps, this sounded like a lame excuse that would hardly win the trust of either foreigners or the Chinese people themselves, "aside from the violent and the lower classes" (16 December). Hence, no matter how hard Chiang tried to present himself as Sun Wen's heir, "this will be useless […] so long as he does not reject Communism and break up with Communists and Russian advisors" (4 October).[3] At the same time, it appeared that Chiang could

3 As an instance of these attempts to distance themselves from the Communists, see an interview with Chiang in Jiujiang (TA 19 November evening). GMD member Yin Rugeng, who

not easily free himself of these bonds. Behind the successful advance of the GMD, the editor observed, there were "the young students and labourers" in China, and Russian support from abroad (3 September).

Whether initiative for the Expedition had come from Russia or the GMD, or whether Chiang was a Communist pawn or not, in the eyes of Japanese commentators the military campaign remained related to the threat of "reddening" (*sekka*). Quotations from the *Nationalist Party Weekly* included the following passage:

> the Communist Party propagandises its ideology and in the end, wherever the Northern Expedition armies arrive, there arrives the influence of the Communist Party. Although originally it was the Nationalist Party's Northern Expedition, the Communist Party has used it to gain power, wreaking havoc on the Nationalist Party. (OM 21 November)[4]

The *Asahi*, too, shared the view that the Expedition's steady advance into the Yangzi region meant, without doubt, that "the reddening forces have come to control almost half of China" (30 November). The editor then pondered the disquieting consequences of such a situation:

> The time when all of China turns red may not be far off. The reddening of all China is the emergence of a second Russia. Both the Canton government and the leaders of the Northern Expedition pledge that they will not carry out Communism, and that they uphold the Three Principles of the People of Mr Sun Wen. We also do not believe that today, after the failure of idealistic Communism in Russia, they will try to carry out in China this kind of Communism. However, if we look at the political structure of the Canton government, in the cell organisation based on the proletarian masses there is no difference from the Soviet organisation of workers/peasants. […] Should they control all of China, the point is whether they will keep their reiterated hard line on the abrogation of established treaties. […] Although the reddening of China is China's own problem, if the effects of reddening involve indiscriminate repeal of the established treaties, that is a vital problem for Japan. For the sake of a vital problem, regardless of whether the counterpart turns red or not, one has to assert those rights that must be asserted.

had taken refuge in Japan during the previous war, spoke in defence of Chiang in an interview to the *Asahi* (10 September evening). Evening editions bear the following day's date.

4 In another article, Negishi explained how the organisation of the Revolutionary Army followed the Soviet model and how its political sections, in charge of propaganda, were under Deng Yanda, "red among the reds" (TA 3 January 1927). He also wrote about the ties between the GMD and Leftist mass organisations of peasants and workers (TA 6, 7 January 1927).

This view contrasts with the more positive attitude of the *Ōsaka Asahi*, which sympathised with the GMD as the only possible agent of China's reunification supported by popular legitimacy (Gotō 1987, 249-52), and considered likely a substantial reduction of Soviet influence over the party in the future (Gotō 1987, 249-53).

Undeniably, the GMD had an explicit anti-imperialist goal, that is to say: abrogation of the unfair treaties that set limits on China's sovereignty to the advantage of the foreign powers (TA 14 September). Even admitting that now the GMD targeted only British interests, it might soon turn its attention to Japan as well if the Expedition clashed with the Fengtian clique in the North (OM 18 September). The practical consequences of anti-imperialism in the context of the Expedition became clear at the start of 1927, with the takeover of British concessions in Hankou and Jiujiang. These events came as shocking news to the Japanese public. The *Mainichi* (7 January) called the occupation "a grave problem that […] requires also the attention of our country". The *Asahi* (12 January) stated emphatically: "As a world problem, at present and in the future, there is no problem as great as this". Quite naturally, as discussed further below, anti-British incidents fuelled the debate on how Japan should protect its own interests in China.

On these developments, Chiang took an ambiguous stand. When addressing a large Chinese audience at a welcome rally in Nanchang, he stressed the need to fight imperialism so as to achieve the abolition of extraterritoriality and the restitution of concessions (OM 15 January evening). On the other hand, on a different occasion he allegedly stated that the Hankou concession should be given back to Britain, as occupation was the wrong means to that end (OM 16 January evening). As one journalist put it, "Chiang Kai-shek, having in mind the people's inclinations, has tried to cater to their will with ingenious propaganda, by professing aloud what the public wants him to say" (Ikeda 1927, 50). In this respect, Chiang's behaviour was similar to that of foreign minister Eugene Chen and other GMD officials, whose tones swung between the threatening and the reassuring. After interviewing the 'top five' men in government (Chen, Xu Qian, Song Ziwen, Deng Yanda and Sun Ke, in OM 4-6 January), the *Mainichi* reporter concluded (6 January) that they shared some common ideas regarding Japan. These were: the absolute necessity of Sino-Japanese friendship, based on an equal footing; the acknowledgment of Japan's special position in Manchuria; and, in the long-term, an agreement for the restitution of Japanese concessions. Commentators, however, remained wary of conciliatory statements. Negishi recalled that Chiang, after the capture of Wuhan, had declared that "the National Government will stifle British imperialism in the South; the National Army will stifle Japanese imperialism in the North" (TA 8 January 1927). Moreover, the spread of radical movements in the territories occupied by the GMD reinforced doubts about the ability of its officials to restrain the Communists and labour unions (OM 17, 22

March). For these reasons, the press kept a close eye on the mounting factional strife within the GMD.

3 Towards Rupture Point: the Path from Nanchang to Shanghai

From the start of the Expedition, it was clear that the political situation in Canton was unstable (TA 17 August). Internal divisions became rife at the end of 1926 when Chiang, in response to the establishment of a Provisional Joint Council in Wuhan by Leftist leaders, summoned from Canton the remaining group of party officials to form a rival political centre in Nanchang. Tension between the two factions soon escalated. At the Third plenum of the central executive committee (CEC), held in Hankou on 11 March, the Left majority stripped Chiang of his key posts (the most detailed account is in OM 13 April). Chiang, however, simply refused to recognise the legitimacy of those decisions. He and his allies started to use armed force against the Communists, repressing demonstrations and coups in several cities. The violent suppression of thousands of Communists in Shanghai on 12 April marked a point of no return in the break from the United Front. A few days later, a new government was formed in Nanjing in open opposition to Wuhan.

Thus, in the first months of 1927, Japanese newspapers had a growing body of evidence which set Chiang apart from the GMD's Left wing. Shortly before the Third plenum, the *Mainichi* (7 March) noted that both sides had their reasons to resent each other. On the one hand, the concentration of military and political power in Chiang's hands was in total disregard of the committee system that had so far been the norm in party governance (on the Soviet origins of this feature, see TA 5 January 1927). On the other, those in Wuhan were "more radical than Chiang and others"; their ability to instigate workers and take advantage of anti-foreign incidents was a cause of serious concern to the Nanchang group (the former aspect is emphasised in TA 1 March evening). Yet, since the CCP and the GMD had some powerful common enemies, the editor's prediction was that Chiang would not resort to a coup, as he had in March of the previous year, and that the GMD would not split unless Chiang struck a compromise with the Northern coalition. The *Asahi* (6 March) agreed that a formal split of the party was unlikely, offering a different reason: the senior officials had moved to Nanchang because there Chiang would protect them from the radical Left; as long as Chiang held military power, the Wuhan faction would not dare to act. However, in the wake of the party summit – in which Chiang did not even participate – the break appeared serious. Leftist propaganda accused the commander-in-chief of despotic behaviour, of conspiring in view of an agreement with the North, and of having turned pro-Japanese. This was nothing but an attempt "to beat down and reduce to

impotence Mr Chiang Kai-shek, who is a thorn in the side for the Communist faction of Wuhan", so as to "carry out the reddening campaign as they wish" (OM 16 March evening). According to an anonymous GMD official, however, such high-handed behaviour would only hasten the explosion of internecine conflict (TA 16 March).

What had so emboldened the radical Left? The *Mainichi* (16 March evening) listed three causes: (Russian) financial support through Borodin; anti-Chiang popular sentiment in Wuhan, resulting from effective propaganda; and the elimination of Chiang's military influence in Wuhan thanks to the cooptation of Tang Shengzhi. One other fact (already pointed out in OM 16 January evening, 14 March) signalled a process that would receive much attention in the press: the emergence of competing military factions within the GMD. Tang had been one of the first local leaders to join the party at the start of the Expedition; several others followed, defecting from the enemy. Moreover, the GMD had already coopted some powerful warlords, such as Li Zongren from Guanxi. There were also rising party members who took the Expedition as an opportunity to acquire a territorial base, as did Li Jishen in Guandong. Chiang himself, by advancing into the Lower Yangzi region, secured direct control of Chiangxi, Fujian and his home province of Zhejiang. Earlier, the *Mainichi* had already started to see Chiang as the leader of a "new military clique" (*shingunbatsu*) based in Nanchang (2 February). This was ironic, for one of the declared goals of the Expedition was precisely that of sweeping away warlordism. Instead, political conflict within the GMD created a fertile ground for the rise of military factions, old and new (24 September). Hence the comment: "Whenever they open their mouth, the Southerners attack the military cliques, but in this way they criticise the others' defects without noticing their own, and rather deserve ridicule" (19 December).

The *Mainichi* observed that the allegiance of generals to either the Wuhan faction or to Nanchang/Nanjing depended more on personal convenience than on ideology (16 May, 16 December). In the case of Tang, for example, the opinion was that in the future he would abandon the Communists to "join with the new Beiyang faction that will emerge" (18 March evening). Shortly after, when he appeared to switch sides, this was seen as a predictable reaction to Communist violence in Shanghai (TA 24 March). Tang continued to support the Wuhan government, but in July he approved the occupation of the city by his subordinate commander He Jian. The coup led to the flight of Borodin and also of leaders of the extreme Left, resulting in a shift of power to the Wang Jingwei faction (OM 19 July; TA 20 July evening). Thus, by turning to the "pink party" (that is, the moderate Left), Tang tried to "fulfill his year-long ambitions" (OM 21 July). In the following months, Tang concentrated on strengthening his hold on Hunan and Hubei. When the main GMD factions reached a compromise for a new government in Nanjing (TA 20 September), Tang took a defiant attitude

(TA 21 September evening; OM 22, 24 September). Accused of plotting an alliance with the Fengtian clique, he had to deal with a punitive expedition and was forced to take refuge in Japan in November.

Chiang did not target Wuhan immediately after the Third plenum, apparently because his forces were still engaged in the offensive against Nanjing warlord Sun Chuanfang and his ally Zhang Zongchang. However, the Mainichi foresaw that after the capture of Nanjing and Shanghai the next target would be Wuhan; in the end, Chiang would prevail over the Left because of his superior military power (OM 16 March evening). The circumstances under which the Revolutionary Army took Shanghai and Nanjing, on 22-24 March, contributed to an escalation in the confrontation between factions. In Shanghai, troops led by Bai Chongxi repressed a Communist-sponsored uprising; in Nanjing, Nationalist units looted and assaulted foreign residents, provoking a retaliatory bombardment by British and US warships. Reporters sent horrified accounts of violence in Nanjing, especially the attack on the Japanese consulate (TA 25, 26 March; OM 30 March). Chiang protested that the looters must have been retreating enemy soldiers disguised as Nationalists, and gave assurance that he would look into the incident (TA 26 March; OM 27 March). However, the version prevailing overseas (see consul Morioka, in TA 29 March) was that the perpetrators were Communists in the GMD ranks. It was thought that the CCP had planned the incident with the purpose of causing Chiang trouble in two ways: on the one hand, they would thwart his efforts to win foreign support; on the other, by provoking the powers' retaliation, they would rouse xenophobic feelings among the Chinese people who would turn also against the moderate commander (Negishi 1927, 74; Maida 1927, 78-80; Yoshino 1927a, 108-9).[5] While the *Ōsaka Asahi* stressed the need to avoid a hardline reaction (Gotō 1987, 258-9), the *Tōkyō Asahi* (27 March) added that Chiang should promptly reform the army and punish the ringleaders. The *Mainichi* (27 March) commented that the GMD was at least morally responsible for what had happened, because it had instigated hatred against the foreigners; although its government officially rejected such violent measures, there were many Communists and other radical agitators in the party. The conflict, therefore, between Wuhan and Chiang's "moderate faction" could not but have serious international consequences (1 April). In other words, dissociating himself from the Left had become for Chiang ever more crucial to win international recognition.

Chiang attempted a *rapprochement* with Wang Jingwei (TA 5 April evening; OM 5 April; Yamamura 1927b, who also traces the story of their rela-

5 The thesis of a Communist conspiracy was then extended to the anti-Japanese incident that occurred in Hankou on 3 April (OA 5 April, in Gotō 1987, 259; OM 5 April). The *Asahi* (5 April) stressed the responsibility of the Japanese government, which had not taken adequate pre-emptive measures.

tionship in the GMD), whom the Third plenum had summoned back from Europe to resume the chairmanship, but failed to dissuade him from going to Wuhan. There, the *Mainichi* expected, the Communists would use Wang's prestige for their own ends (17 March, 5 April). Although the *Ōsaka Asahi* still hoped that Wang might mediate so as to bring unity back to the party (7 April, quoted in Gotō 1987, 260-1), the following weeks saw an escalation of factional violence that led to Chiang's final break with the CCP and the formalisation of the GMD split. Chiang's motives seemed clear. There were rumours of imminent attempts on his life and on that of other members of his faction by the Communists in Shanghai (OM 2 April); he was concerned about internal order and foreign relations which he saw as "priority problems" (OM 4 April); his "moderate faction" was enraged about the effects of the "wild policies" of the Communist-dominated Wuhan government, such as relentless strikes and peasant violence (OM 10 April); and it was rumoured that Right-wing leaders, dissatisfied with Chiang's tolerance of Communists, were planning to establish an independent regime in Guanxi and Guandong provinces (TA 13 April evening). Hence, the red purge in Shanghai came as no surprise to the press (TA 13 April). It was, rather, the logical result of a combination of domestic and international factors.

4 Revolution Stumbles as Factional Strife in the Nationalist Party Produces Warlords

Although Chiang's coup had stopped the tide of Communism, journalists did not become any more optimistic about the situation in China. An editorial in the *Asahi* (30 April), entitled "The suicide of national revolution", remarked that the GMD-CCP alliance had been decisive for the success of the Northern Expedition (as explained also in Ikeda 1927, 51-4; Yamamura 1927a, 40-1). The premature end of the United Front, therefore, made the prospects of reunification of the country more difficult. Moreover, the *Mainichi* (16 May) pointed out that there were factional divisions in both the Wuhan and the Nanjing camps. In the former, apart from "three or four people" such as Xu and Deng, there were no members of the "true Communist faction" in top government posts; most of the higher military officers in the armies of Tang and Zhang Fakui were, if anything, anti-Communist and perhaps plotting a coup. In Nanjing, on the other hand, there were "surprisingly many members of the Communist Party" among the lower officers in Chiang's forces. In addition, both governments were under external threat. Wuhan faced its enemies on three sides: the Fengtian clique in the north, Nanjing in the east, and Canton (controlled by Li Jishen) in the south. Chiang, instead, had to confront both Wuhan and the Northern coalition. Neither branch of the GMD, then, seemed to have strength enough to break the stalemate.

In Wuhan, as recalled above, the balance of forces gradually swung against the Communists. There had been signs of this from the onset of the split (OM 22, 23 May; TA 22, 24 May). Yoshino Sakuzō, the well-known political scientist and columnist, noted that the Communist Party was in China "an extremely small group" and its recent rise to power was but "a temporary aberration" (1927a, 110). According to the *Mainichi* (25 May), the Wuhan government had lost popular support and was isolated because of its radical policies, which had wrecked the economy and social order. Even Moscow had no longer any interest in supporting such a failure.[6] As he had already done with Chiang, the editor pointed out that the expulsion of Communists from Wuhan, besides stemming from personal rivalries, had become necessary from the standpoint of external relations (25 July). This observation referred not only to other factions in the GMD (29 June), but also to the international sphere. Britain had severed all diplomatic ties with the Wuhan government, claiming that it lacked the ability to enforce any agreement. This had boosted the image of the Nanjing faction, which was promoting itself as a reliable negotiating partner for the foreign powers (see, for example, Wu Chaoshu in OM 17 May). The *Mainichi*, however, remained sceptical about how trustworthy Nanjing was (21 May). For *Chūō kōron* (editorial 1927c), the red purge in Wuhan marked the end of CCP influence: "In China the Communist Party is like something that flies away when it blows. We don't know if one should rejoice or grieve for China; in sum, however, their power today does not pose a problem anymore".

The *Ōsaka Asahi* (Gotō 1987, 269-71) greeted the ousting of Communists from Wuhan as the fruit of Japan's moderate policy. The latter had convinced Chiang that Russia was not acting in China's interests and consequently made the Wuhan faction realise that radicalism would only bring isolation. However, relations between the two Nationalist centres remained tense. Differently from the spring, Wuhan seemed now in a stronger position than its rival. As explained in the *Asahi* (26 July), financial recovery had been steady, and the advantage of troop numbers over Nanjing was clear. Chiang, instead, could trust only the armies of He Yingqin, Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi; the other commanders were former enemies on whom he could not rely. Moreover, after negotiations for a truce failed, Nanjing was losing ground under the counter-offensive of the Northern forces. As a condition for mending the split, Wuhan (especially Tang, as later pointed out in OM 14 August) demanded that Chiang be removed from power. It was hardly likely, however, that such a request could be accepted by the Nanjing faction (TA 26 July).

6 On this point, however, the *Asahi* (2 August) commented that Russia would learn from its mistake of supporting only one faction. Its ties with China would continue, because there were still many Communists both inside and outside the GMD.

The persistence of GMD divisions caused strong concern in the Japanese press. According to the *Mainichi* (4 August), it was possible that Wuhan's break with the CCP might open the path to the peaceful unification of China, since "for both North and South there is no need to continue further a useless war". This seemed to be flouting the GMD's ambition for national reconstruction through eradication of the Northern warlords. In fact, the editor's belief was that "the South's national revolution belongs already to the past" (13 August). On this issue, the *Asahi* (10 August) was more sympathetic to the GMD:

> Revolution consists in putting first the destruction of the *status quo*, and building something new over destruction. [...] The value of revolution lies in whether arduous construction succeeds or not. [...] Having severed its relation with the Communist Party, will the Nationalist Party be able to proceed straight and forward on the path of national revolution in accordance with the Three Principles of the People? [...] The more the Nationalist Party splits and struggles, the more it will disappoint the Chinese people, and the Communist Party might ride on that chance.

At last, on 13 August Chiang's decision to step down for the sake of party unity ended the *impasse*. The *Asahi* (16 August evening) found several reasons to explain his 'retirement'. Besides having suffered heavy losses on the Northern front, Chiang had lost key allies. The top posts in Nanjing had been assigned to people originally from Zhejiang, causing resentment among the other regional factions. In particular, it was said that Li Zongren and Bai had persuaded He Yingqin to side with them in pressing Chiang to resign. Another article (TA 17 August a), which traced Chiang's rise and fall from the start of the Expedition, also indicated the concentration of power in the Zhejiang group as a cause of hostility against Chiang. Among the military, Chiang had lost most of his loyal officers from the Whampoa academy in battle; in the fragile coalition of commanders, it was now Li Zongren who held "the casting vote". During the Expedition, Li had always been sent to the front, hence missing the opportunity to strengthen his own territorial base. Until recently, he had hesitated to respond to overtures from Wuhan, but once the latter had carried out its own red purge, the main obstacle to an agreement had vanished. In conclusion, "superficially, the split between Wuhan and Nanjing factions is a split between Communism and anti-Communism, but that is not all. Rather, it is not an exaggeration to say that it is chiefly a split based on feelings and interests" (TA 17 August).

Further considerations on both the military and the political causes of Chiang's defeat led to a grim prediction about the GMD (TA 17 August b). Although Chiang's exit from the scene could pave the way to formal reunification of the party, the revolutionary spirit had grown thin. Chiang

had revived the party's Right wing (the so-called Western Hills faction) and made room for "bureaucratic" elements. His fall meant that the "new military clique" would give way to the "old military cliques" that had joined the GMD, such as those of Tang and Li, for whom national revolution was just a struggle for power, and so, "until the birth of a new revolutionary force, aimless disorder may continue". These concerns over the breakup of the GMD into military factions appeared again in the editorial of 30 August. The *Mainichi* (16 August) offered a similar, though less detailed, analysis of the causes of Chiang's retreat. The overall evaluation of his character was that "personally, he has a passion and spirit that are unlikely in a Chinese, and also frankness; nevertheless, his lack of political experience and ability to exert control [...] have been standing out more and more". Recalling that an American journalist had called Chiang "the strong man that China had been waiting for", the editor could not but point at the gap between this kind of prediction and reality.

It is true that, compared to just the year before, Chiang had acquired immense visibility on the international scene. The *Asahi* (TA 17 August a) noted that all the world now knew him as China's Kemal Pasha or Napoleon.[7] Analogy with great leaders, past and present, became popular from the spring of 1927, with the completion of the campaign in the lower Yangzi region. Journalist Furushō Kunio (1927b, 79) wrote that "looking at the history of China, his rapid success has no comparison"; at the same time (81-2), he wondered whether Chiang would become a second Kemal, or instead fall into disgrace like Lev Trotsky (the same question is put in TA 6 March). Furushō (1927c) also sketched one of the first 'private' portraits of the commander, touching on his habits and relating anecdotes that illustrated his virtues and defects. As noted by Matsushige (2013, 48-9), this interest for Chiang's private life developed in the wake of his resignation as commander-in-chief, which allowed for a separation of the public and private spheres in the 'massification' of Chiang's mediatic image. Representative of the new approach is a long report about a visit to Chiang in his home village (OM 8 September), in which the reporter's stated aim was to leave aside politics and other "hard talk" to capture instead some "enjoyable talk" (*omoshiroi hanashi*). This trend peaked during Chiang's trip to Japan (29 September-9 November), when especially the local newspapers gave the visit to Song Meiling's mother a clear romantic slant – with no apparent interest in the political implications of Chiang's imminent marriage into one of Shanghai's prominent families (Iechika 2013, 75-6; see also OM 26 September). There was no coverage of Chiang's private interview with premier Tanaka Giichi (for

7 For example, in the wake of Chiang's entrance into Shanghai, *Time* (4 April 1927) featured his portrait on the cover and an article entitled "Conqueror".

the official record, see Satō 2009, 225-7); this, however, is perfectly understandable in the light of the confidential nature of the visit.

The November issue of *Chūō kōron* featured a collection of short essays on Chiang, which together formed a kaleidoscope view of both his public role and moral qualities. At one extreme, was a laudatory piece by Yin Rugeng and at the other, a scathing critique by the Marxist economist Inomata Tsunao, who was a former member of the clandestine Communist Party of Japan. Inomata accused Chiang of first trying to reduce the GMD to a tool in the hands of the "semi-feudal bourgeois reaction" and then, having failed in this, of turning his back on the people to join forces with the military cliques and the imperialists. From a similar standpoint, the Marxist intellectual Yamakawa Hitoshi (1927) predicted that Chiang would return to power not "as the leader of national revolution", but just as "one element of the old forces of warlordism". Also on a negative note was the article by Socialist thinker Takabatake Motoyuki, who portrayed Chiang as an opportunist politician – like every other revolutionary leader in China. Protestant educator Shimizu Yasuzō, who had recently met Chiang in Nara, criticised his authoritarian ways but also praised his effort to avoid in China the excesses of the Russian revolution; he judged Chiang superior to all the other Chinese leaders he had met. Finally, former army captain and ruralist thinker, Nagano Akira, traced, in a more detached way, Chiang's gradual re-positioning in the GMD through the years, from cooperation to conflict with the Communists. As causes of his recent fall from office, he cited Chinese intolerance of the concentration of power and Chiang's excessive favoritism for his regional fellows – another typical Chinese trait. It seemed to Nagano that the GMD was growing weak in revolutionary punch and becoming more like a military clique. In such circumstances, Chiang had taken a wise decision to temporarily leave the country. He still stood a chance of running for leadership, but would be wise to take care not to become just another warlord.

Indeed, during Chiang's 'vacation' in Japan, the struggle for power in the GMD had continued – to the advantage of the Northern coalition (OM 28 October). Both the *Asahi* (20 September, 10 October, 26 October) and the *Mainichi* (4 October) painted a pessimistic picture of the situation. Although negotiations among party factions had led in mid-September to the formation of a new government in Nanjing, the agreement did not work immediately. In defiance of Nanjing, where Li Zongren had the upper hand, Wang reasserted the independence of Wuhan with Tang's military support. Rather than face the punitive expedition, however, on 12 November Tang fled to Japan. The *Asahi* (15 November) feared that the practical consequence for the GMD would be just a partitioning of Tang's territorial base among his opponents. In the meantime, Wang had moved to Canton under the protection of Zhang Fakui, who was struggling with Li Jishen for control of Guandong.

It was amidst such disorder that the conditions matured for the return of Chiang to the political arena as a mediator. On the eve of Chiang's arrival in Shanghai (10 November), the Japanese public received news of his *rapprochement* with Wang. Chiang had supposedly written to his old rival that he could "not bear to stand by and watch the disarray of the Nationalist Party", and that he wanted "to stand up again to rescue it". In reply, Wang had agreed to start talks in Shanghai in preparation for a Fourth CEC plenum (OM 10 November evening; TA 10 November). Thus, another round of complex negotiations was set in motion (for a summary, see Wilbur 1983, 686-9). This time, Chiang led the field over Wang. Over the next weeks, Wang's position was badly damaged by his suspected involvement in two incidents: first, the coup that Zhang Fakui staged against Li's forces in Canton (17 November); then, the Communist uprising that devastated the same city on 11-13 December, until Zhang suppressed it ruthlessly. On 17th of that month, Wang left for exile in France. The very day before the insurrection, the preparatory conference in Shanghai had asked Chiang to resume his post as commander-in-chief, and entrusted him to call the Fourth plenum, scheduled for January.

While reporting on these facts, the *Asahi* (29 November) noted that the GMD was splintering further. After Tang's defeat, generals of the Hunan and Guanxi cliques were competing for control of the territories under the former Wuhan faction; moreover, Zhang's coup (discussed on 22 November) had led to the establishment of a separate regime in Canton. As a result of intricate factional balancing, the main leaders did not oppose Chiang's reinstatement as supreme commander. In practice, however, he could count neither on their support nor on the loyalty of their soldiers (12 December). At first, it seemed that the shock of the Communist capture of Canton might help the GMD to pull together (13 December; on a more optimistic tone, OA 15 December, in Gotō 1987, 279). Because of Wang's alleged role behind the coup, though, it would be more difficult for Chiang to cooperate with his faction (14 December). In the wake of Wang's departure, China's domestic situation showed no sign of improvement: both the Northern military cliques and the GMD seemed "neither dead nor alive" (21 December). This stark view contrasts, again, with the appraisal of the Nationalists' achievements that year by the *Ōsaka Asahi*. According to the editorial of 29 December (quoted in Gotō 1987, 280-1), criticism that the GMD had lost its revolutionary spirit was leaning towards the Communist interpretation of the facts. By expelling the radical elements, the party seemed to have found its way back to "bourgeois democracy". The *Mainichi*, too, kept a close eye on the interplay between Chiang and Wang. It appeared that both wanted to force the Western Hills faction into the background (7 December); this could explain why Wang sponsored Chiang's reappointment (12 December). However, it was expected that their cooperation would not last long (14 December). Chiang, it seemed,

"had tried to ride on two horses at the same time", that is, Wang and the Western Hills group. Now, he was severing ties with the compromised Wang so as to re-establish his own faction (16 December).

With Tang, Wang, and soon also Zhang out of his way (Li Jishen retook Canton at the end of the year), Chiang moved on to regain leadership in the GMD. Despite the title of commander-in-chief, which he officially took again on 9 January, Chiang had only limited military power to back his authority. Hence, it was reported that Chiang and his associates were using their hold on fiscal resources and personal connections to buy – literally – the support of different military cliques (TA 6 January evening). However, as powerful generals from Guanxi, Hubei and other provinces formed a "new Wuhan faction", Chiang's position remained precarious (TA 6 January evening). It seemed that the near future, far from unifying them, would see the GMD fragmenting even further around the three main poles of Nanjing, Wuhan and Canton (TA 17 January). Nevertheless, the long-postponed Fourth plenum (13 January-3 February 1928) was a success for Chiang, whose proposals for conservative reorganisation of the party won the full approval of the participants (Wilbur 1983, 697-9). Still, the *Asahi* (15 February) objected that Chiang had managed to dispel the influence of the Western Hills faction, but not that of either the Wuhan or Canton military cliques. Therefore, as long as the South was divided, conditions for resuming the drive on Beijing would not be right. This prediction, however, proved wrong. Even without support from the Guanxi generals – Bai would lead reinforcements as late as May – in February, Chiang started preparations for a joint offensive with the armies of Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan in the North. By early June, the Nationalist flag was waving in Beijing.

5 Japan's Interests in China and the Northern Expedition

Since the early battles in the summer of 1926, the Japanese press had followed the advance of GMD forces in Southern China with some apprehension. As noted above, the campaign was perceived as a threat to Japanese interests because of strong Communist influence in the GMD and the anti-imperialist goals that were integral to the Nationalist ideology itself. While the red purges to some extent dispelled the fears of a radical takeover, the Northern Expedition remained a source of deep concern. It was towards the end of the campaign that heavy fighting broke out between Nationalist and Japanese troops in Jinan, the capital city of Shandong Province. The Jinan Incident (3-11 May 1928) has been analysed in a number of studies (for example, Iriye [1965] 1990, 193-205; Wilbur 1983, 702-6; Satō 2009, 234-45; Taylor 2009, 79-83) for it left a scar on Sino-Japanese relations. On the one hand, it inflamed anti-Japanese sentiment in China

and convinced Chiang that Japan posed the greatest threat to the future of his country. On the other, it set a precedent for those in Japan who believed in military force as a means of asserting national interests on the continent. How did Japanese public opinion, however, react to such dramatic news? To put things into perspective, let us first review how the perception of risk evolved over the successive stages of the Northern Expedition, along with changes in Japan's China policy.

At the start of the Expedition, the foreign minister in a cabinet led by the liberal Kenseikai party was a seasoned diplomat, Shidehara Kijurō. Since his appointment in 1924, Shidehara had pursued a policy of international *détente*. An important achievement in this sense had been, in 1925, the normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union. Japan had made overtures to China for the recovery of customs tariff autonomy and professed a line of non-intervention in domestic affairs. When Shidehara declared that Japan would not take sides in the dispute over tariffs between Britain and Canton, the *Mainichi* (18 September 1926) commented that this decision was in line with the minister's established policy, which so far had not been detrimental to Japan. Nevertheless, the newspaper accused Shidehara of short-sightedness. Nationalist expansion would harass mainly the British in the Yangzi region; if war moved northward, however, Japan would be forced to abandon its policy of strict non-intervention. Although "the Fengtian Army does not have any special relation with Japan, nor does it receive any remarkable support", the Canton government and Feng Yuxiang would use the pretext of stopping Japanese expansionism in order to attack the North. These considerations logically raised the question of how Japan should pre-empt this menace.

For the *Asahi* (15 December), cooperation with Great Britain was problematic because the latter's position in either South or North China was very different from that of Japan.[8] Therefore, in order to defend its "vital interests", Japan should "prepare autonomous measures" so as to "face any situation" that may arise in China. For "the near future", it seemed that only the Nationalists had the potential for establishing a strong government. In this perspective, it would be "disadvantageous to stick to the anachronistic old treaties". What was required on Japan's side, instead, was a "resolute attitude" to "solve neatly the unequal treaties". The *Mainichi* (23 October) agreed that at present there could be no effective cooperation among the foreign powers and that Japan, as the country with the closest ties with China, should work out a new basis for bilateral relations with its neighbour. In this way, Japan would play the leading role in the redefinition of China's international status, as Britain had done before

8 On this issue, the *Mainichi* (7 January 1927) quoted from the *New York Times* the opinion that Britain's foremost goal in Asia was rather that of restraining Japanese influence.

with Japan itself. For this strategy to succeed, however, an "absolutely necessary pre-condition" was that China drop its "useless and harmful foreign policy measures" (that is, economic boycotts and other anti-foreign activities). Of course, the lack of a unified government in China posed a major obstacle to negotiations. Should Japan deal directly with the Nationalists? For the *Mainichi* (30 November), the territorial advance of the GMD naturally raised the problem of diplomatic recognition. Japan, after all, had been the first country to acknowledge the Republic of China in 1913. However, there was a crucial difference: at that time the new regime had agreed to fulfil all previous international obligations. Although it would be sensible, "and maybe necessary", to recognise a *de facto* regional government, Japan would have to proceed with caution.

In the wake of the Hankou and Jiujiang Incidents in the British concessions, the *Mainichi* (8, 10 January, 25 February, 26-28 February) collected the opinions of several representatives of big business regarding the situation in China. A few stressed optimistically – or cynically – that, since Britain was now the target of Nationalist attacks, Japanese firms would even benefit from this trend. The prevailing view, however, was that the anti-foreign tide could easily turn against Japan as well. The *Asahi* (19 January) summarised in general terms two sets of opposing viewpoints: on the one hand, that the GMD had fallen under Communist control and should be stopped somehow before it invaded the rest of China; on the other, that "reddening" was just a passing phase and that it should not be too difficult to settle bilateral disputes, in light of the strong reciprocal interests between the two countries. The latter position substantially corresponded to that of the government. Minister Shidehara, in his policy speech at the 52nd Imperial Diet (18 January, transcribed in both OM and TA), reaffirmed the four tenets of Japanese diplomacy towards China, namely: non-interference; economic cooperation in the spirit of "coexistence and co-prosperity"; sympathy and support for the just aspirations of the Chinese people; and the "defence with rational means" of Japan's "legitimate and important rights and interests". While the *Ōsaka Asahi* fully agreed with this policy (Gotō 1987, 255), there were also more tepid responses in the press. The *Mainichi* (19 January) observed that the problem did not lie in policy guidelines, but in the actual management of specific issues and incidents. The *Tōkyō Asahi* (20 January), too, wondered how the government would turn its abstract principles into practice.

Negotiations between British and Nationalist authorities offered further cause for reflection. The *Asahi* (12 January), looking at the meek response of London to rampant violations of international law, read it as a sign of the changing times. It seemed that Britain had no choice but to follow a line of non-resistance, as an aggressive reaction would only worsen the situation. The *Asahi*, then, was concerned about the rising voice of hard-liners among public opinion in Britain. In order to prevent an escalation of the

conflict which would further destabilise China to the disadvantage of all parties involved, Tokyo would have to persuade London to abandon all idea of armed resistance in Shanghai; at the same time, it would have to urge the GMD to give up its "fanatic" activism for the recovery of China's international status. Going a step further, the *Ōsaka Asahi* (Gotō 1987, 254) also spoke in favour of gradual restitution to China of foreign concessions. The *Mainichi* (31 January) expressed similar views against the anachronistic recourse to military means, stressing (28 January) that Japan had no reason to get entangled in hazardous British initiatives. In the following weeks, while Anglo-Chinese relations remained strained, the Nationalists seemed to respond favourably to Shidehara's policy of appeasement. The press reported with cautious optimism on the quasi-official mission to Japan of GMD representative Dai Jitao, who strove to present his party as a responsible partner for international dialogue (OM 4, 13, 17 February; TA 18 February a, b, 26 February evening, 27 February). The April issue of *Chūō kōron* (1927a) expressed sympathy for the revolutionary cause. The same magazine also featured two articles by China expert Komura Shunsaburō, formerly an interpreter in the diplomatic service. Komura (1927a) urged Japan not to antagonise the GMD, especially by backing the Fengtian clique, because this would only push China into the arms of Communist Russia, thus endangering the whole world (for a similar warning by an *Ōsaka Asahi* journalist, see Kamio 1927, 118). Later (1927b), he considered several arguments in favour of either direct or indirect interference, again in order to prove that neither, if not actually counterproductive, would serve to safeguard Japan's interests.

However, the ever-widening fracture between Nationalist factions cast a shadow on the prospects for amicable relations. The Nanjing Incident, in addition, was a terrible blow to the image of the Revolutionary Army. As noted above, it also revived doubts about Chiang's ability to enforce discipline. To further complicate matters, in April 1927 a financial crisis triggered a change of government in Tokyo. The new cabinet, in which retired army general Tanaka Giichi served at the same time as premier and foreign minister, was an expression of the Rikken Seiyūkai conservative party. Under its former president Takahashi Korekiyo (1921-25), the Seiyūkai had backed a policy of international cooperation and arms limitation, most notably at the Washington Conference held from November 1921 to February 1922. Since Tanaka had taken over the presidency, however, the party had started to adopt more assertive policies. While in opposition, the Seiyūkai had voiced strong criticism of Shidehara's weak diplomacy (see, for instance, OM 26 January, 5 April evening; TA 1 April a, 2 April; Uehara 1927). This position appealed especially to those industries and trading companies that had direct interests in China (TA 1 April b, 12, 20 April). Hence, the *Asahi* (20 April) did not need to provide specific evidence to claim that the return to power of the Seiyūkai had aroused uneasiness

among the Chinese people. The *Mainichi* (24 April) worried that the cabinet's "positive policy", or "hard policy", might lead to another disaster such as the Siberian expedition (the anti-Bolshevik intervention launched in 1918, which Tanaka had supervised as war minister in 1918-21). The editor conceded that "even if premier Tanaka cannot read the trend of times, he will not fail to understand that such a reckless policy cannot receive the support of the majority of our nation". The editorial continued with an implicit warning not to defy "the strength of public opinion", since it was thanks to the latter's support for parliamentary practice that the Seiyūkai had been reinstated smoothly to government.[9] In conclusion, Japan was to intervene in the Chinese crisis only by providing "moral support", and diplomatic leadership for all the countries involved.

The events, however, would soon confirm that a shift in Japan's foreign policy was under way. Journalist Murofuse Kōshin (1927, 113) defined this change as a passage from "petty bourgeois opportunism" to "armed imperialism". On 27 May, the Tanaka cabinet decided to send a small expeditionary force to Shandong in order to protect the local Japanese residents. Although ostensibly the purpose was to prevent the re-occurence of violent incidents, the operation did constitute an interference in the ongoing civil war, as the presence of Japanese troops might deter the Nationalists from moving northward. Moreover, differently from the stationing of troops in Tianjin and Beijing, this deployment was not contemplated in any international agreement. Although the cabinet tried to reassure the belligerent parties that the expedition was purely defensive and would end as soon as security conditions in the province allowed (the official statement was published in OM and TA 27 May), both the Nanjing and Beijing governments protested against this infringement of China's sovereignty.

The Shandong Expedition proved a controversial matter for Japan. The main opposition party, the Rikken Minseitō (formed at the start of June with the merger of the Kenseikai with a party seceded from the Seiyūkai) expressed reservations on what it judged a premature decision, and later demanded the withdrawal of the troops (OM and TA 17 June, 18 July). For the majority of the House of Peers, too, the cabinet's initiative was unnecessary and risky (TA 28 May a). The harshest criticism came from the so-called "proletarian parties" linked to the labour and tenant movements, which formed after the enactment of universal suffrage for men in 1925. The Nihon Rōnōtō (Japan's Labour-Farmer Party) denounced the expedition as an attempt to repeat in China the infamous Siberian intervention, and exhorted the people to resist "to make Japan's imperialists capitulate" (TA 28 May b). The Shakai Minshūtō (Social People's Party), which called premier Tanaka "the boss of the military clique for many

9 Komura (1927c, 77) later expressed the same concept in a more straightforward way.

years", claimed that the real objective of the expedition was to interfere with the belligerents' strategy (TA 31 May). Both parties organised public rallies in protest. The reaction of the most radical party, the Rōdō Nōmintō (Labour-Farmer Party, which the government disbanded in March 1928 as part of a crackdown on Communists) is not documented in these articles. Chairman Ōyama Ikuo, however, referred to similar protest activities in a strongly-worded essay in *Chūō kōron*, where he called Chiang "the puppet of the rising urban bourgeoisie" (1927, 107). The *Asahi*, besides reporting on the reaction of political groups, interviewed some well-known personalities (29 May a). Apart from those aligned with the official stance of their party, there was independent Lower House member Ozaki Yukio. The veteran politician, a famous advocate of anti-militarism, voiced his alarm about the risk of undue interference: the army had always been partial to the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin, and "the boss of the military clique" was now leading the cabinet. In contrast, cotton magnate Miyajima Kiyojirō stressed that the expedition was inevitable because previous incidents proved that the Revolutionary Army could not be trusted; those Peers who objected "should go and see China once". In addition, the same newspaper (29 May b) asked the opinion of those whom the expedition would affect most directly, that is, the Japanese residents in Northern China. According to this survey, the prevailing view was that such a grave initiative should be avoided; in case of actual danger, it would be more appropriate to evacuate the expatriates from Jinan to Qingdao.

On their part, both *Asahi* and *Mainichi* were critical of the Shandong expedition. They raised the same objections (OM 26 May; TA 28, 29 May c, 1 June). First, that sending troops might produce the opposite effect and therefore should be considered only as a last resort in the event that all other means failed. The *Ōsaka Asahi* (Gotō 1978, 265-7) expressed the same opinion. Secondly, they argued that the Communists had been responsible for previous incidents, but Chiang Kai-shek had now suppressed them. Moreover, the *Mainichi* (29 May) pointed out that the risk of clashing with Japanese forces along the Jinan railway could prevent the Southern army from advancing in that direction; this would clearly represent an interference.[10] It seemed that the military had dragged the cabinet into action, exposing the inconsistency of the latter's China policy. The same article noted that war minister Shirakawa had already earned the hostility of the GMD while serving as commander of the Japanese forces in the leased territory in Manchuria. Afterwards, the *Asahi* repeatedly called for the withdrawal of troops (12 June, 28 June, 7 July, 26 August). Besides reiterating its arguments, the newspaper remarked that the expedition had

10 *Chūō kōron* editorials (1927c, 1927d) and Yoshino (1927b, 119; 1927c, 92) put forward the same argument.

spurred widespread boycotts in China, seriously damaging Japanese business interests. The *Mainichi* (27 June, 7 July), also, reported this negative outcome. However, at least part of the enterprises involved still supported the cabinet's policy: a group of Kansai-based industries even lobbied for the sending of troops to Shanghai (TA 20 August), as Britain had done. The *Asahi* (26 August) commented that if the cabinet was to listen to this kind of request, the time for withdrawal would never come. The expedition had already cost four million yen: how could the Japanese people bear such a burden indefinitely for reasons that defied common sense? Yoshino, too, denounced the cabinet for its disregard of public opinion (1927c, 91-2).

In the end, it was the failure of Chiang's summer offensive to Northern China that solved the problem. Since there was no more imminent danger that Shandong would become a theatre of war, on 30 August Japan withdrew its expeditionary force. The press observed these developments with relief and criticised the government for pretending that the operation had been a success (TA 1 September; OM 1 October). On the other hand, the *Asahi* (1 September) urged the Chinese authorities to reflect on their inability to guarantee security, as it was this failure which had justified the expedition. The *Mainichi* (30 August), noting that trade in Northern China had declined remarkably less than in regions affected by the Nationalist revolution, concluded that the expedition had "not necessarily been a failure".

6 From Jinan to Beijing: an Uncertain Scenario

The situation, however, turned critical when Chiang resumed the northern advance in the spring of 1928. As the *Asahi* had foreseen (19 April), at the end of April the Tanaka cabinet again sent troops to Qingdao. From there the field commander, general Fukuda, decided to proceed to Jinan, home to about 2000 Japanese nationals. On 2 May, in response to Chiang's pledge to maintain order, Fukuda consented to clear part of the occupied area. The next day, however, a minor incident between the Japanese and the newly-arrived Nationalist troops escalated into intense fighting.[11] The version of the facts reported by various sources since the evening, which the War Ministry soon confirmed (OM, TA 5 May evening), was that some Chinese soldiers had shot at a Japanese patrol when it had tried to stop them from looting in the protected area. The skirmish had attracted more and more Southern forces, resulting in a general attack against the Japanese. The War Ministry suspected that it was a planned offensive (OM and

11 For further discussion of press coverage of the Jinan Incident, see Tamai Kiyoshi kenkyūkai 2015, which was published while this volume was in preparation.

TA 5 May evening, 5 May). Undisclosed sources from Tianjin and Beijing reported that "over one hundred" or "280" expatriates had been massacred by the Southern army in Jinan, and sent gruesome accounts of these atrocities (OM and TA, 4-5 May). The news, however, was not confirmed by sufficiently reliable evidence. Eventually, the consular police reported about 14 dead and over 20 missing (OM 15 May evening), that is about as many as already confirmed by the War Ministry (OM 8 May).

The balance of forces in Jinan was about 5,500 men to the Nationalist's 35,000, but Chiang had no intention of being bogged down in a conflict that would only jeopardise his advance northward. He reached an agreement for a cease-fire and left the city, soon to be followed by most of his troops. However, the Japanese command was not conciliatory. After obtaining reinforcements, Fukuda sent the Nationalists an ultimatum with humiliating conditions. Notwithstanding a partial acceptance of these requests, the imperial army attacked. By 11 May it had driven the Chinese garrison out of Jinan and inflicted heavy losses; many civilians, too, died in the bombardment of the walled city. The expeditionary corps did not leave Shandong until a year later, after long diplomatic negotiations which on 28 March led the Chinese and Japanese governments to sign a statement in which they expressed deep regret for the incident. The task of discussing compensation for both sides was deferred to a joint committee (Gaimushō 1993, vol. 3, 501-7).

The official histories of the *Asahi* and *Mainichi* (Asahi shinbun 1995, vol. *Taishō–Shōwa senzen hen*, 301-11; Mainichi shinbun 1972, 155-7; Mainichi shinbun 2002, vol. 1, 674-80) stress that, though they printed exaggerated news for some days of a massacre, these newspapers from the very beginning condemned the dangerous conduct of the Tanaka cabinet. On the other hand, however, they overlook other problematic aspects of the press coverage.

In the first place, both newspapers seemed to ignore the fact that on 3 May the Nationalist official in charge of negotiating the truce and his staff had been brutally killed at the hands of Japanese soldiers. When the Nanjing government publicly denounced the fact, the *Mainichi* (9 May) only reported that in the United States this statement had been afforded great attention, while the *Asahi* (9 May evening) dismissed it as "risible" propaganda. Later on, the *Mainichi* (12 May b) deplored the Chinese habit of slandering Japan abroad in more general terms.

Secondly, although both *Asahi* (5 May) and *Mainichi* (5 May a, 12 May a) held the Tanaka cabinet politically responsible for the incident, they also laid the blame for the military confrontation squarely on Chinese shoulders. According to the former newspaper (5 May), the Southern army lacked discipline and a unified command. Soldiers involved in the clash, led by He Yaouzu, had already been the perpetrators of the Nanjing Incident. It could not be ruled out that behind their actions there was again "a plot of

Communist-linked military corps to overthrow Mr Chiang Kai-shek". There were, moreover, "many banditesque elements" in the forces under Feng Yuxiang. In any case, this time there was plenty of evidence that the Southern army had acted "in an organised and planned manner", as proven by the deliberate damage to the railway and the telegraph lines. Therefore, as noted by Gotō (1987, 290-1) with respect to the *Ōsaka Asahi*, the editor completely absolved the Japanese army of taking any undue initiative. Initially, the *Mainichi* (5 May a) gave no credit to the claim that the Chinese had planned the attack. Nevertheless, it did observe that the Nationalist commanders had failed to prevent the recurrence of anti-Japanese agitation among the lower officers; this proved, if not their bad faith, at least their lack of authority. Therefore, "the responsibility of Mr Chiang Kai-shek and others is more grave than in the Nanjing Incident". The editor, however, changed his mind after receiving news that on the eve of the incident, officers had distributed hand grenades to the soldiers: this proved that, from the beginning, the Southern army had a treacherous plan to attack the expeditionary force (other evidence was reported from Beijing, in OM 5 May evening and OM 6 May evening). Although Chiang was certainly not involved in this scheme, he remained guilty of lack of control over his subordinates (6 May). The Japanese command, too, deserved censure, as they had been so naive as to trust the Nationalists (5 May b; the same opinion in TA 13 May). In a long article in the same newspaper (11-14 May), Kyoto University professor Yano Jin'ichi repeated similar arguments. Furthermore, he defended the expedition as a legitimate means to protect Japan's residents, and even called for the sending of more troops to Tianjin and Beijing.

Finally, over the course of the incident there was a considerable change in the attitude of the *Mainichi* towards the deployment of military force. At first the newspaper opposed the sending of reinforcements, as this would only cause further tension; although it was Japan's right to demand apology and reparation, these should be obtained by diplomatic means (6 May). Later on, however, false reports that the Nationalists had broken the truce sparked an outraged reaction:

> At this point, the circumstances are clearly a provocation from the Chinese side; there is no reason for excuse. For the honour of our army, this wild Southern army must be crushed with determination. […] Until today, for the sake of Sino-Japanese relations we have called repeatedly for the adoption of peaceful means; but against the extreme affront of this provocation by the Chinese troops, there are no means to be taken other than thorough retribution. Therefore from now on whatever grave situation may arise, and into whatever difficult position it may lead both countries, the responsibility is theirs; we must not endure any more. […] The violent affront done to our army must be swept away, no matter at what sacrifice. (9 May)

Therefore, the claim that "our newspaper since the start opposed [the Shandong expedition], and tried to put a brake on the lone run of the military" (Mainichi shinbun 2002, 1, 682) is not entirely accurate.

The *Asahi*, instead, maintained a cautious tone. Although the sending of reinforcements had become inevitable for self-defence, it was now necessary to prevent an escalation; the risk was that it would trigger a chain of events as happened in the Siberian intervention, with far worse consequences (10 May). In this perspective, the Tanaka cabinet had already made a grave miscalculation:

> From the start we opposed the imprudent expedition; we were extremely dissatisfied with the ignorant, inconsistent, reckless attitude [of the cabinet], as if there were no diplomacy other than the expedition. […] The only reason for the expedition was the protection of our residents on the spot, but if we consider that both residents and Imperial Army got into a scrape and many have been brutally killed and wounded, what was the purpose of the expedition? (5 May)

The editor also expressed concern that prolonging the expedition would not only damage Sino-Japanese relations, but also arouse the suspicion of foreign powers. Although public opinion abroad had been sympathetic to Japan during the incident, there were signs that the mood was changing (13 May).

In this regard, the press survey that Japanese newspapers presented appears inconclusive. Some of the articles cited supported the Japanese position (the British *Morning Post* and *Daily News*, in TA 8 May; *Daily Telegraph*, *Daily Mail* and *Morning Post*, in OM 9 May; *Daily Telegraph* and *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, in OM 10 May; *Herald Tribune*, in TA 13 May evening). Others, however, were either neutral or critical of Japan (*Manchester Guardian* in TA 8 May; *New York Times* and *New York World*, in TA 10 May; the British magazines *New Statesman*, *Outlook* and *Saturday Review*, and the *Berliner Tageblatt* in TA 13 May evening; *Allgemeine Zeitung*, in OM 10 May). The Russian *Pravda* (in TA 13 May evening) of course denounced Japan's imperialism. According to the *Mainichi* (15 May), on the whole, Chinese propaganda had failed to persuade foreign public opinion because the facts were too evident. Although the American press was wary that Japan might use the incident as a pretext to occupy Shandong permanently, Washington would avoid becoming embroiled in the matter, since bilateral relations with Tokyo were too important. As for the British press, doubts about Japan's intentions were more a reflection of the view of Japan as a trade rival rather than a sympathy for China. Therefore, as long as Japan upheld its legitimate rights, other countries would not interfere.

In Japan, though, opinions were mixed (Uchida et al. 1990, vol. 3, 30-3). The *Mainichi* hosted a round table of big business representatives, who

voiced support for a hard-line policy (10 May). The Chambers of Commerce and other business organisations also issued a joint resolution, which urged the cabinet to take effective measures for the protection of national interests in China (OM and TA 19 May; quoted in Eguchi 1973, 358). The Minseitō kept a low profile during the incident, and only on 21 June censured the cabinet's incompetency with a formal resolution. The *Asahi* (22 June) found this response disappointing, as the main opposition party seemed unable to do much more than criticise instead of formulating a valid policy alternative (as already criticised in OM 27 February). As before, it was the "proletarian parties" who took the strongest stance against the Shandong expedition, claiming that its real aim was only to protect the northern military cliques and Japan's capitalists (TA 10 May). In his column in *Chūō kōron*, Yoshino (1928a) expressed sympathy for the brave Japanese soldiers, but questioned the political responsibility of the cabinet, who had underestimated the risks involved in the expedition. He urged caution, stressing that no gain could come from treating China as an enemy.

In the following weeks, attention for the issues left over from the Jinan Incident waned as the Northern Expedition reached its final stage. Fearing that the Nationalist armies might penetrate Manchuria, the Tanaka cabinet pressed Zhang Zuolin to retreat behind the Great Wall; Chiang had already been warned not to cross that line (Wilbur 1983, 706-10). In this way, the Nationalists would win Beijing but remain outside Japan's special sphere of interest. However, events took an unexpected turn. Japanese officers dissatisfied with Zhang had plotted his assassination; they carried out their plan on 4 June, by blowing up the train that was taking the Fengtian leader back home. Zhang Xueliang, who eventually emerged as his father's successor, would soon prove unwilling to accept Japan's tutelage.

The spectacular bombing of Zhang's train warranted big headlines in the Japanese press, but the plot behind it remained long undisclosed to the public. Although in China there were immediate suspicions of Japanese involvement, the main newspapers supported the thesis that the authors were Nationalist agents (OM and TA 5 June evening, 5 June), as claimed by the War Ministry after investigation (TA 12 June evening; OM 12 June; for an extensive survey of Japanese press coverage of the incident and the consequences for Japan's domestic politics until the spring of 1929, see Tamai Kiyoshi kenkyūkai 2010). Journalists were more interested in the broader consequences of Zhang's demise, which was confirmed only on 19 June, and in the prospects for the reunification of China under the Nationalist Party. It was a shared opinion that the capture of Beijing, though a major development, did not mean that "national revolution" had been achieved, even in its military stage; it was still to be seen whether the fragile coalitions around Chiang, Feng and Yan would stabilise or break up (TA 5, 14 June; OM 9, 12 June). Moreover, beyond the Great Wall there was the very real risk of a fragmentation of power, which might lead to disorder, with

grave consequences for Japan's security (TA 8 June). The *Asahi*, nevertheless, reached an overall conclusion that left room for optimism. Although the new government in Nanjing was the product of compromise between different factions, this alliance had more solid foundations than those of past regimes in Beijing; it was unlikely that in the near future internal strife would put it at risk. Without doubt, "The reason for the existence of the Nanjing government and its significance are that it represents the popular will, and receives the people's support" (26 June).

Therefore, willingly or otherwise, it was time to rethink Japan's foreign policy, which so far had been "conceived in a dualistic way between Manchuria-Mongolia and the Chinese mainland". Despite their geography, sooner or later the Three Eastern Provinces would be assimilated by the mainland, politically and economically. Manchuria was "an important 'part', not the 'whole'", in Japan's China policy. Hence, there was no reason to sacrifice the whole for the sake of one part. Japan should strive to solve its problems in China, including Manchuria, by working with Nanjing as its only legitimate counterpart (26 June; see also TA 19 June, which complained about the Tanaka cabinet's poor diplomatic skills). These remarks, for once, were more outspoken than those in the *Ōsaka Asahi* (Gotō 1987, 296-301) in favour of concessions to the new regime. On a more tentative note, Yoshino (1928b) observed that the question of the future unification of Manchuria with the rest of China would depend on the solidity of the Nationalist government, which was still to be tested. He also agreed, however, that Japan needed to "revise from the foundations its general approach" towards China. It was time to abandon the established framework, even if it meant giving up some rights, and build anew relationship based on "coexistence and co-prosperity".

7 Conclusion

The press survey presented in this paper suggests that in Japan the prevailing public perception of the Northern Expedition evolved over three phases. In the first, the rapid advance of the Nationalist armies across the Yangzi region was associated with the threat of Communist expansion across China, as observed in the spread of radical movements and anti-foreign incidents. There were mixed judgements concerning Chiang Kai-shek and other GMD leaders, depending on how close to the Communists they seemed to stand. The breakup of the United Front in the spring of 1927, which marked the start of the second phase, led to a positive reevaluation of Chiang's leadership. Opinions regarding the GMD, nevertheless, remained charged with criticism for its factional divisions, which were dragging the party into a process of 'warlordisation'. In the last phase, the campaign that led to the capture of Beijing stirred ambivalent feelings

towards the Nationalist government. On the one hand, there was hope for a return of stability in China after many years of civil war. On the other, besides persisting scepticism regarding the GMD's potential to achieve this goal, there was concern for the future of Sino-Japanese relations under the new regime. While the Jinan Incident again sparked doubts about Chiang's ability to exert control over his troops and eradicate Communist infiltration, the Nationalist advance to the borders of Manchuria brought to the forefront the issue of Japan's "special interests" in China, which remained an open question.

Although this progression of the debate basically matches the findings of Matsushige (2013), sources examined here show that responses to the Northern Expedition were more articulate. Matsushige (54) focuses on the sense of threat to national interests that prevailed after the Jinan Incident, and claims that expectations for government protection paved the way for popular endorsement of the occupation of Manchuria. The mainstream press, however, was still far from supporting a military solution to international problems; even its judgement of Tanaka's "positive policy" was severe. There was a significant difference, nevertheless, between the attitude of the two *Asahi* and the *Mainichi*. The former, while acknowledging the many shortcomings of the Nationalist Party, saw no viable alternative for the stabilisation of China, and stressed the need for sound dialogue between Nanjing and Tokyo in the interests of both countries. Although the *Ōsaka Asahi* was usually more forward-looking than its Tokyo partner, in the end the two reached similar conclusions.

The *Mainichi*, on the other hand, developed a pessimistic view of Nationalist leadership, which seemed bound to become just another incarnation of warlordism. Moreover, if only briefly, it shifted from a moderate to a hard-line stance during the fighting in Jinan. That the same incident exposed the weakness of both *Asahi* and *Mainichi* in reacting to the manipulation of news by the Japanese military – as again after the killing of Zhang Zuolin, should not, however, be underestimated. Still, this does not mean that an insufficient screening of sources would necessarily lead to unconditional support for the invasion of Manchuria a few years later. It is also important to note that in the 1920s censorship in Japan was lenient enough to give holders of opinions that were marginal on the political scene a hearing, for instance those who sympathised with the GMD Left and even with the CCP. Although little represented in the leading newspapers, these views found considerable space in progressive magazines, such as *Chūō kōron* and *Kaizō*.

In conclusion, press coverage of the Northern Expedition testifies to the diversity of Japanese public opinion in that period. While reasons for conflict with China were already looming, there was no widespread belief that a violent confrontation was either imminent or inevitable. Therefore, further research should ascertain whether the shift of public opinion to-

wards support for an aggressive policy, as seen following the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in September 1931, was grounded in a changing perception of China in the early years of Nationalist rule.

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21 May. Ed. “Eikoku no Bukan seifu zetsuen” 英国の武漢政府絶縁 (Britain’s Break with the Wuhan Government).
25 May. Ed. “Bukan ha no unmei: RoShi kankei ichidanraku ka” 武漢派の運命　露支関係一段落か (The Fate of the Wuhan Government: A Settlement in Russia-China Relations?).
26 May. Ed. “Waga kuni iyoiyo shuppei ka: nao kōryo no yochi ari” 我国愈出兵か　尚考慮の余地あり (Our Country on the Verge of an Expedition? There Is Still Room for Reflection).
29 May. Ed. “Futatabi Shina shuppei ni tsuite” 再び支那出兵について (Again on the China Expedition).
27 June. Ed. “Waga shuppei no daika: Shanhai no boikotto” 我出兵の代価　上海のボイコット (The Price of Our Expedition: Boycotts in Shanghai).
29 June. “Bukan seifu: akairo wa usureta ga nao sakan” 武漢政府　赤色は薄れたがなほ盛ん (The Wuhan Government: Red Colour Has Grown Thin But It’s Still Thriving).

7 July. Ed. “Sainan hahei” 済南派兵 (The Dispatch of Troops to Jinan).
19 July. “Bukan de kūdetā: Ka Ken shi jūyō chiten senryō” 武漢でクーデター　何鍵氏重要地点を占領 (Coup d’état in Wuhan: Mr He Jian Occupies Key Points).
21 July. “Bukan seifu tsuini bunretsu” 武漢政府遂に分裂 (The Wuhan Government Finally Splits).
25 July. Ed. “Shina no bunkai sayō: Bukan ha no bunretsu” 支那の分解作用　武漢派の分裂 (The Dissolution of China: The Wuhan Faction’s Split).
4 August. Ed. “Shina no heisō: heiwa wa koranu” 支那の兵争　平和は来らぬ (Military Conflict in China: Peace Is Not Coming).
13 August. Ed. “Kokumin kakumei no shūen: Borojin shi no haiin” 国民革命の終焉　ボロヂン氏の敗因 (The End of National Revolution: The Causes of Mr Borodin’s Defeat).
16 August. Ed. “Shōshi no intai: Bukan Nankin ha dakyō no gisei” 蒋氏の引退　武漢南京派妥協の犠牲 (Mr Chiang’s Retirement: A Victim of Compromise between Wuhan and Nanjing Factions).
30 August. Ed. “Santō teppei no gi: kore mata tōzen” 山東撤兵の議　これ亦当然 (The Opinion for the Withdrawal of Troops: It Is with Good Reason).
22 September. “Nankin seifu no nayami: Tō Seichi shi Bukan ni tachikomoru” 南京政府の悩み　唐生智氏武漢に立籠る (The Worries of the Nanjing Government: Mr Tang Shengzhi Shuts Himself in Wuhan).
24 September. Ed. “Shin Nankin seifu: sono shōrai ikan” 新南京政府　その将来如何 (The New Nanjing Government: What Future?).
1 October. Ed. “Handō jidai rai: gen naikaku gaikō” 反動時代来　現内閣の外交 (Coming of the Reactionary Age: The Present Cabinet’s Foreign Policy).
4 October. Ed. “Mata ugokidaseru Shina no keisei” 又動き出せる支那の形勢 (China’s Situation Can Move On Again).
28 October. Ed. “Kateru Hōten gun: Chō shi no chii” 勝てる奉天軍　張氏の地位 (The Fengtian Army May Win: Mr Zhang’s Position).
7 December. “Kokumintō zentai kaigi wa jijitsujō ketsuretsu shita” 国民党全体会議は事実上決裂した (The Nationalist Party General Congress Has Actually Fallen Apart).
12 December. “Shō shi no deyō hitotsu” 蒋氏の出様一つ (Mr Chiang’s Attitude Is One).
14 December. Ed. “Kanton no bōdō to kyōsantō” 広東の暴動と共産党 (The Canton Insurrection and the Communist Party).
16 December. Ed. “NanShi tōitsu nan: jijō iyoiyo fukuzatsu” 南支統一難　事情愈複雑 (Unification of South China Is Difficult: The Situation Gets Complicated).
19 December. Ed. “Nanboku bunritsu no dairiyū shōmetsu: tōitsu no shinkikai” 南北分立の大理由消滅　統一の新機械 (The Big Reason for the North-South Split Has Disappeared: A New Chance for Unification).

29 December. Ed. “Shina wa doko e iku: naisō ni toshi kureru” 支那は何処へ行く　内争に年暮る (Where Is China Going? The Year Closes on Civil War).

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27 February. Ed. “TaiShi seisaku no teiton: mui no tōkyokusha musaku no hantaitō” 対支政策の停頓　無為の当局者　無策の反対党 (China Policy at a Standstill: Idle Government, Clueless Opposition).
5 May a. Ed. “Nisshi hei no shōtotsu: Shina gawa no sekinin jūdai” 日支兵の衝突　支那側の責任重大 (Clash of Japanese and Chinese Soldiers: Grave Responsibility on China’s Side).
5 May b. Ed. “Shuppei mokuteki no bōkyaku” 出兵目的の忘却 (Expedition’s Purpose in Oblivion).
6 May. Ed. “Sainan jiken zengo: saizen no doryoku o yō su” 済南事件善後　最善の努力を要す (Settlement of the Jinan Incident: Utmost Effort Required).
9 May. Ed. “Waga gun ni taisuru chōsen: tetteiteki yōchō o kise” 我軍に対する挑戦　徹底的膺懲を期せ (A Challenge to Our Army: Go for Thorough Punishment).
11-14 May. Yano Jin’ichi 矢野仁一. “Sainan jiken no ikkōsatsu” 済南事件の一考察 (Considerations on the Jinan Incident).
12 May a. Ed. “Soku ni sennin gaishō o oke” 即に専任外相を置 (Appoint Immediately a Full-Time Foreign Minister!).
12 May b. Ed. “Shina no gyaku senden: keikai o yō su” 支那の逆宣伝　警戒を要す (China’s Counter-Propaganda: Caution Required).
15 May. Ed. “Sainan jiken no taigai hankyō” 済南事件の対外反響 (Foreign Responses to the Jinan Incident).
9 June. Ed. “Shina kakumei undō no zento” 支那革命運動の前途 (The Outlook for China’s Revolutionary Movement).
12 June. Ed. “Shō Kaisekishi no shintai: ken ni nite obietaru mono ka”蒋介石氏の進退　賢に似て怯たるものか (Mr Chiang Kai-shek’s Course of Action: Looks Smart But Is He Scared?).

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3 April. “Kanton wa shibaraku onkenha no tenka” 広東派暫く穏健派の天下 (For the Time Being Canton Is the Realm of the Moderate Faction).
19 April. “Kanton wa izen sakeiha yūsei” 広東は依然左傾派優勢 (In Canton the Leftist Faction Still Prevails).
21 April. “Kanton no ryōha antō o tsuzuku” 広東の両派暗闘を続く (Secret Feud between Factions in Canton Continues).

6 July. Ed. “Kanzei kaigi no chūzetsu” 関税会議の中絶 (Interruption of the Tariff Conference).
21 July. Ed. “Shina jikyoku no jūdaisei” 支那時局の重大性 (The Gravity of the Situation in China).
17 August. Ed. “Shina gunbatsu no sansukumi” 支那軍閥の三すくみ (A Three-Way Deadlock for China’s Military Cliques).
14 September. Ed. “Kakumei seiryoku no shinten” 革命勢力の進展 (The Advance of the Revolutionary Forces).
30 November. Ed. “Shina sekka no taisei” 支那赤化の大勢 (The Trend for China’s Reddening).
15 December. Ed. “Shina jikyoku to Nihon” 支那時局と日本 (China’s Situation and Japan).

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3-8 January. Negishi Tadashi 根岸佶. “Hokubatsugun to sekka” 北伐軍と赤化 (The Northern Expedition Army and Reddening).
12 January. Ed. “Kyōkōna Shina no taigai taido” 強硬な支那の対外態度 (The Foreign Policy Attitude of Hard-Line China).
19 January. “Kokumin seifu to wa nanzo ya: kōsubeki ka haisubeki ka” 国民政府とは何ぞや　興すべきか排すべきか (What Is the Nationalist Government? Should It Be Supported, or Should It Be Rejected?).
20 January. Ed. “Shina mondai no kongo” 支那問題の今後 (The China Question Hereafter).
27 February. Ed. “Nanpō Shina no shisetsu: Tai shi kitaru” 南方支那の使節　戴氏来たる (Southern China’s Envoy: Mr Dai Has Come).
1 March evening. “Yōyaku rokotsu to natta kokumin seifu no nairin kenka” 漸く露骨となった国民政府の内輪喧嘩 (Internecine Struggle in the Nationalist Government Has Finally Become Plain).
6 March. Ed. “Nanpō chūshin seiryoku no dōyō” 南方中心勢力の動揺 (Trembling at the Core of Southern Power).
16 March. “Shō Kaiseki shi wa mattaku koritsu” 蔣介石氏は全く孤立 (Mr Chiang Kai-shek Completely Isolated).
24 March. “Tō shi Nanshō ha ni kishite:Kankō no keisei kyūten su” 唐氏南昌派に帰して　漢口の形勢急転す (Mr Tang Returning to the Nanchang Faction: Reversal of Forces in Hankou).
27 March. Ed. “Nankin jiken no kaiketsu” 南京事件の解決 (Solution of the Nanjing Incident).
5 April. Ed. “Kankō no bōdō: Nihon seifu no sekinin” 漢口の暴動　日本政府の責任 (Violence in Hankou: The Responsibility of Japan’s Government).
13 April. Ed. “Shō shi no kūdetā” 蔣氏のクーデター (Mr Chiang’s Coup d’État).

30 April. Ed. “Kokumin kakumei no jisatsu: kongo no kōsei ikan” 国民革命の自殺　今後の更生如何 (The Suicide of Nationalist Revolution: Shall There Be a Rebirth?).
24 May. Ed. “Shina jikyoku no henka: kyōsan ha to Hōten ha” 支那時局の変化　共産派と奉天派 (Changes in China’s Situation: The Communist Faction and the Fengtian Faction).
28 May. Ed. “Tai Shi shuppei mondai” 対支出兵問題 (The Issue of the Expedition to China).
29 May a. “Santō shuppei o hyō su” 山東出兵を評す (A Comment on the Shandong Expedition).
29 May b. “Santō shuppei wa igi jūdai” 山東出兵は意義重大 (The Shandong Expedition Has Grave Meaning).
29 May c. Ed. “Santō shuppei kettei” 山東出兵決定 (Shandong Expedition Decided).
1 June. Ed. “Naisei fukanshō no gensoku” 内政不干渉の原則 (The Principle of Non-Intervention).
12 June. Ed. “Shuppei tachiōjō” 出兵立往生 (The Expedition Is Stranding).
28 June. Ed. “Tōhō kaigi ni nozomu” 東方会議に望む (We Have Expectations from the Eastern Conference).
7 July. Ed. “Santō shuppei mondai: iyoiyo fukami ni hairu” 山東出兵問題　いよいよ深味に入る (The Shandong Expedition Problem: It’s Getting Deep).
26 July. Ed. “Nankin ha to Bukan ha: chōteisetsu no kakuhi” 南京派と武漢派　調停説の確否（Nanjing Faction and Wuhan Faction: Reliability of the Conciliation Theory).
2 August. Ed. “Kokumin kakumei to Roshia” 国民革命とロシア (Nationalist Revolution and Russia).
10 August. Ed. “Kokumin kakumei no nanten” 国民革命の難点 (The Difficult Point of Nationalist Revolution).
16 August evening. “Shō shi shikkyaku no shin’in” 蔣氏失脚の真因 (The True Causes of Mr Chiang’s Disgrace).
17 August a. “Shō shi no botsuraku” 蔣氏の没落 (The Downfall of Mr Chiang).
17 August b. Ed. “Kakumei seikyoku no gyakuten: Shō shi no geya” 革命政局の逆転　蔣氏の下野 (A Reversal in Revolutionary Politics: Mr Chiang’s Retirement).
26 August. Ed. “Teppei wa hatashite itsu ka” 撤兵は果たして何時か (When Shall Withdrawal Come?).
30 August. Ed. “Shina jikyoku to Nanpō ha” 支那時局と南方派 (China’s Situation and the Southern Faction).
1 September. Ed. “Santō teppei o yorokobu” 山東撤兵を喜ぶ (We Rejoice at the Withdrawal from Shandong).
20 September. Ed. “Kokumintō no danketsu” 国民党の団結 (Union in the Nationalist Party).

10 October. Ed. “Nanboku no jikyoku: Kokumintō no kiki” 南北の時局　国民党の危機 (The North-South Situation: The Crisis of the Nationalist Party).
26 October. Ed. “Nanpō ha no tōsō” 南方派の闘争 (Struggle in the Southern Faction).
15 November. Ed. “Tō Seichi shi no botsuraku” 唐生智氏の没 落(The Downfall of Mr Tang Shengzhi).
22 November. Ed. “Kanton no kūdetā: Kokumintō gōdōnan” 広東のクーデター　国民党合同難 (Coup d’État in Canton: Union of the Nationalist Party Difficult).
29 November. Ed. “Shina jikyoku no chūshin” 支那の時局の中心 (The Core of the Situation in China).
12 December. “Shō shi no fukushoku wa kaette zento o sugiru” 蒋氏の復職はかへつて前途を過る (Mr Chiang’s Restoration in Office Exceeds the Prospects).
13 December. Ed. “Kanton no saiseihen” 広東の再政変 (Another Political Crisis in Canton).
14 December. “Shō, Ō ryōkyotō bunri no keisei” 蒋、汪両巨頭分離の形勢(Separation of the two Leaders, Chiang and Wang).
21 December. “RoShi no kankei danzetsu: fukasoku no jikyoku” 露支の関係断絶　不可測の時局 (Severance of Russia-China Relations: An Unpredictable Situation).

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6 January evening. “Shin Bukan ha nari: taisei Shō shi ni furi” 新武漢派なり　大勢蒋氏に不理 (The New Wuhan Faction Is There: Trend Unfavourable to Mr Chiang).
17 January. Ed. “Shō shi saiki no kōka” 蒋氏再起の効果 (The Effects of Mr Chiang’s Return).
15 February. Ed. “Shina nanboku no keisei” 支那南北の形勢 (The Prospects in South and North China).
19 April. Ed. “Santō keisei no kikyū: saishuppei fuka” 山東形勢の危急　再出兵は不可 (Shandong’s Dire Situation: Another Expedition Impossible).
5 May. Ed. “Nisshi ryōgun no shōtotsu” 日支両軍の衝突 (The Clash between the Japanese and Chinese Armies).
10 May. Ed. “Jitai no jūdaika” 事態の重大化 (Worsening of the Situation).
13 May. Ed. “Kokugai shoron ni kangamiyo” 国外の所論に鑑みよ (Bear in Mind the Foreign Opinion).
5 June. Ed. “Shinseimen no dakai ikan: Chō shi sōnan to Tōsanshō” 新生面の打開如何　張氏遭難と東三省 (How to Break the Deadlock? Mr Zhang’s Disaster and the Three Eastern Provinces).

8 June. Ed. “Bakudan jiken no eikyō: jitai kyokudo ni jūtaika” 爆弾事件の影響　事態極度に重体化 (The Consequences of the Bomb Incident: The Situation Has Become Extremely Grave).
14 June. Ed. “Shina jikyoku no tenbō” 支那時局の展望 (The Outlook for China’s Situation).
19 June. Ed. “TaiShi gaikō no kekkan: Sainan jiken o kaiketsu seyo” 対支外交の欠陥　済南事件を解決せよ (The Shortcomings of Diplomacy towards China: Do Solve the Jinan Incident).
22 June. Ed. “Minseitō no taiShi ketsugi” 民政党の対支決議 (Minseitō’s Resolution on China).
26 June. Ed. “Nankin seifu no shōnin mondai” 南京政府の承認問題 (The Issue of Recognition of the Nanjing Government).

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8 April. Ed. “Roshiya no taiShi seisaku: hatashite itten ka” ロシヤの対支政策　果たして一転か (Russia’s China Policy: A Turnabout?).
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7 April. Ed. “Jūdai jiki: Shina sarani midaren” 重大危機　支那更に乱れん (A Grave Crisis: China Plunges into Further Disorder).
21 July. Ed. “Innin gaikō no shōri: Kyōsantō taijō su” 隠忍外交の勝利　共産党退場す (Victory for the Diplomacy of Endurance: The Communist Party Leaves the Stage).
15 December. Ed. “Kanton no kyōsan bōdō: Kokumintō bunretsu no shosan” 広東の共産暴動国民党分裂の所産 (The Communist Uprising in Canton: A Product of the Nationalist Party’s Split).
29 December. Ed. “Kotoshi no Shina” 今年の支那 (This Year’s China).

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Editorial (1927b). “Nisshi ryōgoku taishū no seishinteki renkei” 日支両国大衆の精神的連携 (The Spiritual Connection Between the Masses of Japan and China). *Chūō kōron* 42, 5 (May), 2-3.
Editorial (1927c). “Shina jikyoku no seishi” 支な時局の正視 (A Straight View of China’s Situation). *Chūō kōron* 42, 7 (July), 2-3.

Editorial (1927d). “Seiyūkai naikaku no tai ManMō seisaiku” 政友会内閣の対満蒙政策 (The Seiyūkai Cabinet’s Policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia). *Chūō kōron* 42, 9 (September), 2-3.

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Nagano Akira 長野朗 (1927). “Seigi jindō ni motozuku kaiketsu” 正義人道に基く解決 (A Solution Based on Justice and Humanity). *Chūō kōron* 42, 3 (May), 58-63.

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Takabatake Motoyuki 高畠素之 (1927). “Hiiki yakusha o miru” 贔屓役者を見る (Watch a Favourite Actor). *Chūō kōron* 42, 11 (November), 101-2.
Uehara Etsujirō 植原悦二郎 (1927). “Ureu beki Shina no genjō to Shidehara gaikō” 憂ふべき支那の現状と幣原外交 (China’s Grievous Situation and Shidehara Diplomacy). *Chūō kōron* 42, 3 (March), 105-11.
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Chiang Kai-shek and His Time
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The *Alter Ego* of China
Westernized Chinese Intellectuals and the Building of Chiang Kai-shek's Image in Wartime West

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Abstract Since 1927 raising a positive perception of Chiang in foreign public opinion was one of the goals of the Guomindang's propaganda machine. During the War of Resistance against Japan and the second world war the plan to project Chiang's international image as that of the predestined, capable leader of a resurgent China assumed a global dimension. Westernized Chinese intellectuals engaged in diplomatic and cultural work in China and in the West were mobilized to this end. One outcome of their efforts was the publication of some biographies of Chiang Kai-shek in foreign languages, with the aim of improving the knowledge and understanding of the Chinese leader's personality and historical role. This article puts these works in the context of Guomindang war propaganda, but also investigates how, while presenting the Generalissimo as the personification of the new modern, national identity of the Chinese Republic, they also reflected a broader cultural agenda of the Guomindang, willing to shape Western discourse on China's civilization and place in world history and culture.

Keywords Chiang Kai-shek. International propaganda. Chinese intellectuals. Biographical literature.

In an article entitled "Foreign views on Chiang Kai-shek" and published in the Shanghai English language magazine *The China Critic* just before the war, in 1936, Randall Gould, editor of the *Shanghai Evening Mercury Post*, wrote that "in foreign eyes, General Chiang Kai-shek at the time of his fiftieth birthday is one of the few truly great men of the world" (Gould 1936). In spite of the fact that, as has been noted, Chiang was also destined to become one of the major targets of criticism, political satire and irony in China and abroad (Taylor 2015), Gould's opinion would be echoed by several publications in the following years. Between the 1930s and the 1940s Chiang Kai-shek was increasingly presented to public opinion as one of the celebrities of world politics. China's participation in the world war brought Chiang international prominence that no Chinese leader had ever

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enjoyed before. Besides Western biographies of the Generalissimo (Berkov 1938; Hedin 1939), Chiang's profile could be read in books dedicated to *Moulders of National Destinies* (Soward 1939), to *Great Soldiers of World War II* (De Weerd 1944), to *Giants of China* (Kuo 1944), and *Four Modern Statesmen* (Renyold 1944). He was compared not only to Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, but also to great general-emperors of the past such as Napoleon and Qin Shi Huangdi, or, as did the German writer author Schaub, catalogued among the *Kämpfer für ihr Volk* alongside Mussolini and Kemal Ataturk (Schaub 1938). Most of these writings celebrated his stature as a leader, and as a symbol of a new China ready to take its place in the circle of modern, progressive nations.

Raising a positive perception of Chiang in foreign public opinion was certainly one of the goals of the Guomindang's propaganda machine, which was also engaged in building up the personality cult surrounding Chiang in China during the Nanjing decade (Taylor 2006). Nevertheless, it was during the War of Resistance against Japan and the second world war that the plan to project Chiang's international image as that of the predestined, capable leader of a resurgent China assumed a global dimension. Actually, and especially in the West, the war propaganda battlefront was quite complicated. Besides fighting the Japanese propaganda and gaining Western public opinion's support, since the early 1940s Nationalist propaganda's efforts had to face the challenge represented by some negative opinions about Chiang and the Nationalist government offered by Western writers and journalists more sympathetic with the Communist Party. In spite of their efforts, they were not able to control the flow of images, opinions and news about China's war situation in Western newspapers and magazines. Nevertheless, the Guomindang poured great energies in creating a system for international propaganda (Tsang 1980; Tong 2005; Wei 2014; Zhu 2012).

Westernized Chinese intellectuals engaged in diplomatic and cultural work in China and in the West were mobilized to this end. One outcome of their efforts was the publication of some biographies of the Chiang Kai-shek in foreign languages, with the aim of improving the knowledge and understanding of the Chinese leader's personality and historical role. This article puts these works in the context of Chinese Nationalist war propaganda, but also investigates how, while presenting the Generalissimo as the personification of the new modern, national identity of the Chinese Republic, they also reflected a wider cultural agenda of the Guomindang, willing to shape Western discourse on China's civilization and place in world history and culture.

1 Chiang Kai-shek's Official Image in the West: Dong Xianguang and His Biography of Chiang

The propaganda efforts aimed at building Chiang's legitimacy as the national leader of China in foreign eyes pre-dated the war. It was actually connected to the creation of Chiang's *public persona* through written, visual and aural media. This was a gradual, complex process which started in the 1920s, by the desire of the leader himself (Taylor 2006, 2015). Chiang was well aware of the importance of his public image. He actually promoted the collection and the editing of records concerning his deeds and words, to produce the *Shilüe gaoben* (Huang 2010) for future historians. Collections of Chiang's speeches and political writings, autobiographical accounts, written by ghost-writers, Chiang's personal secretary Chen Bulei for instance, were also produced. The whole process of building up his public image tapped several cultural resources deeply rooted in Chinese Confucian and popular culture but nonetheless relevant to the emerging modern nationalist imaginary in twentieth-century China, such as the traditional moral concept of "enduring humiliation" (*chiku*), the stoic ability to face difficulties in preparation for future victory (Huang 2011).

Narratives of Chiang's life also played an important role in Chiang's legitimization as a leader, making him an inspirational model for modern Chinese identity. Biographical accounts of Chiang served to publicly acknowledge him as a leader of pure revolutionary pedigree, the true heir of Sun Yat-sen, and to promote him as an object of veneration for the Chinese people for his moral, military and political qualities.

The pattern of this narrative was set in the first biography of Chiang in Chinese, published as early as 1927. Written by Qin Shou'ou, a playwright belonging to the school of Mandarin Ducks and Butterflies, it celebrated Chiang's military and moral qualities (Qin 1927). The tale of Chiang's life, from infancy to the end of the Northern Expedition, is actually constructed following the model type of the "rebel-reformer", also important in the traditional historiography but that acquired a new prominence in the revolutionary era (Wang 1990). As with Sun Yat-sen, the rise of nationalism gave new meaning to this traditional type of hero, a personality who breaks the rules in order to guide a positive change for his people. Offering a portrait of Chiang's life as that of a revolutionary hero but also a reformer, this narrative aimed to enhance Chiang's legitimization as a leader China along the path established by Sun.

This pattern was destined to become the model for the narratives of Chiang Kai-shek's life in foreign languages produced by the Guomindang's intellectuals to the benefit of foreign public opinion. In fact, just before the war, the effort targeted at foreign public opinion to strengthen Chiang's fame abroad became more systematic and the first official biography of Chiang in English was produced by a well-known Nationalist propaganda

intellectual, Dong Xianguang. His work, titled *Chiang Kai-shek. Soldier and Statesman* appeared in Shanghai in 1937, and later revised and republished in Taiwan (Tong 1937).

Dong Xianguang, who was known in the West as Hollington K. Tong, played a key role in creating first an informal network and later a propaganda structure. He came from a Christian family and graduated in journalism from the University of Missouri and Columbia University. In the early twentieth-century he taught English to Chiang Kai-shek at the Longjing High School of Fenghua. Dong had been the editor of the English language newspaper the *China Press* (MacKinnon 2008) and later, in 1935, he was chosen to work in the supervision of foreign cable news in Shanghai. In 1937 he was appointed a Vice-Minister of Information, in charge of the Department of International Propaganda (Tong 2005; Wei 2014).

Thanks to his professional training abroad and his experience as an editor of an English language newspaper, Dong was well acquainted with the *milieu* of foreign correspondents in China and consequently able to gain the support and cooperation of Western journalists to address foreign public opinion during the war.

Dong's knowledge of the Western media culture was certainly useful to his work as Chiang Kai-shek's chief English language propagandist. He presented himself as someone who had access to a great lot of information, but, though his biography of Chiang was evidently a laudatory work, he pretended that it respected Western norms of objectivity. In the preface, Dong is lavish with eulogistic adjectives and expressions such as "the greatest soldier-statesman of our time on the continent of Asia", the "Builder of New China, who has successfully evolved order out of chaos" (Tong 1953, xiii). But, for it addressed a Western audience, it also aimed to reflect the author's adherence to professional criteria of objectivity and scientific approach to his subject that he thought would strongly increase the credibility of his biography in Western eyes.

In spite of his official role and personal connection to Chiang, Dong pretended that his work on Chiang was the outcome of his spontaneous admiration for the leader. He affirms that he first had the idea to write such a biography when he was spending some time with Chiang in Xikou in early 1930. There he began to better understand the greatness of the man. During this trip, he decided that someday he would write a biography of the Nationalist leader, since:

> Even in those days it had already become clear that no Chinese in this generation would rise to such heights of greatness as the Generalissimo. Specially during the following six years his life was so full of movement that it would be a national loss if it were not accurately recorded and properly interpreted. Hence the author's present undertaking.

> Aware of the value of self-revelation, the author has, wherever possible, let the Generalissimo reveal himself in his speeches and writings and in his actions. Realizing that, in many instances, by summarizing, much of the essence of the original would be lost, many of the speeches and written appeals to the nation have been given in full. In brief the author has humbly followed in the steps of Boswell instead of attempting to emulate the brilliant biographers who are the present – perhaps passing – vogue. Though only a pedestrian performance, this biography claims to be truthful – some may think unnecessarily truthful. (Tong 1953, xvi-xvii)

As an official biography Dong chose to reproduce *verbatim*, as much as possible, the words of the Generalissimo. According to him, this proved necessary in order to dispel the rumours and gossip which surrounded the leader's personal history. The true nature of the man was simply buried in his own deeds and his words. But, in order to be more persuasive he chose to dedicate more space to the impressions and ideas of Chiang offered by foreigners themselves, making use of these sources to build an image of a national leader which could be convincing in Western eyes.

> In many cases stress has been laid upon the reaction to the Generalissimo's policy and personality by foreign correspondents in China and other foreigners. This was deliberate. In the nature of things articulate Chinese are either pro- or anti-Chiang. The foreigner is able to take a detached and objective view of matters which are of vital personal concern to the Chinese, and regarding which the Chinese could hardly be expected to be entirely free from partiality or prejudices. (Tong 1953, xvii)

Dong's biography concentrates mainly on Chiang's career as a military and political leader. Being an authorized and official source as regards the leader's life and thoughts, consistently with Chiang's aspiration to act and to be considered as a "Confucian scholar-soldier" (Taylor 2009, 38), Dong's main concern was to persuade the Western reader that Chiang was the product of the best of China's tradition, but also that as a leader he was different from the stereotypical Asian despot. Dong Xianguang's Chiang was physically and psychologically strong, never ambiguous in his speech and thought, never opportunistic and completely trustworthy. He embodied a new kind of Chinaman, who could meet the expectations of Westerners. But his personality was, at any rate, deeply rooted in the great moral and spiritual tradition of Chinese civilization. Chiang's main features were actually his strong will, self-discipline and perseverance. His leadership was that of "a man fitted by nature and training successfully to guide the Chinese people to a happier and fuller life" (Tong 1953, xx), but Chiang's life was that of a 'self-made' leader, who had acquired that position for his merits and capacities in politics and war:

> Chiang devoted a score of years to training himself for the role of leadership. He had hardened his body, and had schooled himself to endurance. He had gained not only book knowledge, but the knowledge of practical military and political affairs that had enabled him to graduate with honors from the University of Experience. (Tong 1953, xvi)

His leadership and strong personality were not surprising considering the roots of his moral qualities and his greatness. Dong informed the readers that "the key to much that is obscured in the development of Chiang's powerful character is revealed by an understanding of: 1) his family influence, 2) the historical setting of his time of birth and, 3), his early topographical surroundings" (Tong 1953, 2; on the importance of his provincial origins in analysis of Chiang see Taylor, Huang 2012, 103). It was within his family and native community that his basic moral values – such as total commitment to the public good – had been preserved and learnt. Dong emphasized that most of Chiang's political actions were just the reflection of his adherence to a set of values channelled in the pursuit of the public good, and not of personal power. Even political and military defeats provided occasion to show this commitment. Dong dedicates several pages to Chiang's temporary retreat from the political scene after the Shanghai repression in 1927, when he moved to a Buddhist temple in Xikou. The biographer explains that this was a chance for the Generalissimo to show how he was always motivated by the highest dedication to the public interest.

> Why Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, at the seeming apex of his military career, accepted retirement so submissively will seem inexplicable to many readers. Throughout his career, Chiang has always been willing to eliminate himself when others felt he had become an obstacle to unity. (Tong 1953, 92)

In order to justify this interpretation, Dong recalls the impressions of foreign journalists who went to interview Chiang and discovered an inspired, sober and strong leader for China and not a power-hungry militarist.

> Attired in a long grey gown, he might well have been a monk in this setting, but his steady eyes and stern, clear-cut features, and his erect military bearing, indicated the soldier he is. (Tong 1953, 96)

> His words were never vague and one could not help but feel that his mind worked fast and clearly. Here indeed has a strong character, a leader of the type that China needs so badly; and one could not doubt his sincerity. (Tong 1953, 98)

According to Dong Xianguang, even Chiang's conversion to Christianity was first of all an example of the high moral qualities and strength of his personality. What counted was that, in the practice of his Christian faith, Chiang showed the same serious attitude he possessed in the political and military field.

> It was characteristic of Chiang in deciding to become a Christian, he was to follow the act by whole-hearted consecration to his new creed. To Chiang, Christianity has been an inspiration which he has carried devoutly into his daily life. After entering the Christian faith he set aside inviolably a portion of each day which he devotes to solitary prayers and devotions. Not even the most urgent State business has permitted to interrupt him doing his prayer period. To Chiang, Christianity has been not a thing of rituals, but a deep personal experience. Although he was to be the ruler of a largely non-Christian nation, he has never permitted opportunistic considerations to silence his public participation in Christian activities, nor his public avowals of his religion. (Tong 1953, 104)

Dong's biography of Chiang was explicitly a mirror of the leader's self-representation on the public stage. As a product of a man of the Guomindang's propaganda apparatus, this official portrait was evidently consistent with the message Chiang himself aspired to convey to the international public opinion: Chiang was a trustworthy leader, deserving respect, admiration and political support, able to think and act for his people's sake. Moreover he was able to guide the Chinese to develop those virtues –such as self-discipline and endurance – which lay at the very heart of his rise as the Chinese national military and political leader, but which were also fundamental for creating a rejuvenated and strong China. These virtues were rooted in Chinese tradition, which was consistent with the goal of modernization and were the foundation of Chinese national identity.

This official work, which transformed a "soldier" in a political leader and a moral guide for all the Chinese nation, was further elaborated in some biographies of Chiang Kai-shek written by Westernized Chinese intellectuals abroad.

These biographies were based on official sources and did not contravene the directives of Nationalist official propaganda, as they were also connected to the Nationalist diplomatic networks. Nevertheless, though their authors shared the same goal of Dong's biography, they conceived their mission as that of 'cultural brokers' between China and the West. The portrait of the leader they built served to celebrate Chiang, but it also revealed their own aspiration to shape the cultural identity of their country in the global discourse about China.

2 The Sustaining Power of the Past: Zhang Xinhai's *Asia's Man of Destiny*

Exploring the moral and cultural dimensions of Chiang's personality and life and elevating him to the "epitome of his race" (Chang 1944, x) was the fundamental concern of the biography written by Zhang Xinhai (Chang Hsin-Hai) and published in New York in 1944 under the title *Chiang Kai-shek. Asia's Man of Destiny*.

Zhang was a Westernized intellectual, whose career concerns lay mostly in Nationalist bureaucracy for foreign relations. Zhang had studied in Shanghai and later obtained a Ph.D. in English Literature from Harvard in 1922. As one of the founders of the liberal magazine *The China Critic*, he was close to famous liberal cosmopolitan intellectuals like Lin Yutang (Sima 2012). But from the early 1920s, he became involved in diplomacy, though he also taught English Literature at Beijing University. In 1928, he accepted a post for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving in Portugal and Poland as Ambassador. He was back in Nanjing in 1933, where he taught English literature. In 1942 he was sent to the United States to contribute to Chinese cultural diplomacy efforts during the war. Actually, he was Song Ziwen's man, Song being at that time Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Chinese Embassy in Washington (Wu 1993).

Zhang's biography of Chiang seems to have enjoyed quite a large circulation, since it was translated into German in 1945 in Zurich, in French in 1946 and – with a different title – in Danish in 1947. As the author explains in his long introduction, it sprang from the decision to satisfy the several requests received from foreign friends upon his arrival in the United States. There Zhang had realized that "in spite of the many channels of information which were open to the American public, the understanding of China and things Chinese was both limited and quite often inaccurate" (Chang 1944, i). There was great curiosity surrounding China and especially regarding Chiang Kai-shek, but, as Zhang emphasized, "only one of Chiang Kai-shek's own countrymen, who was at the same time familiar with the West and its literature and history, should undertake the task" (ix) of satisfying their curiosity. As foreign friends reminded him that "Surely it should be your duty to bring us and the Western world nearer to him and him to us" (ix), Zhang had decided to study the subject and write a book about Chiang Kai-shek.

Hoping to bridge the gap between the West and China's leader, and at the same to project a positive image of China to educated American public opinion, Zhang also wanted his work to have a literary value, taking as his model the English biographer, Lytton Strachey. Actually, Zhang's goals were greater than just to offer a narrative of the main events in the Generalissimo's life. He wanted to provide the reader with an erudite, yet readable introduction to the links binding Chiang, Chinese civilization and

Sun Yat-sen, presenting Chiang as the champion of Chinese traditional virtues and the finest interpreter of Chinese nationalism and modern transformation. In his biography, therefore, are long digressions into Chinese history from the Opium Wars, the unequal treaties and especially Sun Yat-sen and his ideas.

Aware of the relevance that the ideal of "democracy" could have in the American readership's eyes, Zhang described Chiang as the only leader capable of putting into practice Sun Yat-sen's political thought and plans, building a "social democracy in which constitutional powers will, accordingly to old Chinese conceptions, reside in the people and thereby create a perfect State" (Chang 1944, 143). This perfect State was inherently democratic, since, as Zhang argues, democracy was ever the essence of Chinese political thought from antiquity. Drawing upon from Sun's teachings, Chiang was driving his people towards a future of progress and democracy based on the spiritual legacy of ancient Chinese tradition. This was the newest and greatest contribution of the man, and an intellectual and political challenge of global relevance.

Aspiring to make of Chiang's life an exemplary tale of Chinese virtues, Zhang divides his narrative into three parts evoking fundamental Chinese values: "Devotion", Chiang's infancy and youth, "Loyalty", Chiang's experience in the Republican and Nationalist revolutions, and lastly, "Fulfilment", Chiang's history and role after the establishment of the Nanjing government.

So, the first part is aimed at showing how the young orphan Chiang was respectful and devoted to family traditional values, under the enlightened guide of his mother and his grandfather, studied and worked hard to succeed and began to nourish patriotic feelings inspired by national military and patriotic heroes such as Yue Fei.

The second part is mainly dedicated to Sun Yat-sen and to the faith that Chiang held in the father of the nation, shown in his participating in the revolution and defending Sun from the Guangdong militarist Chen Jiuming. Demonstrating his military and political capacities and his loyalty to the Chinese nation during the Northern Expedition, Chiang fought the Communists in 1927 to preserve the success of the national revolution.

The third part of the biography is dedicated to Chiang's role as the leader of China during the Nanjing decade, to his plans for national regeneration – from the New Life Movement to National Reconstruction – up to the Xi'an incident and his role during the War of Resistance and further, to the Cairo Conference in 1943. Chiang is portrayed as a strong leader wanting to restore order to Chinese society and culture, building its material and spiritual progress on the basis of the revival of the same ancient virtues which inspired his own life. China, in Zhang's view, was at that time in a state of confusion where "ancient and modern, Chinese and foreign customs were hopelessly mixed up" (229), a problem that Chiang aspired to solve.

One of the main topics addressed by Zhang in his depiction of Chiang is the relationship between Chinese civilization and the world on the one side and the connection between Chinese tradition and modernity on the other. The author's main concern is to demonstrate how China, in order to become modern, should not betray its traditional identity. The greatness of Chiang was to have understood this truth and put it into practice:

> To the student of sociology and history, the interesting question is whether it is possible to create a new and progressive society that can withstand the strain of modern conditions on the basis of values that are an inalienable part of a society that was so radically different in structure. It is Chiang Kai-shek's belief that they are compatible. And I think that he has thus, either consciously or unconsciously, grasped the secret of China's long and vigorous history. The secret is in China's ability to absorb the new into the matrix of the old. The principle of continuity has ever been the most vital principle in the history of China. (Chang 1944, 9)

Zhang supports his argument explaining, for example, the symbolic meaning of several of Chiang's actions from an historical and cultural perspective, though without overlooking the new elements in his style of government. One example is his description of the presidential couple's trip in the Western regions in 1935:

> There was little rest for the couple during this extended tour of the historic provinces from which Chinese culture had arisen and which seemed so neglected. Without an airplane such a journey would have been impossible. It was the first time in the history of China that a ruler and his consort had covered so large an area of the land over which they ruled. It was nevertheless done in the best historic tradition. Chinese rulers from the earliest times felt the need of national itineraries in order personally to learn the condition of the people and to seek the means of improving their lot.
>
> The journey was indeed a historic performance. It had its effect in two ways. The people of China had heard a great deal about the country's leading man, and how they had made his personal acquaintance. At the same time it had brought unity between the different sections of the country, something that had not been entirely done before. But more than that, the journey symbolized the direction of China's future development and expansion. China's growth had historically been from north to south, from west to east. Chiang, in this journey, indicated his intense interest and preoccupation with the development of the country from east to west. (237-8)

The historic importance of the Western regions, the cradle of Chinese civilization, for the future of the country was not ignored by a leader so aware of the weight of tradition. Moreover "it was from these capitals also that the initiative for an intercourse of cultures was made". If China was historically open to foreign cultures and exchanges, the virtues which had shaped and guided traditional Chinese society were nonetheless fundamental to point modern leaders like Sun and Chiang along the right political path:

> The moral development must begin with the word *xiao*, devotion to one's parents. That was why Sun Yat-sen impressed upon his countrymen that the truth of Chinese civilization had its own foundation to stand upon, that it was imperative that there should be no imitation of Western superficialities, especially with regard to the worship of might as the guiding principle of national and international life. (241)

A full portrait of Chiang as an embodiment of this China open to the world but firmly and confidently anchored in its own tradition and values is offered by Zhang in a chapter called "The Sustainable Power of the Past". As a leader of China, Chiang could not simply be understood according to Western standards, but should be appreciated by understanding his debt to the great civilization of which he was the current best expression.

> It is only logical that people in Europe and America should judge Chiang Kai-shek according to the standards which they themselves know best, but any attempt to do so will not result in a complete understanding of the man. He is completely friendly to foreign visitors and his mind is receptive to all constructive ideas wherever they come from. In fact he keeps a secretarial staff busy bringing him information about new books and publications about which he desires to know something. But the fact remains that Chiang's whole background and training are so thoroughly Chinese, and he draws so heavily on Chinese learning and scholarship that it is impossible to conceive him apart from this Chinese milieu. (220)

This because:

> No great leader in Chinese history can have a permanent influence on his people without himself being an example of virtues and qualities which are traditionally considered by the Chinese as being indispensable to such a person. (220)

Zhang informs the reader that, even if Chiang was a military man, his thoughts and actions were mostly inspired by the Chinese classics he read, and by the examples of the philosopher Wang Yangming and the great Qing stateman Zeng Guofan. His strength depended on his spiritual resources.

As a traditional scholar, Chiang paid utmost attention to moral self-scrutiny following the example of Confucius. Moreover, he practiced meditation according to Buddhist teaching in order to purify his mind. Finally, he had become Christian to enlarge his spiritual foundation. Zhang argues that Chiang's conversion to Christianity was not a refusal or a relinquishment of Chinese tradition, but rather an expansion of Chiang's spirit. He attempts to make of Chiang the symbol of a China naturally ready to accept foreign cultural imports without by this weakening her identity. Chiang personified a China even more cosmopolitan than the West.

> Chiang Kai-shek's spiritual foundation will forever remain in the greatness of China's historical past. His belief in Christianity is no conversion; it is enlargement, development, and expansion. If, conversely, Christians are also willing to regard Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism in the spirit for a dispassionate search of truth, then we are on the way to a real universal brotherhood of men for which we have been groping but have failed to reach. We are too much confined to institutions, which are not an essential part of the spirit and become therefore circumscribed in our outlook. But the true life of the spirit is full and all-embracing and welcomes other kindred truths. Chiang Kai-shek's life is a demonstration of this eternal principle. (223)

This feature of Chinese culture, according to Zhang, had important political consequences. Chiang's leadership demonstrated that the greatest contribution China could make to the world could be the importance of moral law in the behaviour not only of men, but also of nations. Chiang embodied the identity of China in the world, that of a civilization whose essence was spiritual and moral, and for these reasons truly cosmopolitan.

Reflecting the cultural nationalism of its author, a Westernized Chinese intellectual conscripted into the service of government propaganda, Zhang' s book portrays Chiang's rise first to the national and then to the international scene as the projection of Chinese tradition onto the world stage. But he strives to persuade readers that this tradition was open and cosmopolitan, attempting to universalise its core values. His main concern was to make Chiang's 'Chineseness' the embodiment of the global ideals of progress and democracy adapted to the national context. Thanks to Chiang, the author suggests, finally Chinese tradition could find the place it deserved in the international world as a lively and worthy source of values and ideas. "It is Chiang's task, thus, to create a new and better China and, through China, a new and better world" (Chang 1944, 9).

3 Chiang and His China in the Works of Xie Shoukang and Lin Qiusheng

The global ambitions of Nationalist propaganda nourished the appearance of works on Chiang Kai-shek in several other Western languages. Continental Europe's public opinion was actually considered just as important as the English-speaking world's for Chinese international communication strategy, and some works on Chiang Kai-shek were published in French and in German by Chinese intellectuals working in Europe.

The first biography of Chiang published in Europe was written in French by Xie Shoukang (Sie Cheou Kang). Xie was another Western-educated intellectual employed in diplomacy by the Nationalist government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and especially in cultural diplomacy during the war. As a government student, Xie had studied political science in France and Belgium, and in 1923 received a Ph.D. in Economics from the Free University of Brussels. He was active in the political organizations of Chinese students in Europe in 1920, and back in China in 1929 he became Director of the Literature Department of the National Central University in Nanjing, before being sent to the Chinese Embassy in Belgium. His career in foreign affairs developed in Europe until, in 1941, he was appointed first Chinese ambassador to the Holy See, a position he was able to cover only in 1943.

Xie was actually a Chinese intellectual astride two worlds. His expertise in French language and literature awarded him membership of the Belgian Royal Academy of French Language and Literature in 1946. Author of several theatrical works and essays in French, and a well-known painter, Xie actually contributed with his literary and artistic skills to Nationalist propaganda in Europe publishing, in Brussels in 1941, *Le Maréchal Chiang Kai-shek. Son enfance, sa jeunesse* (Tang 2013). A second edition was printed in Switzerland, Berne 1943, and a third in Paris after the end of the war, in 1946. The book was finally translated into English in Taipei in 1954.

Like Zhang Xinhai, Xie committed himself to act as a bridge between China and the West in the intellectual and cultural realms. In his introduction, Xie quoted the Latin translation of a text by Mencius and made reference to Plutarch to explain how a universal law in History held that the history of a great people was always characterized by the difficulties and problems they had to overcome from the youngest age in order to strengthen their nature and rise to glory. The key factors in the life of the protagonists of History were to be traced in their childhood and youth. Consequently, the secrets of Chiang Kai-shek's greatness were buried in facts not known to everybody, in those early years the West was unaware of. With this book, Xie wished to fill that vacuum of knowledge, making clear how Chiang's personality and leadership had developed from his experience as a child and a young man in China and that these traits were deeply rooted in Chinese tradition and culture. In the preface to the third

edition in 1946, Count Carlo Sforza, Italian Minister in China in the first decade of the 1900s, and also Minister of Foreign Affairs after the fall of Fascism in Italy, seems to have understood the spirit of Xie's book.

> Sie explained Chiang, because he has intinctly [*sic*] felt, as a true Chinese, that a man is what his family, his surroundings and his ancesters [*sic*] have made him. That is why these pages show us Chiang Kai-shek such as he is and not otherwise. (Sie 1946, iv)

Actually, as Xie himself acknowledges, the main source for his narrative was an official one: the twenty volumes of the records from Chiang's diary edited by Mao Sicheng in 1937 with the title *Minguo shiwunian yiqian de Chiang Kai-shek xiansheng* (Chiang Kai-shek before 1936). The content of these published records was revised by Chiang himself before publication, and they became the standard source for biographies of Chiang's early life. Xie claims he received Mao's work from Chiang's personal secretary, Chen Bulei. Though this act suggests that Xie's decision to write a biography of the Generalissimo was akin to an official assignment, Xie affirms in the introduction that the idea of writing it had come to him as early as 1931, when he had the chance to meet Chiang personally.

Xie provides the readers with a long, vivid narrative, in which all chapters are introduced by proverbs or aphorisms which summarize the basic meaning of each section. Long dialogues between the protagonists hint at the author's interest for the theatre. On the whole, Chiang's personal history is again presented as deeply embedded in Chinese civilization. In the first chapter, Xie starts his narrative by tracing the origins of the Chiangs to the early era of Chinese history. Chiang's ancestors were descended from Bailing, the third son of the Duke of Zhou, who established Chiang's estate in Henan. Over the centuries they moved South, producing Buddhist doctrines in the Middle Ages and scholars from the Song Dynasty on (4). Later, a branch moved to Xikou and from that branch, which in time developed and increased in number, the Generalissimo was born. Orphaned as a child, he owed his moral education to his grandfather and his mother, an education inspired by Buddhist and Confucian values. Following their teachings and examples, the young Chiang was slowly inspired by the old masters, demonstrating from an early age his courage, concentration, strong will and respect for Chinese culture.

His qualities as a young man were discovered and appreciated by all the masters Chiang Kai-shek met. They guided him in the study of great Confucian Statesmen such as Zeng Guofan, but also in the discovery of the revolutionary ideals of Sun, which directed Chiang's patriotic spirit towards personal engagement in political action. Breaking with the social conventions of his birth-place, all these meetings and events prompted him to become a military man in order to save the Chinese nation from

the dramatic crisis it had been thrown into by the Manchus and foreign imperialism, but whose deep cause he soon discovered lay in the weakness of its leaders and people.

In Xie's narrative, two main figures shaped the development of Chiang's personality and rise to power. The first was Chiang's mother, whose support for her gifted child never wavered, resisting all social pressures, and above all, instilling in him the spiritual values of self-discipline and public ethics which made him become a great leader. The second was Chen Qimei, who spurred and guided Chiang to become a loyal revolutionary and follower of Sun Yat-sen. The book was actually dedicated to one of Chen's nephews, Lifu, the powerful head of the CC clique. More than Sun himself, it is Chen Qimei who figures strongly in the account of Chiang's participation in the revolutionary movement.

Devotion to his mother and to his mentor, Chen, are the fundamental quality of Chiang's personality that Xie Shoukang chose to highlight and that, according to him, was at the same time the very essence of Chiang's 'Chineseness'. Chiang's greatest ability was his capacity to reconcile his duties towards the family, and especially his mother, and his duty towards the nation. The affection he nourished towards her was the same as the affection he felt for the motherland. He was a good son of China because he was a good son for his mother Wang. When his mother died, he could channel all his devotion into the nation with the same spirit that had motivated his filial attitude towards his mother. In the same vein, Xie describes Chiang as an affectionate and caring father to his two sons Jingguo and Weiguo, the suggestion being that he could well become a good father for all his compatriots.

Besides the centrality attributed to Chiang Kai-shek's family values and personal relations as the source of his civic values, Xie describes the Generalissimo as a scholar, placing great emphasis on his fondness for philosophy and poetry, quoting verses Chiang had composed in significant moments in his life and explaining how the thought of Neoconfucian philosophers like Wang Yanming shaped Chiang's attitude towards life. Chiang's revolution was mainly the restoration of Chinese values, and a strong sense of continuity with the past was the greatest source of his legitimacy as the leader of Chinese nation.

A similar argument was developed in the biography of Chiang written in German by Li Qiusheng, a Chinese intellectual which played a key-role in the relationships between Nationalist China and Germany. The efforts Nationalists channelled towards German public opinion during the war were a complex enterprise which actually reflected the complicated relationship between the two countries during these years (Leutner 1998; Glang 2014). When the war froze relations between Germany and China, Lin strove to maintain the cultural relations between the two countries. Lin Qiusheng had studied Germany, and in the 1930s acted as one of the

most important informers regarding German affairs for Chiang Kai-shek and his entourage. He was a lecturer at Berlin University and Guomindang activist, member of the Chinese Supreme National Defence Council (Liang 1978, Leutner 1998). Besides his role as a political link between pro-China elements in German political and military milieux and Chiang Kai-shek, Lin was the founder of a Chinese propaganda paper in Berlin, the *China Post*, which he hoped could balance what he perceived as negative information about China in Germany. Moreover, from the late 1930s, he wrote several academic works about Chinese traditional culture in German. Though Lin stayed in Berlin until 1941, in 1938 the Chinesische Kultur-Dienst (China Cultural Service), an institute founded by Lin as a tool of cultural diplomacy in Berlin, moved to Zurich. The declared goal of the Institute was to improve knowledge of Chinese culture without any political affiliation, and, during the war, it published several works in German concerning Chinese traditional culture, art and philosophy. Not surprisingly, considering the cultural agenda of the Guomindang's propaganda abroad, political essays on Chiang and translations of Chiang's works were also published by the institute. In 1936 Lin had already published the German translation of Chiang Kai-shek's *China's Unification and Reconstruction*. While in Zurich in 1943 Lin published a short essay under the title *Chiang Kai-shek. Erneurer und Einiger Chinas. Eine Skizze* (Chiang Kai-shek. Renovator and Unifier of China). As the author wrote on the first page, the book had been written for the "sixth anniversary of the Japanese aggression on China" and it was mainly dedicated to explaining what were, according to the author, the key factors of Chiang Kai-shek's leadership and vision which supported Nationalist China's military capacity to resist Japanese aggression.

More than Chiang's life and personality, or history as a revolutionary leader, Lin wanted to highlight Chiang's philosophy of the State and his belonging to the great Chinese political and philosophical tradition. He explains to his readers that Chiang had been able to unite and revive Chinese traditional ethics being on the one hand similar to Qin Shi Huangdi, as a great military chief and unifier of China, and on the other, inspiring himself with the teaching of Confucius, the master who did not create but transmitted the teachings of the old Sages of Antiquity. In Lin's perspective, Chiang embodied the two most important original Chinese State philosophies, the Legalist and the Confucian, which had been the basis of China's past greatness.

This was China's peculiar and intellectually independent path to emerging national strength:

> The new form of government and its creator Chiang Kai-shek because of their simplicity and naturalness could seem not sufficient in the eyes of many Europeans. But in the immense force attached in these simple

> teaching words, you will find the keys for understanding the renewal of China and its emerging form of government. The key can be found in Sun Yat-sen's words: "China depends on its own path and can imitate neither the Western conception of life nor the Western idea of power. (Lin 1943, 41)

Chiang was the embodiment of the true spirit of the Chinese State, a State which was built first on the Confucian ethos, whose values had also been at the root of Chinese military capacity to resist Japanese aggression, a capacity which depended on the unity of the nation. The revival of ancient values had been the basis for the mobilization of all the officers and people for the sake of the nation and therein lay the strength of Chiang's leadership.

> We can see that what the greatest part of Chiang Kai-shek's construction and renewal achieved has been the return of the ancient Chinese ethos in everyday life, the restoration of loyalty, righteousness and concord among the people, as is represented by the promulgation of the New Life Movement. Without it, all the bravery and fearlessness would have been vain. (Lin 1943, 45)

All in Lin's pamphlet, from the reproduction of Chiang's calligraphy, to the few pictures portraying Chiang dressed as an old Confucian scholar, contributed to evoking the image of the Generalissimo as an embodiment of Chinese values and culture. Chiang's power was not that of a revolutionary but of a renovator along the path of his ancestors, a reformer able to drive his people to discover again the source of their identity and strength. Moreover he was obviously a Statesman, since he was fighting to create a strong and unified State, the only dimension within which the Chinese, as individuals and a community, could fully achieve the moral standards worthy of their glorious past. According to Lin, this had to be recognized as sufficient basis for Chiang's legitimization as a leader able to project again the greatness of the Chinese past onto its future.

4 Concluding Remarks

In the propaganda war which China fought during the resistance war and the second world war, the *persona* of Chiang Kai-shek played a fundamental role. In the domestic and international contexts as well, the Chinese leader was depicted as the personification of the Chinese people's capacity to resist foreign aggression and fight for their own freedom against foreign imperialism. Nationalist China aspired to carve out a space in a media landscape dominated by Western media and to speak with its own voice,

working to increase its ability to play a part on the world stage, taking part in the translational debate about the war and especially defining the place of China and its leader in the world that war was shaping.

Westernized Chinese intellectuals working for Chiang's diplomacy were called to play a fundamental role in this scenario to achieve this aim. As the examples illustrated in this article show, the call was effective.

Each of the authors and works considered in this article had received a foreign education at the highest level, in the United States and in Europe, and were modern cosmopolitan intellectuals well-versed in foreign cultures, literature and society. Nevertheless, they did not hesitate to place their skills at the service not only of the Republic of China but of the celebration of the leader himself.

As a matter of fact, the works of these writers were essentially an amplification of the discourse already developed by the Chinese domestic propaganda apparatus aimed at legitimizing Chiang as the central leader of China. The image of Chiang offered by these writers was, consistently with the aspiration of Chiang himself, that of, together, a military leader and a modern Statesman, but also a Confucian scholar, a devoted son, a loyal comrade, a good husband and father for his sons and all the Chinese citizens.

But insofar as they addressed foreign public opinion, these portraits had a greater objective. They all wanted first of all to persuade readers of Chiang Kai-shek's 'Chineseness', not only reversing the perception of their country as a weak, corrupt and divided country, but rather suggesting that modern China's cultural identity and political present and future were rooted in the past and had to be understood on its own terms. The recounting of Chiang's life had to sum up all Chinese native philosophical and moral tradition, but also reflect a new Chinese cosmopolitanism and openness to the world. Wrapped up in Chiang's *persona*, the contradictions between Chinese tradition and modernity which had dominated political and intellectual dynamics since the nineteenth century were to be seen as finally solved.

In this perspective, the leader's life and personality were made a means to at last project modern Chinese cultural nationalism onto the global scene. Actually, these biographies were not only hagiographies of the leader; they were the reflection of Guomindang's attempt to affirm China's importance in the world from a cultural point of view. Emphasizing the cultural genealogy of the Chinese leader and his being the embodiment of the highest values of Chinese – and Asian – civilization, they were aimed at reversing what they perceived as a marginalization of Chinese tradition in political and cultural global imaginary.

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

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